kvm.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list),
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org (open list:KERNEL SELFTEST
	FRAMEWORK), Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	x86@kernel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add warning for CVE-2021-3656
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 18:48:18 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210914154825.104886-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210914154825.104886-1-mlevitsk@redhat.com>

Just in case, add a warning ensuring that on guest entry,
either both VMLOAD and VMSAVE intercept is enabled or
vVMLOAD/VMSAVE is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 861ac9f74331..deeebd05f682 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3784,6 +3784,12 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu));
 
+	/* Check that CVE-2021-3656 can't happen again */
+	if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE) ||
+	    !svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE))
+		WARN_ON(!(svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &
+			  VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK));
+
 	sync_lapic_to_cr8(vcpu);
 
 	if (unlikely(svm->asid != svm->vmcb->control.asid)) {
-- 
2.26.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-14 15:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-14 15:48 [PATCH 00/14] nSVM fixes and optional features Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 01/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: restore int_vector in svm_clear_vintr Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:04   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 02/14] KVM: x86: selftests: test simultaneous uses of V_IRQ from L1 and L0 Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:05   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 03/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: test eax for 4K alignment for GP errata workaround Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:05   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 04/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: don't copy pause related settings Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 05/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: don't copy virt_ext from vmcb12 Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 14:06   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 06/14] KVM: x86: SVM: don't set VMLOAD/VMSAVE intercepts on vCPU reset Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 16:40   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-09-14 15:48 ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2021-09-23 16:44   ` [PATCH 07/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add warning for CVE-2021-3656 Paolo Bonzini
2021-10-12  0:21     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-10-11 17:30   ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-10-12  7:51     ` Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 08/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add module param to control LBR virtualization Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 09/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 10/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested LBR virtualization Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 11/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested VMLOAD/VMSAVE Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 12/14] KVM: x86: SVM: add module param to control TSC scaling Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 13/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: implement nested " Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-14 15:48 ` [PATCH 14/14] KVM: x86: nSVM: support PAUSE filter threshold and count Maxim Levitsky
2021-09-23 16:54 ` [PATCH 00/14] nSVM fixes and optional features Paolo Bonzini

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210914154825.104886-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com \
    --to=mlevitsk@redhat.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=bsd@redhat.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=shuah@kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
    --cc=wei.huang2@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).