From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 329FBC33CA1 for ; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:53:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E15802051A for ; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:53:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728244AbgBEJxI (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Feb 2020 04:53:08 -0500 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:41492 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728061AbgBEJxH (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Feb 2020 04:53:07 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 0159oq70033439 for ; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 04:53:05 -0500 Received: from e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.99]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2xyhn2gnv1-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 05 Feb 2020 04:53:04 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:53:03 -0000 Received: from b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.194) by e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.133) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:52:59 -0000 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 0159qweZ43188324 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:52:58 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32AD2AE053; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:52:58 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id CEB83AE04D; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:52:57 +0000 (GMT) Received: from dyn-9-152-224-44.boeblingen.de.ibm.com (unknown [9.152.224.44]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 5 Feb 2020 09:52:57 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [RFCv2 05/37] s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests To: Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank Cc: KVM , Cornelia Huck , David Hildenbrand , Thomas Huth , Ulrich Weigand , Claudio Imbrenda , Andrea Arcangeli References: <20200203131957.383915-1-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> <20200203131957.383915-6-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> From: Janosch Frank Autocrypt: addr=frankja@linux.ibm.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFubpD4BEADX0uhkRhkj2AVn7kI4IuPY3A8xKat0ihuPDXbynUC77mNox7yvK3X5QBO6 qLqYr+qrG3buymJJRD9xkp4mqgasHdB5WR9MhXWKH08EvtvAMkEJLnqxgbqf8td3pCQ2cEpv 15mH49iKSmlTcJ+PvJpGZcq/jE42u9/0YFHhozm8GfQdb9SOI/wBSsOqcXcLTUeAvbdqSBZe zuMRBivJQQI1esD9HuADmxdE7c4AeMlap9MvxvUtWk4ZJ/1Z3swMVCGzZb2Xg/9jZpLsyQzb lDbbTlEeyBACeED7DYLZI3d0SFKeJZ1SUyMmSOcr9zeSh4S4h4w8xgDDGmeDVygBQZa1HaoL Esb8Y4avOYIgYDhgkCh0nol7XQ5i/yKLtnNThubAcxNyryw1xSstnKlxPRoxtqTsxMAiSekk 0m3WJwvwd1s878HrQNK0orWd8BzzlSswzjNfQYLF466JOjHPWFOok9pzRs+ucrs6MUwDJj0S cITWU9Rxb04XyigY4XmZ8dywaxwi2ZVTEg+MD+sPmRrTw+5F+sU83cUstuymF3w1GmyofgsU Z+/ldjToHnq21MNa1wx0lCEipCCyE/8K9B9bg9pUwy5lfx7yORP3JuAUfCYb8DVSHWBPHKNj HTOLb2g2UT65AjZEQE95U2AY9iYm5usMqaWD39pAHfhC09/7NQARAQABtCVKYW5vc2NoIEZy YW5rIDxmcmFua2phQGxpbnV4LmlibS5jb20+iQI3BBMBCAAhBQJbm6Q+AhsjBQsJCAcCBhUI CQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEONU5rjiOLn4p9gQALjkdj5euJVI2nNT3/IAxAhQSmRhPEt0 AmnCYnuTcHRWPujNr5kqgtyER9+EMQ0ZkX44JU2q7OWxTdSNSAN/5Z7qmOR9JySvDOf4d3mS bMB5zxL9d8SbnSs1uW96H9ZBTlTQnmLfsiM9TetAjSrR8nUmjGhe2YUhJLR1v1LguME+YseT eXnLzIzqqpu311/eYiiIGcmaOjPCE+vFjcXL5oLnGUE73qSYiujwhfPCCUK0850o1fUAYq5p CNBCoKT4OddZR+0itKc/cT6NwEDwdokeg0+rAhxb4Rv5oFO70lziBplEjOxu3dqgIKbHbjza EXTb+mr7VI9O4tTdqrwJo2q9zLqqOfDBi7NDvZFLzaCewhbdEpDYVu6/WxprAY94hY3F4trT rQMHJKQENtF6ZTQc9fcT5I3gAmP+OEvDE5hcTALpWm6Z6SzxO7gEYCnF+qGXqp8sJVrweMub UscyLqHoqdZC2UG4LQ1OJ97nzDpIRe0g6oJ9ZIYHKmfw5jjwH6rASTld5MFWajWdNsqK15k/ RZnHAGICKVIBOBsq26m4EsBlfCdt3b/6emuBjUXR1pyjHMz2awWzCq6/6OWs5eANZ0sdosNq dq2v0ULYTazJz2rlCXV89qRa7ukkNwdBSZNEwsD4eEMicj1LSrqWDZMAALw50L4jxaMD7lPL jJbauQINBFubpD4BEADAcUTRqXF/aY53OSH7IwIK9lFKxIm0IoFkOEh7LMfp7FGzaP7ANrZd cIzhZi38xyOkcaFY+npGEWvko7rlIAn0JpBO4x3hfhmhBD/WSY8LQIFQNNjEm3vzrMo7b9Jb JAqQxfbURY3Dql3GUzeWTG9uaJ00u+EEPlY8zcVShDltIl5PLih20e8xgTnNzx5c110lQSu0 iZv2lAE6DM+2bJQTsMSYiwKlwTuv9LI9Chnoo6+tsN55NqyMxYqJgElk3VzlTXSr3+rtSCwf tq2cinETbzxc1XuhIX6pu/aCGnNfuEkM34b7G1D6CPzDMqokNFbyoO6DQ1+fW6c5gctXg/lZ 602iEl4C4rgcr3+EpfoPUWzKeM8JXv5Kpq4YDxhvbitr8Dm8gr38+UKFZKlWLlwhQ56r/zAU v6LIsm11GmFs2/cmgD1bqBTNHHcTWwWtRTLgmnqJbVisMJuYJt4KNPqphTWsPY8SEtbufIlY HXOJ2lqUzOReTrie2u0qcSvGAbSfec9apTFl2Xko/ddqPcZMpKhBiXmY8tJzSPk3+G4tqur4 6TYAm5ouitJsgAR61Cu7s+PNuq/pTLDhK+6/Njmc94NGBcRA4qTuysEGE79vYWP2oIAU4Fv6 gqaWHZ4MEI2XTqH8wiwzPdCQPYsSE0fXWiYu7ObeErT6iLSTZGx4rQARAQABiQIfBBgBCAAJ BQJbm6Q+AhsMAAoJEONU5rjiOLn4DDEP/RuyckW65SZcPG4cMfNgWxZF8rVjeVl/9PBfy01K 8R0hajU40bWtXSMiby7j0/dMjz99jN6L+AJHJvrLz4qYRzn2Ys843W+RfXj62Zde4YNBE5SL jJweRCbMWKaJLj6499fctxTyeb9+AMLQS4yRSwHuAZLmAb5AyCW1gBcTWZb8ON5BmWnRqeGm IgC1EvCnHy++aBnHTn0m+zV89BhTLTUal35tcjUFwluBY39R2ux/HNlBO1GY3Z+WYXhBvq7q katThLjaQSmnOrMhzqYmdShP1leFTVbzXUUIYv/GbynO/YrL2gaQpaP1bEUEi8lUAfXJbEWG dnHFkciryi092E8/9j89DJg4mmZqOau7TtUxjRMlBcIliXkzSLUk+QvD4LK1kWievJse4mte FBdkWHfP4BH/+8DxapRcG1UAheSnSRQ5LiO50annOB7oXF+vgKIaie2TBfZxQNGAs3RQ+bga DchCqFm5adiSP5+OT4NjkKUeGpBe/aRyQSle/RropTgCi85pje/juYEn2P9UAgkfBJrOHvQ9 Z+2Sva8FRd61NJLkCJ4LFumRn9wQlX2icFbi8UDV3do0hXJRRYTWCxrHscMhkrFWLhYiPF4i phX7UNdOWBQ90qpHyAxHmDazdo27gEjfvsgYMdveKknEOTEb5phwxWgg7BcIDoJf9UMC Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2020 10:52:57 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.2.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200203131957.383915-6-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="I0cnfmJnUd5YoLsHwgnKyfsLQ4VdgFDMs" X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 20020509-0012-0000-0000-00000383DAB3 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 20020509-0013-0000-0000-000021C04475 Message-Id: <24c74c31-578f-1387-afbd-b0daddc50e58@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138,18.0.572 definitions=2020-02-05_02:2020-02-04,2020-02-05 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=13 phishscore=0 clxscore=1015 adultscore=0 mlxlogscore=983 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2001150001 definitions=main-2002050078 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --I0cnfmJnUd5YoLsHwgnKyfsLQ4VdgFDMs Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="ZrwNSBofzZnuYTplWjbXBluSLRVg0zvv2" --ZrwNSBofzZnuYTplWjbXBluSLRVg0zvv2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 2/3/20 2:19 PM, Christian Borntraeger wrote: > From: Claudio Imbrenda >=20 > This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cop= e > with secure guests. >=20 > Co-authored-by: Ulrich Weigand > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda > --- > arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h | 2 + > arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 + > arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 1 + > arch/s390/include/asm/page.h | 5 + > arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 34 +++++- > arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h | 59 ++++++++++ > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= > 7 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >=20 > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.= h > index 37f96b6f0e61..f2ab8b6d4b57 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > #ifndef _ASM_S390_GMAP_H > #define _ASM_S390_GMAP_H >=20 > +#include > #include >=20 > /* Generic bits for GMAP notification on DAT table entry changes. */ > @@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ struct gmap { > spinlock_t shadow_lock; > struct gmap *parent; > unsigned long orig_asce; > + unsigned long se_handle; > int edat_level; > bool removed; > bool initialized; > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h > index bcfb6371086f..984026cb3608 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu.h > @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ typedef struct { > unsigned long asce; > unsigned long asce_limit; > unsigned long vdso_base; > + /* The mmu context belongs to a secure guest. */ > + atomic_t is_se; > /* > * The following bitfields need a down_write on the mm > * semaphore when they are written to. As they are only > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/s390/include/as= m/mmu_context.h > index 8d04e6f3f796..0e5e67ecdaf8 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct= *tsk, > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->context.gmap_list); > cpumask_clear(&mm->context.cpu_attach_mask); > atomic_set(&mm->context.flush_count, 0); > + atomic_set(&mm->context.is_se, 0); > mm->context.gmap_asce =3D 0; > mm->context.flush_mm =3D 0; > mm->context.compat_mm =3D test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT); > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.= h > index a4d38092530a..eb209416c45b 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h > @@ -151,6 +151,11 @@ static inline int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long = pfn) > #define HAVE_ARCH_FREE_PAGE > #define HAVE_ARCH_ALLOC_PAGE >=20 > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_S390_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_HOST > +int arch_make_page_accessible(struct page *page); > +#define HAVE_ARCH_MAKE_PAGE_ACCESSIBLE > +#endif > + > #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ >=20 > #define __PAGE_OFFSET 0x0UL > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pg= table.h > index 7b03037a8475..65b6bb47af0a 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include >=20 > extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[]; > extern void paging_init(void); > @@ -520,6 +521,15 @@ static inline int mm_has_pgste(struct mm_struct *m= m) > return 0; > } >=20 > +static inline int mm_is_se(struct mm_struct *mm) > +{ > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_S390_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_HOST > + if (unlikely(atomic_read(&mm->context.is_se))) > + return 1; > +#endif > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline int mm_alloc_pgste(struct mm_struct *mm) > { > #ifdef CONFIG_PGSTE > @@ -1059,7 +1069,12 @@ static inline int ptep_clear_flush_young(struct = vm_area_struct *vma, > static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, > unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep) > { > - return ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)); > + pte_t res; > + > + res =3D ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)); > + if (mm_is_se(mm) && pte_present(res)) > + uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > + return res; > } >=20 > #define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_MODIFY_PROT_TRANSACTION > @@ -1071,7 +1086,12 @@ void ptep_modify_prot_commit(struct vm_area_stru= ct *, unsigned long, > static inline pte_t ptep_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma, > unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep) > { > - return ptep_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID))= ; > + pte_t res; > + > + res =3D ptep_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)= ); > + if (mm_is_se(vma->vm_mm) && pte_present(res)) > + uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > + return res; > } >=20 > /* > @@ -1086,12 +1106,16 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(str= uct mm_struct *mm, > unsigned long addr, > pte_t *ptep, int full) > { > + pte_t res; > if (full) { > - pte_t pte =3D *ptep; > + res =3D *ptep; > *ptep =3D __pte(_PAGE_INVALID); > - return pte; > + } else { > + res =3D ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)); > } > - return ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)); > + if (mm_is_se(mm) && pte_present(res)) > + uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > + return res; > } >=20 > #define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_SET_WRPROTECT > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h > index cdf2fd71d7ab..4eaea95f5c64 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include >=20 > #define UVC_RC_EXECUTED 0x0001 > #define UVC_RC_INV_CMD 0x0002 > @@ -24,6 +25,10 @@ >=20 > #define UVC_CMD_QUI 0x0001 > #define UVC_CMD_INIT_UV 0x000f > +#define UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR 0x0200 > +#define UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR 0x0201 > +#define UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED 0x0341 > +#define UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED 0x0342 > #define UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1000 > #define UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1001 >=20 > @@ -31,8 +36,12 @@ > enum uv_cmds_inst { > BIT_UVC_CMD_QUI =3D 0, > BIT_UVC_CMD_INIT_UV =3D 1, > + BIT_UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR =3D 6, > + BIT_UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR =3D 7, > BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS =3D 8, > BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS =3D 9, > + BIT_UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED =3D 21, > + BIT_UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED =3D 22, > }; >=20 > struct uv_cb_header { > @@ -70,6 +79,19 @@ struct uv_cb_init { >=20 > } __packed __aligned(8); >=20 > +struct uv_cb_cts { > + struct uv_cb_header header; > + u64 reserved08[2]; > + u64 guest_handle; > + u64 gaddr; > +} __packed __aligned(8); > + > +struct uv_cb_cfs { > + struct uv_cb_header header; > + u64 reserved08[2]; > + u64 paddr; > +} __packed __aligned(8); > + > struct uv_cb_share { > struct uv_cb_header header; > u64 reserved08[3]; > @@ -170,12 +192,49 @@ static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void) > return prot_virt_host; > } >=20 > +int uv_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb,= int pins); > +int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr); > + > +static inline int uv_convert_to_secure_pinned(struct gmap *gmap, > + unsigned long gaddr, > + int pins) > +{ > + struct uv_cb_cts uvcb =3D { > + .header.cmd =3D UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR, > + .header.len =3D sizeof(uvcb), > + .guest_handle =3D gmap->se_handle, > + .gaddr =3D gaddr, > + }; > + > + return uv_make_secure(gmap, gaddr, &uvcb, pins); > +} > + > +static inline int uv_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned lon= g gaddr) > +{ > + return uv_convert_to_secure_pinned(gmap, gaddr, 0); > +} > + > void setup_uv(void); > void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax); > #else > #define is_prot_virt_host() 0 > static inline void setup_uv(void) {} > static inline void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax) {} > + > +static inline int uv_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gadd= r, void *uvcb, int pins) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > +static inline int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > +static inline int uv_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned lon= g gaddr) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > #endif >=20 > #if defined(CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST) || = \ > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c > index f7778493e829..136c60a8e3ca 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c > @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -98,4 +100,172 @@ void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax) > if (prot_virt_host && *vmax > uv_info.max_sec_stor_addr) > *vmax =3D uv_info.max_sec_stor_addr; > } > + > +static int __uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr) > +{ > + struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb =3D { > + .header.cmd =3D UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED, > + .header.len =3D sizeof(uvcb), > + .paddr =3D paddr, > + }; We completely loose .header.rc and rrc if something goes wrong and hence we'll have no way finding out what went wrong after the fact. We should either make sure to warn_on_once() or come up with a way of logging that to somewhere useful. > + > + if (uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb)) > + return -EINVAL; > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it > + * accessible to the host for paging (export). > + * > + * @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be exported > + */ > +int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) > +{ > + struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb =3D { > + .header.cmd =3D UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR, > + .header.len =3D sizeof(uvcb), > + .paddr =3D paddr > + }; > + > + uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb); > + > + if (uvcb.header.rc =3D=3D 1 || uvcb.header.rc =3D=3D 0x107) Magic constant is magic We either need a comment, or a constant with a fitting name. That also goes for the 0x10a. > + return 0; > + return -EINVAL; > +} > + > +static int expected_page_refs(struct page *page) > +{ > + int res; > + > + res =3D page_mapcount(page); > + if (PageSwapCache(page)) > + res++; > + else if (page_mapping(page)) { > + res++; > + if (page_has_private(page)) > + res++; > + } > + return res; > +} > + > +struct conv_params { > + struct uv_cb_header *uvcb; > + struct page *page; > + int extra_pins; > +}; > + > +static int make_secure_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data= ) > +{ > + struct conv_params *params =3D data; > + pte_t entry =3D READ_ONCE(*ptep); > + struct page *page; > + int expected, rc =3D 0; > + > + if (!pte_present(entry)) > + return -ENXIO; > + if (pte_val(entry) & (_PAGE_INVALID | _PAGE_PROTECT)) > + return -ENXIO; > + > + page =3D pte_page(entry); > + if (page !=3D params->page) > + return -ENXIO; > + > + if (PageWriteback(page)) > + return -EAGAIN; > + expected =3D expected_page_refs(page) + params->extra_pins; > + if (!page_ref_freeze(page, expected)) > + return -EBUSY; > + set_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags); > + rc =3D uv_call(0, (u64)params->uvcb); > + page_ref_unfreeze(page, expected); > + if (rc) > + rc =3D (params->uvcb->rc =3D=3D 0x10a) ? -ENXIO : -EINVAL; > + return rc; > +} > + > +/* > + * Requests the Ultravisor to make a page accessible to a guest. > + * If it's brought in the first time, it will be cleared. If > + * it has been exported before, it will be decrypted and integrity > + * checked. > + * > + * @gmap: Guest mapping > + * @gaddr: Guest 2 absolute address to be imported > + */ > +int uv_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb,= int pins) > +{ > + struct conv_params params =3D { .uvcb =3D uvcb, .extra_pins =3D pins = }; > + struct vm_area_struct *vma; > + unsigned long uaddr; > + int rc, local_drain =3D 0; > + > +again: > + rc =3D -EFAULT; > + down_read(&gmap->mm->mmap_sem); > + > + uaddr =3D __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr); > + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr)) > + goto out; > + vma =3D find_vma(gmap->mm, uaddr); > + if (!vma) > + goto out; > + if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) > + goto out; > + > + rc =3D -ENXIO; > + params.page =3D follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_NOWAIT); > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(params.page)) > + goto out; > + > + lock_page(params.page); > + rc =3D apply_to_page_range(gmap->mm, uaddr, PAGE_SIZE, make_secure_pt= e, ¶ms); > + unlock_page(params.page); > +out: > + up_read(&gmap->mm->mmap_sem); > + > + if (rc =3D=3D -EBUSY) { > + if (local_drain) { > + lru_add_drain_all(); > + return -EAGAIN; > + } > + lru_add_drain(); > + local_drain =3D 1; > + goto again; > + } else if (rc =3D=3D -ENXIO) { > + if (gmap_fault(gmap, gaddr, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)) > + return -EFAULT; > + return -EAGAIN; > + } > + return rc; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_make_secure); > + > +/** > + * To be called with the page locked or with an extra reference! > + */ > +int arch_make_page_accessible(struct page *page) > +{ > + int rc =3D 0; > + > + if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags)) > + return 0; > + > + rc =3D __uv_pin_shared(page_to_phys(page)); > + if (!rc) { > + clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags); > + return 0; > + } > + > + rc =3D uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page)); > + if (!rc) { > + clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags); > + return 0; > + } > + > + return rc; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_page_accessible); > + > #endif >=20 --ZrwNSBofzZnuYTplWjbXBluSLRVg0zvv2-- --I0cnfmJnUd5YoLsHwgnKyfsLQ4VdgFDMs Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEwGNS88vfc9+v45Yq41TmuOI4ufgFAl46kHkACgkQ41TmuOI4 ufgv7A//QkECPfz1+ErA979xR8X9KVVN/qfQuMVOj7A6VL446tGJG4LoTSE1Xa62 49ItVnvSgwoe2F6P3EKHGjWaz2lTbS2EeJW2Bse7J2v6gZllLjsJt2Kod5MVwMAc q0wPOUxDB3D7C9ZTiTS9mE8Fv+G073iCtuixsqzBFRjQLDFRrkCNu9hH3h07pqiM ungAkdNL2m1O3k2pzXmFv5zJzjnaYHaJsHlkgxc3C+bTa3Df+pkeJqvdaX+wxcqZ SUPNH+jNav89Rvtm5rNpdG6chYT0u/pYLwBcgrW9AXnCE/hypARZu2B9iL/6UceR c3zaKglaJW27xmoRz2g18ij0/8E+O58PzFBmix/3j+Ma1Rz6zOKOLmJ+d8yIiFJ5 zy168WWjw2T8vxzE6zJ4YaUYWk318ZgTe8fHSMHb5im1E4JzpWcqR9qXXrP+tDbI VXTZSTaMMMMK615FNIQlItDMyV5Rm3kGWD/fztLiB9jHlUw1vu/VhNCThPYmwBgt en1mX8hAvPgjFkYUs5oU7AmIt0yHctY1yABv2o9NvQLl6RZvJS6Gq0tx+cq8CpkY tqt0hZGLYGezdjAt9wz1Ak4w76Ctwb6+n1TdhmGj6B3WEYHM113yzlx26BRpY7Te R/Yn97pGvTyZ76dXpI19x22iq5DNrpm8vHALb3B/eft1dNzYAw8= =DVbR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --I0cnfmJnUd5YoLsHwgnKyfsLQ4VdgFDMs--