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From: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
To: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
	luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
	pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
	dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	alpergun@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com,
	zhi.a.wang@intel.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 18:09:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <68b2d6bf-bce7-47f9-bebb-2652cc923ff9@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4a2016d6-dc1f-ff68-9827-0b72b7c8eac2@amd.com>

On 07/11/2023 20:00, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
> Hello Boris,
> 
> Addressing of some of the remaining comments:
> 
> On 11/7/2023 10:31 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 08:27:35AM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
>>> +static bool early_rmptable_check(void)
>>> +{
>>> +    u64 rmp_base, rmp_size;
>>> +
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * For early BSP initialization, max_pfn won't be set up yet, wait until
>>> +     * it is set before performing the RMP table calculations.
>>> +     */
>>> +    if (!max_pfn)
>>> +        return true;
>>
>> This already says that this is called at the wrong point during init.
>>
>> Right now we have
>>
>> early_identify_cpu -> early_init_amd -> early_detect_mem_encrypt
>>
>> which runs only on the BSP but then early_init_amd() is called in
>> init_amd() too so that it takes care of the APs too.
>>
>> Which ends up doing a lot of unnecessary work on each AP in
>> early_detect_mem_encrypt() like calculating the RMP size on each AP
>> unnecessarily where this needs to happen exactly once.
>>
>> Is there any reason why this function cannot be moved to init_amd()
>> where it'll do the normal, per-AP init?
>>
>> And the stuff that needs to happen once, needs to be called once too.
>>
>>> +
>>> +    return snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &rmp_size);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>   static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>>   {
>>>       u64 msr;
>>> @@ -659,6 +674,9 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>>           if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
>>>               goto clear_sev;
>>>   +        if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) && !early_rmptable_check())
>>> +            goto clear_snp;
>>> +
>>>           return;
>>>     clear_all:
>>> @@ -666,6 +684,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>>   clear_sev:
>>>           setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>>>           setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
>>> +clear_snp:
>>>           setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
>>>       }
>>>   }
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> +bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len)
>>> +{
>>> +    u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end;
>>> +
>>> +    rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
>>> +    rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
>>> +
>>> +    if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) {
>>> +        pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
>>> +        return false;
>>> +    }
>>
>> If you're masking off bits 0-12 above...
>>
>>> +
>>> +    if (rmp_base > rmp_end) {
>>
>> ... why aren't you using the masked out vars further on?
>>
>> I know, the hw will say, yeah, those bits are 0 but still. IOW, do:
>>
>>     rmp_base &= RMP_ADDR_MASK;
>>     rmp_end  &= RMP_ADDR_MASK;
>>
>> after reading them.
>>
>>> +        pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end);
>>> +        return false;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
>>> +
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to
>>> +     * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself
>>> +     * must also be covered.
>>> +     */
>>> +    max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn;
>>> +    if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn)
>>> +        max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end);
>>> +
>>> +    calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
>>> +
>>> +    if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) {
>>> +        pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n",
>>> +               calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz);
>>> +        return false;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    *start = rmp_base;
>>> +    *len = rmp_sz;
>>> +
>>> +    return true;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static __init int __snp_rmptable_init(void)
>>> +{
>>> +    u64 rmp_base, rmp_size;
>>> +    void *rmp_start;
>>> +    u64 val;
>>> +
>>> +    if (!snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &rmp_size))
>>> +        return 1;
>>> +
>>> +    pr_info("RMP table physical address [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
>>
>> That's "RMP table physical range"
>>
>>> +        rmp_base, rmp_base + rmp_size - 1);
>>> +
>>> +    rmp_start = memremap(rmp_base, rmp_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
>>> +    if (!rmp_start) {
>>> +        pr_err("Failed to map RMP table addr 0x%llx size 0x%llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_size);
>>
>> No need to dump rmp_base and rmp_size again here - you're dumping them
>> above.
>>
>>> +        return 1;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
>>> +     * kexec boot.
>>> +     */
>>> +    rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
>>> +    if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
>>> +        goto skip_enable;
>>> +
>>> +    /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */
>>
>> Again: useless comment.
>>
>>> +    memset(rmp_start, 0, rmp_size);
>>> +
>>> +    /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */
>>> +    wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
>>> +
>>> +    /* MFDM must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */
>>
>> First of all, use the APM bit name here pls: MtrrFixDramModEn.
>>
>> And then, for the life of me, I can't find any mention in the APM why
>> this bit is needed. Neither in "15.36.2 Enabling SEV-SNP" nor in
>> "15.34.3 Enabling SEV".
>>
>> Looking at the bit defintions of WrMem an RdMem - read and write
>> requests get directed to system memory instead of MMIO so I guess you
>> don't want to be able to write MMIO for certain physical ranges when SNP
>> is enabled but it'll be good to have this properly explained instead of
>> a "this must happen" information-less sentence.
> 
> This is a per-requisite for SNP_INIT as per the SNP Firmware ABI specifications, section 8.8.2:
> 
> From the SNP FW ABI specs:
> 
> If INIT_RMP is 1, then the firmware ensures the following system requirements are met:
> • SYSCFG[MemoryEncryptionModEn] must be set to 1 across all cores. (SEV must be
> enabled.)> • SYSCFG[SecureNestedPagingEn] must be set to 1 across all cores.
> • SYSCFG[VMPLEn] must be set to 1 across all cores.
> • SYSCFG[MFDM] must be set to 1 across all cores.

Hi Ashish,

I just noticed that the kernel shouts at me about this bit when I offline->online a CPU in
an SNP host:

[2692586.589194] smpboot: CPU 63 is now offline
[2692589.366822] [Firmware Warn]: MTRR: CPU 0: SYSCFG[MtrrFixDramModEn] not cleared by BIOS, clearing this bit
[2692589.376582] smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 63 APIC 0x3f
[2692589.378070] [Firmware Warn]: MTRR: CPU 63: SYSCFG[MtrrFixDramModEn] not cleared by BIOS, clearing this bit
[2692589.388845] microcode: CPU63: new patch_level=0x0a0011d1

Now I understand if you say "CPU offlining is not supported" but there's nothing currently
blocking it.

Best wishes,
Jeremi 

> • VM_HSAVE_PA (MSR C001_0117) must be set to 0h across all cores.
> • HWCR[SmmLock] (MSR C001_0015) must be set to 1 across all cores.
> 
> So, this platform enabling code for SNP needs to ensure that these conditions are met before SNP_INIT is called.
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-12-08 17:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 158+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-16 13:27 [PATCH v10 00/50] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 01/50] KVM: SVM: INTERCEPT_RDTSCP is never intercepted anyway Michael Roth
2023-10-16 15:12   ` Greg KH
2023-10-16 15:14     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 15:21       ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 02/50] KVM: SVM: Fix TSC_AUX virtualization setup Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 03/50] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:50   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 17:30     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-12-13 17:40       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 04/50] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:51   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:31       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:40           ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 14:18               ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 15:41                 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 17:35                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:53                     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 05/50] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-10-25 17:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-27 21:50   ` Dave Hansen
2023-12-13 12:52   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-10-25 18:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 16:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 18:32     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  8:21       ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 15:19         ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 19:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 20:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 21:21           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 21:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:08               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:33                 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-08  6:14                   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  9:11                     ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 19:53                     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-08 17:09       ` Jeremi Piotrowski [this message]
2023-12-08 23:21         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-20  7:07     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 07/50] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-11-14 14:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  3:31     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-09 22:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 08/50] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-11-15 16:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  6:08     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 09/50] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-10-16 14:14   ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-16 14:55     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 10/50] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-11-21 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 11/50] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-11-21 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 16:20     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 12/50] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 13/50] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 14/50] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-11-27  9:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-30  2:13     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-06 17:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-06 20:35         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-09 16:20           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-11 21:11             ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-12  6:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 15/50] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 16/50] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-08 20:54     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-07 16:20   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-08 22:10     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-11 13:08       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12 23:26         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 17/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-08 13:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 23:46     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 18/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-12-09 15:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:38     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 19/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-12-12 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 20/50] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-29 21:41     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:40     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 21/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-12-12 17:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 22/50] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-12-11 13:24   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12  0:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-13 13:31   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-18 14:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 24/50] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-12-18 17:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 25/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 26/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 27/50] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 28/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 29/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 30/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 31/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 32/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 33/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 34/50] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 35/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 36/50] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 37/50] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 38/50] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2023-10-19 12:20   ` Liam Merwick
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 39/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 40/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 41/50] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 42/50] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 43/50] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 44/50] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 45/50] iommu/amd: Report all cases inhibiting SNP enablement Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 46/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:11   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 47/50] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 48/50] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:18   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-17 16:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18  2:28       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-18 13:48         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 20:27           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 20:38             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 21:27               ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 21:43                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19  2:48           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-19 14:57             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19 23:55               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20  0:13                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20  0:43                   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20 15:13                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20 18:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-10 22:07           ` Michael Roth
2023-11-10 22:47             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-16  5:31               ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05  0:30                 ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05  0:48                   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 20:06                     ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05 22:04                       ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 23:11                         ` Dan Williams
2023-12-06  0:43                           ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 49/50] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 50/50] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth

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