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From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	<pgonda@google.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 20:43:47 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231220151358.2147066-6-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231220151358.2147066-1-nikunj@amd.com>

Save the secrets page address during snp_init() from the CC blob. Use
secrets_pa instead of calling get_secrets_page() that remaps the CC
blob for getting the secrets page every time.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 54 +++++++++++++++----------------------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index fd89aca22f6a..6aa0bdf8a7a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ static struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data");
 /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */
 static u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init;
 
+/* Secrets page physical address from the CC blob */
+static u64 secrets_pa __ro_after_init;
+
 /* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */
 struct sev_es_runtime_data {
 	struct ghcb ghcb_page;
@@ -598,45 +601,16 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
 	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
 }
 
-static u64 __init get_secrets_page(void)
-{
-	u64 pa_data = boot_params.cc_blob_address;
-	struct cc_blob_sev_info info;
-	void *map;
-
-	/*
-	 * The CC blob contains the address of the secrets page, check if the
-	 * blob is present.
-	 */
-	if (!pa_data)
-		return 0;
-
-	map = early_memremap(pa_data, sizeof(info));
-	if (!map) {
-		pr_err("Unable to locate SNP secrets page: failed to map the Confidential Computing blob.\n");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	memcpy(&info, map, sizeof(info));
-	early_memunmap(map, sizeof(info));
-
-	/* smoke-test the secrets page passed */
-	if (!info.secrets_phys || info.secrets_len != PAGE_SIZE)
-		return 0;
-
-	return info.secrets_phys;
-}
-
 static u64 __init get_snp_jump_table_addr(void)
 {
 	struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
 	void __iomem *mem;
-	u64 pa, addr;
+	u64 addr;
 
-	pa = get_secrets_page();
-	if (!pa)
+	if (!secrets_pa)
 		return 0;
 
-	mem = ioremap_encrypted(pa, PAGE_SIZE);
+	mem = ioremap_encrypted(secrets_pa, PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (!mem) {
 		pr_err("Unable to locate AP jump table address: failed to map the SNP secrets page.\n");
 		return 0;
@@ -2086,6 +2060,12 @@ static __init struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
 	return cc_info;
 }
 
+static void __init set_secrets_pa(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
+{
+	if (cc_info && cc_info->secrets_phys && cc_info->secrets_len == PAGE_SIZE)
+		secrets_pa = cc_info->secrets_phys;
+}
+
 bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -2097,6 +2077,8 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 	if (!cc_info)
 		return false;
 
+	set_secrets_pa(cc_info);
+
 	setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
 
 	/*
@@ -2249,16 +2231,16 @@ static struct platform_device sev_guest_device = {
 static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void)
 {
 	struct sev_guest_platform_data data;
-	u64 gpa;
 
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	gpa = get_secrets_page();
-	if (!gpa)
+	if (!secrets_pa) {
+		pr_err("SNP secrets page not found\n");
 		return -ENODEV;
+	}
 
-	data.secrets_gpa = gpa;
+	data.secrets_gpa = secrets_pa;
 	if (platform_device_add_data(&sev_guest_device, &data, sizeof(data)))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-12-20 15:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-20 15:13 [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 10:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27  3:54     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25 11:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27  4:01     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-31 13:58     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 10:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-01 11:10         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-01 14:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-02  3:50             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-02 16:14               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-05  9:23                 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-06 10:04                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27  4:05     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-26 22:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27  4:06     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-01 15:46   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-01 15:48     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-20 15:13 ` [PATCH v7 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-01-25  6:08 ` [PATCH v7 00/16] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-01-26  1:00   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27  4:10     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania

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