kvm.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	<pgonda@google.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 20:43:46 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231220151358.2147066-5-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231220151358.2147066-1-nikunj@amd.com>

Drop vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno pointers so that secret page layout
does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework.
Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno when
needed. Added define for maximum supported VMPCK.

Also, change function is_vmpck_empty() to snp_is_vmpck_empty() in
preparation for moving to sev.c.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h              |  1 +
 drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 95 ++++++++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 78465a8c7dc6..97ff8c28d3b8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct secrets_os_area {
 } __packed;
 
 #define VMPCK_KEY_LEN		32
+#define VMPCK_MAX_NUM		4
 
 /* See the SNP spec version 0.9 for secrets page format */
 struct snp_secrets_page_layout {
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 5cafbd1c42cb..9c0ff69a16da 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -56,8 +56,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {
 		struct snp_derived_key_req derived_key;
 		struct snp_ext_report_req ext_report;
 	} req;
-	u32 *os_area_msg_seqno;
-	u8 *vmpck;
+	unsigned int vmpck_id;
 };
 
 static u32 vmpck_id;
@@ -67,14 +66,22 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.
 /* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex);
 
-static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
-	char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
+	return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id * VMPCK_KEY_LEN;
+}
 
-	if (snp_dev->vmpck)
-		return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+	return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id;
+}
 
-	return true;
+static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+	char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
+	u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev);
+
+	return !memcmp(key, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -96,20 +103,22 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
  */
 static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
-	dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id %d to prevent IV reuse.\n",
-		  vmpck_id);
-	memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
-	snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
+	u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev);
+
+	dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id %u to prevent IV reuse.\n",
+		  snp_dev->vmpck_id);
+	memzero_explicit(key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
 }
 
 static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
+	u32 *os_area_msg_seqno = snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
 	u64 count;
 
 	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
 
 	/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */
-	count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno;
+	count = *os_area_msg_seqno;
 
 	return count + 1;
 }
@@ -137,11 +146,13 @@ static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 
 static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
+	u32 *os_area_msg_seqno = snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
+
 	/*
 	 * The counter is also incremented by the PSP, so increment it by 2
 	 * and save in secrets page.
 	 */
-	*snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno += 2;
+	*os_area_msg_seqno += 2;
 }
 
 static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file)
@@ -151,15 +162,22 @@ static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file)
 	return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc);
 }
 
-static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(u8 *key, size_t keylen)
+static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
 	struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx;
+	u8 *key;
+
+	if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+		pr_err("VM communication key VMPCK%u is null\n", vmpck_id);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!ctx)
 		return NULL;
 
-	if (aesgcm_expandkey(ctx, key, keylen, AUTHTAG_LEN)) {
+	key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev);
+	if (aesgcm_expandkey(ctx, key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN, AUTHTAG_LEN)) {
 		pr_err("Crypto context initialization failed\n");
 		kfree(ctx);
 		return NULL;
@@ -589,7 +607,7 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long
 	mutex_lock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
 
 	/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
-	if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+	if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
 		dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
 		mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
 		return -ENOTTY;
@@ -666,32 +684,14 @@ static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = {
 	.unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl,
 };
 
-static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout, u32 **seqno)
+bool snp_assign_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *dev, unsigned int vmpck_id)
 {
-	u8 *key = NULL;
+	if (WARN_ON((vmpck_id + 1) > VMPCK_MAX_NUM))
+		return false;
 
-	switch (id) {
-	case 0:
-		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0;
-		key = layout->vmpck0;
-		break;
-	case 1:
-		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_1;
-		key = layout->vmpck1;
-		break;
-	case 2:
-		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_2;
-		key = layout->vmpck2;
-		break;
-	case 3:
-		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_3;
-		key = layout->vmpck3;
-		break;
-	default:
-		break;
-	}
+	dev->vmpck_id = vmpck_id;
 
-	return key;
+	return true;
 }
 
 struct snp_msg_report_resp_hdr {
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ static int sev_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
 	guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);
 
 	/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
-	if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+	if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
 		dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
 		return -ENOTTY;
 	}
@@ -847,21 +847,20 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		goto e_unmap;
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, layout, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
-	if (!snp_dev->vmpck) {
-		dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %d\n", vmpck_id);
+	snp_dev->layout = layout;
+	if (!snp_assign_vmpck(snp_dev, vmpck_id)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %u\n", vmpck_id);
 		goto e_unmap;
 	}
 
 	/* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */
-	if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
-		dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %d is null\n", vmpck_id);
+	if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %u is null\n", vmpck_id);
 		goto e_unmap;
 	}
 
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev);
 	snp_dev->dev = dev;
-	snp_dev->layout = layout;
 
 	/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
 	snp_dev->request = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
@@ -877,7 +876,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		goto e_free_response;
 
 	ret = -EIO;
-	snp_dev->ctx = snp_init_crypto(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+	snp_dev->ctx = snp_init_crypto(snp_dev);
 	if (!snp_dev->ctx)
 		goto e_free_cert_data;
 
@@ -902,7 +901,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (ret)
 		goto e_free_ctx;
 
-	dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using vmpck_id %d)\n", vmpck_id);
+	dev_info(dev, "Initialized SEV guest driver (using vmpck_id %u)\n", vmpck_id);
 	return 0;
 
 e_free_ctx:
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-12-20 15:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-20 15:13 [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 10:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27  3:54     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 11:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27  4:01     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-31 13:58     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 10:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-01 11:10         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 14:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-02  3:50             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-02 16:14               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-05  9:23                 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-06 10:04                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27  4:05     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-26 22:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27  4:06     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-01 15:46   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-01 15:48     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25  6:08 ` [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-26  1:00   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27  4:10     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20231220151358.2147066-5-nikunj@amd.com \
    --to=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dionnaglaze@google.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).