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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19.y] KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653)
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2021 16:02:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210816140240.11399-2-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)

From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>

[ upstream commit 0f923e07124df069ba68d8bb12324398f4b6b709 ]

* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
  nested_vmcb02_prepare_control

* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr

This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.

Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
	The above upstream SHA1 is still on its way to Linus

 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h |    2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c         |   15 ++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 93b462e48067..b6dedf6c835c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
 #define V_IGN_TPR_SHIFT 20
 #define V_IGN_TPR_MASK (1 << V_IGN_TPR_SHIFT)
 
+#define V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK (V_IRQ_MASK | V_INTR_PRIO_MASK | V_IGN_TPR_MASK)
+
 #define V_INTR_MASKING_SHIFT 24
 #define V_INTR_MASKING_MASK (1 << V_INTR_MASKING_SHIFT)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index bd463d684237..5ddf63896d01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1394,12 +1394,7 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (vgif) {
-		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VGIF))
-			vgif = false;
-		else
-			pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
-	}
+	vgif = false; /* Disabled for CVE-2021-3653 */
 
 	return 0;
 
@@ -3590,7 +3590,13 @@ static void enter_svm_guest_mode(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 vmcb_gpa,
 	svm->nested.intercept            = nested_vmcb->control.intercept;
 
 	svm_flush_tlb(&svm->vcpu, true);
-	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl = nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl | V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &=
+			V_INTR_MASKING_MASK | V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK | V_GIF_MASK;
+
+	svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl &
+			(V_TPR_MASK | V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK);
+
 	if (nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)
 		svm->vcpu.arch.hflags |= HF_VINTR_MASK;
 	else
-- 
2.26.3


                 reply	other threads:[~2021-08-16 14:02 UTC|newest]

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