From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 08/35] KVM: SVM: Prevent debugging under SEV-ES
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 15:15:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <58093c542b5b442b88941828595fb2548706f1bf.1600114548.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1600114548.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Since the guest register state of an SEV-ES guest is encrypted, debugging
is not supported. Update the code to prevent guest debugging when the
guest is an SEV-ES guest. This includes adding a callable function that
is used to determine if the guest supports being debugged.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index c900992701d6..3e2a3d2a8ba8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1234,6 +1234,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*reg_read_override)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);
void (*reg_write_override)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg,
unsigned long val);
+
+ bool (*allow_debug)(struct kvm *kvm);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index f8a5b7164008..47fa2067609a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1729,6 +1729,9 @@ static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value)
{
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ if (svm->vcpu.arch.vmsa_encrypted)
+ return;
+
if (unlikely(value != svm_dr6_read(svm))) {
svm_dr6_write(svm, value);
vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb, VMCB_DR);
@@ -1739,6 +1742,9 @@ static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (vcpu->arch.vmsa_encrypted)
+ return;
+
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
@@ -1757,6 +1763,9 @@ static void svm_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ if (vcpu->arch.vmsa_encrypted)
+ return;
+
svm_dr7_write(svm, value);
vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DR);
}
@@ -4243,6 +4252,11 @@ static void svm_reg_write_override(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg,
vmsa_reg[entry] = val;
}
+static bool svm_allow_debug(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return !sev_es_guest(kvm);
+}
+
static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
@@ -4384,6 +4398,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.reg_read_override = svm_reg_read_override,
.reg_write_override = svm_reg_write_override,
+
+ .allow_debug = svm_allow_debug,
};
static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 46ba2e03a892..fb8591bba96f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7879,6 +7879,11 @@ static bool vmx_check_apicv_inhibit_reasons(ulong bit)
return supported & BIT(bit);
}
+static bool vmx_allow_debug(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
.hardware_unsetup = hardware_unsetup,
@@ -8005,6 +8010,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
.need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
.migrate_timers = vmx_migrate_timers,
+
+ .allow_debug = vmx_allow_debug,
};
static __init int hardware_setup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index a5afdccb6c17..9970c0b7854f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9279,6 +9279,9 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long rflags;
int i, r;
+ if (!kvm_x86_ops.allow_debug(vcpu->kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (dbg->control & (KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB | KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_BP)) {
--
2.28.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-14 20:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 87+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-14 20:15 [RFC PATCH 00/35] SEV-ES hypervisor support Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 01/35] KVM: SVM: Remove the call to sev_platform_status() during setup Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 02/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES capability in KVM Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 03/35] KVM: SVM: Add indirect access to the VM save area Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 04/35] KVM: SVM: Make GHCB accessor functions available to the hypervisor Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 05/35] KVM: SVM: Add initial support for SEV-ES GHCB access to KVM Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20200914205801.GA7084@sjchrist-ice>
2020-09-15 13:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-15 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-16 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 06/35] KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 07/35] KVM: SVM: Modify DRx register intercepts for an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2020-09-14 21:26 ` [RFC PATCH 08/35] KVM: SVM: Prevent debugging under SEV-ES Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 13:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-15 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-16 15:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-16 16:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-16 16:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-16 16:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-16 20:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-16 22:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-17 16:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 09/35] KVM: SVM: Do not emulate MMIO " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 21:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 10/35] KVM: SVM: Cannot re-initialize the VMCB after shutdown with SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 11/35] KVM: SVM: Prepare for SEV-ES exit handling in the sev.c file Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20200915172148.GE8420@sjchrist-ice>
2020-09-16 16:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 12/35] KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 13/35] KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 14/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x002 Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 15/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x004 Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 16/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x100 Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 17/35] KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 18/35] KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 19/35] KVM: SVM: Support port IO operations " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 20/35] KVM: SVM: Add SEV/SEV-ES support for intercepting INVD Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 22:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 15:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 21/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20200914220800.GI7192@sjchrist-ice>
2020-09-15 15:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 22/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 22:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 15:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-11-30 18:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 23/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 22:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-11-30 18:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 24/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 22:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 15:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 25/35] KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 21:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-15 16:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 20:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-15 22:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-11-30 18:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-11-30 19:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 26/35] KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20200914213917.GD7192@sjchrist-ice>
2020-09-15 14:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-15 16:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 27/35] KVM: SVM: Add support for booting APs for an " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 28/35] KVM: X86: Update kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 21:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 14:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 29/35] KVM: SVM: Add NMI support " Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 30/35] KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 31/35] KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 32/35] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 33/35] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 34/35] KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 20:15 ` [RFC PATCH 35/35] KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
2020-09-14 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH 00/35] SEV-ES hypervisor support Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 17:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-09-15 17:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-15 20:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2020-09-16 0:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-13 20:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-11-30 15:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-11-30 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-11-30 18:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-11-30 18:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-11-30 18:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-11-30 19:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-11-30 20:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
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