From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state
Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 08:25:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87cztf8h43.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e0b20c770c9d0d1403f23d83e785385104211f74.1621878537.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> writes:
> When processing a hypercall for a guest with protected state, currently
> SEV-ES guests, the guest CS segment register can't be checked to
> determine if the guest is in 64-bit mode. For an SEV-ES guest, it is
> expected that communication between the guest and the hypervisor is
> performed to shared memory using the GHCB. In order to use the GHCB, the
> guest must have been in long mode, otherwise writes by the guest to the
> GHCB would be encrypted and not be able to be comprehended by the
> hypervisor.
>
> Create a new helper function, is_64_bit_hypercall(), that assumes the
> guest is in 64-bit mode when the guest has protected state, and returns
> true, otherwise invoking is_64_bit_mode() to determine the mode. Update
> the hypercall related routines to use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of
> is_64_bit_mode().
>
> Add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to is_64_bit_mode() to catch occurences of calls to
> this helper function for a guest running with protected state.
>
> Fixes: f1c6366e3043 ("KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES")
> Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v1:
> - Create a new helper routine, is_64_bit_hypercall(), and use it in place
> of is_64_bit_mode() in hypercall related areas.
> - Add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to is_64_bit_mode() to issue a warning if invoked
> for a guest with protected state.
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 12 ++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> index f98370a39936..1cdf2b213f41 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> @@ -1818,7 +1818,7 @@ static void kvm_hv_hypercall_set_result(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 result)
> {
> bool longmode;
>
> - longmode = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
> + longmode = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
> if (longmode)
> kvm_rax_write(vcpu, result);
> else {
> @@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ int kvm_hv_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> - if (is_64_bit_mode(vcpu)) {
> + if (is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu)) {
> param = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
> ingpa = kvm_rdx_read(vcpu);
> outgpa = kvm_r8_read(vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 9b6bca616929..dc72f0a1609a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -8403,7 +8403,7 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> trace_kvm_hypercall(nr, a0, a1, a2, a3);
>
> - op_64_bit = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
> + op_64_bit = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
> if (!op_64_bit) {
> nr &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
> a0 &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index 521f74e5bbf2..3102caf689d2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -151,12 +151,24 @@ static inline bool is_64_bit_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> int cs_db, cs_l;
>
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected);
> +
> if (!is_long_mode(vcpu))
> return false;
> static_call(kvm_x86_get_cs_db_l_bits)(vcpu, &cs_db, &cs_l);
> return cs_l;
> }
>
> +static inline bool is_64_bit_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + /*
> + * If running with protected guest state, the CS register is not
> + * accessible. The hypercall register values will have had to been
> + * provided in 64-bit mode, so assume the guest is in 64-bit.
> + */
> + return vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected || is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
> +}
> +
> static inline bool is_la57_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
> index ae17250e1efe..c58f6369e668 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
> @@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ int kvm_xen_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu))
> return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
>
> - longmode = is_64_bit_mode(vcpu);
> + longmode = is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu);
> if (!longmode) {
> params[0] = (u32)kvm_rbx_read(vcpu);
> params[1] = (u32)kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Thanks!
--
Vitaly
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-25 6:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-24 17:48 [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state Tom Lendacky
2021-05-25 6:25 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2021-10-01 17:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-26 18:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-11-11 20:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-11-16 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
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