kvm.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, pshier@google.com,
	ricarkol@google.com, rananta@google.com, reijiw@google.com,
	jingzhangos@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, james.morse@arm.com,
	Alexandru.Elisei@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	Drew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
	Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: KVM/arm64: Guest ABI changes do not appear rollback-safe
Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2021 11:39:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87fsuxq049.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOQ_QshSaEm_cMYQfRTaXJwnVqeoN29rMLBej-snWd6_0HsgGw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, 25 Aug 2021 11:02:28 +0100,
Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 2:27 AM Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > Exposing new hypercalls to guests in this manner seems very unsafe to
> > > me. Suppose an operator is trying to upgrade from kernel N to kernel
> > > N+1, which brings in the new 'widget' hypercall. Guests are live
> > > migrated onto the N+1 kernel, but the operator finds a defect that
> > > warrants a kernel rollback. VMs are then migrated from kernel N+1 -> N.
> > > Any guests that discovered the 'widget' hypercall are likely going to
> > > get fussy _very_ quickly on the old kernel.
> >
> > This goes against what we decided to support for the *only* publicly
> > available VMM that cares about save/restore, which is that we only
> > move forward and don't rollback.
> 
> Ah, I was definitely missing this context. Current behavior makes much
> more sense then.
> 
> > Hypercalls are the least of your
> > worries, and there is a whole range of other architectural features
> > that will have also appeared/disappeared (your own CNTPOFF series is a
> > glaring example of this).
> 
> Isn't that a tad bit different though? I'll admit, I'm just as guilty
> with my own series forgetting to add a KVM_CAP (oops), but it is in my
> queue to kick out with the fix for nVHE/ptimer. Nonetheless, if a user
> takes up a new KVM UAPI, it is up to the user to run on a new kernel.

The two are linked. Exposing a new register to userspace and/or guest
result in the same thing: you can't rollback. That's specially true in
the QEMU case, which *learns* from the kernel what registers are
available, and doesn't maintain a fixed list.

> My concerns are explicitly with the 'under the nose' changes, where
> KVM modifies the guest feature set without userspace opting in. Based
> on your comment, though, it would appear that other parts of KVM are
> affected too.

Any new system register that is exposed by a new kernel feature breaks
rollback. And so far, we only consider it a bug if the set of exposed
registers reduces. Anything can be added safely (as checked by one of
the selftests added by Drew).

< It doesn't have to be rollback safety, either. There may
> simply be a hypercall which an operator doesn't want to give its
> guests, and it needs a way to tell KVM to hide it.

Fair enough. But this has to be done in a scalable way, which
individual capability cannot provide.

> > > Have I missed something blatantly obvious, or do others see this as an
> > > issue as well? I'll reply with an example of adding opt-out for PTP.
> > > I'm sure other hypercalls could be handled similarly.
> >
> > Why do we need this? For future hypercalls, we could have some buy-in
> > capabilities. For existing ones, it is too late, and negative features
> > are just too horrible.
> 
> Oh, agreed on the nastiness. Lazy hack to realize the intended
> functional change..

Well, you definitely achieved your goal of attracting my attention :).

> > For KVM-specific hypercalls, we could get the VMM to save/restore the
> > bitmap of supported functions. That would be "less horrible". This
> > could be implemented using extra "firmware pseudo-registers" such as
> > the ones described in Documentation/virt/kvm/arm/psci.rst.
> 
> This seems more reasonable, especially since we do this for migrating
> the guest's PSCI version.
> 
> Alternatively, I had thought about using a VM attribute, given the
> fact that it is non-architectural information and we avoid ABI issues
> in KVM_GET_REG_LIST without buy-in through a KVM_CAP.

The whole point is that these settings get exposed by
KVM_GET_REG_LIST, as this is QEMU's way to dump a VM state. Given that
we already have this for things like the spectre management state, we
can just as well expose the bitmaps that deal with the KVM-specific
hypercalls. After all, this falls into the realm of "KVM as VM
firmware".

For ARM-architected hypercalls (TRNG, stolen time), we may need a
similar extension.

	M.

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.

  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-25 10:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-24 21:15 KVM/arm64: Guest ABI changes do not appear rollback-safe Oliver Upton
2021-08-24 21:34 ` [RFC PATCH] KVM: arm64: Allow VMMs to opt-out of KVM_CAP_PTP_KVM Oliver Upton
2021-08-25  9:27 ` KVM/arm64: Guest ABI changes do not appear rollback-safe Marc Zyngier
2021-08-25 10:02   ` Oliver Upton
2021-08-25 10:39     ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2021-08-25 15:07       ` Andrew Jones
2021-08-25 18:14         ` Oliver Upton
2021-08-26  8:37           ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-26 18:49             ` Oliver Upton
2021-08-27  7:40               ` Andrew Jones
2021-09-29 18:22                 ` Oliver Upton
2021-09-30  7:32                   ` Marc Zyngier
2021-09-30 17:24                     ` Oliver Upton
2021-10-01 11:43                       ` Marc Zyngier
2021-10-01 15:38                         ` Oliver Upton
2022-01-25  3:47                           ` Raghavendra Rao Ananta
2022-01-25  8:45                             ` Marc Zyngier
2022-01-25 17:29                               ` Oliver Upton
2022-02-08  9:46                                 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-02-08  9:56                                   ` Oliver Upton
2022-02-08 16:58                                     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-02-08 17:48                                       ` Marc Zyngier
2021-08-26  8:49           ` Andrew Jones
2021-08-26  8:54             ` Andrew Jones
2021-08-26  9:43               ` Marc Zyngier

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87fsuxq049.wl-maz@kernel.org \
    --to=maz@kernel.org \
    --cc=Alexandru.Elisei@arm.com \
    --cc=drjones@redhat.com \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=jingzhangos@google.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=oupton@google.com \
    --cc=peter.maydell@linaro.org \
    --cc=pshier@google.com \
    --cc=rananta@google.com \
    --cc=reijiw@google.com \
    --cc=ricarkol@google.com \
    --cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).