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From: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
To: yuan.yao@linux.intel.com
Cc: Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, armbru@redhat.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, ehabkost@redhat.com,
	isaku.yamahata@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
	mtosatti@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	yuan.yao@intel.com
Subject: [RFC][PATCH v1 00/10] Enable encrypted guest memory access in QEMU
Date: Thu,  2 Sep 2021 14:04:33 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210902140433.12994-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210506014037.11982-1-yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>

> - We introduce another new vm level ioctl focus on the encrypted
>     guest memory accessing:
>
>     KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{READ,WRITE}_MEMORY
>
>     struct kvm_rw_memory rw;
>     rw.addr = gpa_OR_hva;
>     rw.buf = (__u64)src;
>     rw.len = len;
>     kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state,
>                  KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{READ,WRITE}_MEMORY,
>                  &rw);
>
>     This new ioctl has more neutral and general name for its
>     purpose, the debugging support of AMD SEV and INTEL TDX
>     can be covered by a unify QEMU implementation on x86 with this
>     ioctl. Although only INTEL TD guest is supported in this series,
>     AMD SEV could be also supported with implementation of this
>     ioctl in KVM, plus small modifications in QEMU to enable the
>     unify part.

A general comment, we have sev_ioctl() interface for SEV guests and
probably this new vm level ioctl will not work for us.

It probably makes more sense to do this TDX/SEV level abstraction 
using the Memory Region's ram_debug_ops, which can point these to 
TDX specific vm level ioctl and SEV specific ioctl at the lowest
level of this interface.

Thanks,
Ashish

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-02 14:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-06  1:40 [RFC][PATCH v1 00/10] Enable encrypted guest memory access in QEMU Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 01/10] Extend the MemTxAttrs to include a 'debug' flag. The flag can be used as general indicator that operation was triggered by the debugger Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 02/10] Currently, guest memory access for debugging purposes is performed using memcpy(). Extend the 'struct MemoryRegion' to include new callbacks that can be used to override the use of memcpy() with something else Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 03/10] Introduce new interface KVMState::set_mr_debug_ops and its wrapper Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 04/10] Implements the common MemoryRegion::ram_debug_ops for encrypted guests Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 05/10] Set the RAM's MemoryRegion::debug_ops for INTEL TD guests Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 06/10] Introduce new MemoryDebugOps which hook into guest virtual and physical memory debug interfaces such as cpu_memory_rw_debug, to allow vendor specific assist/hooks for debugging and delegating accessing the guest memory. This is required for example in case of AMD SEV platform where the guest memory is encrypted and a SEV specific debug assist/hook will be required to access the guest memory Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 07/10] Add new address_space_read and address_space_write debug helper interfaces which can be invoked by vendor specific guest memory debug assist/hooks to do guest RAM memory accesses using the added MemoryRegion callbacks Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 08/10] Introduce debug version of physical memory read/write API Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 09/10] Change the monitor and other commands and gdbstub to use the debug API Yuan Yao
2021-05-06  1:40 ` [RFC][PATCH v1 10/10] Introduce new CPUClass::get_phys_page_attrs_debug implementation for encrypted guests Yuan Yao
2021-09-02 14:04 ` Ashish Kalra [this message]
2021-09-02 23:23   ` [RFC][PATCH v1 00/10] Enable encrypted guest memory access in QEMU Yao, Yuan
2021-09-07 10:51     ` Ashish Kalra

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