From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74480CCA47B for ; Mon, 13 Jun 2022 21:17:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1352257AbiFMVRJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Jun 2022 17:17:09 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41992 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235257AbiFMVQ5 (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Jun 2022 17:16:57 -0400 Received: from mail-il1-x135.google.com (mail-il1-x135.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::135]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ECF69F6F for ; Mon, 13 Jun 2022 13:59:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-il1-x135.google.com with SMTP id h18so5180232ilj.7 for ; Mon, 13 Jun 2022 13:59:01 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ga8fmQuD3EjQJc6y9LFAh1+REX1O+10pZrDfXI21feA=; b=o89LuZIGrtaJTyuZxG/tFnoJZC06jfTzoIWRxdGPpGTWCcJd74F804tAWQexje8E3S NKPBUP7yMeJS2wZDVN7+e9vUrsPTTTDTl1Vr6qFT668LVtWD1vpWSabbyMfX0R7kk724 I0MrTsUsfRHEueeWuMHYJ3cXJ+dMvcXowkvDzaBemxuQQAOWK9R841p47SAJqoXkKQzP jSHb2YATHBYiGFSUwkZ4eoiHC7YlXlnfE2nbvZ5Iytq4i8vJE/RkCwYjiloIqqf9Vc8Q fnpO1lj8pByTahSevtouYCYgA68hA3oA82BnsmDzg/4sqbqbSsPeUqy8329WGF860AGD mGDQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ga8fmQuD3EjQJc6y9LFAh1+REX1O+10pZrDfXI21feA=; b=rg1CDiCz1usCkLSAyfwDTMIrChCnmzcP//uvGkm2JuAVD1QDo05a16phUP8tLVtgNX 30FFXt+XsaPQ7HBzlYl9BVp2xNF35l0dJW8JVJQWLVRtHHiRDAlZCKFWX+QB9/pnU/WB EfXMrILemLFV65w84nlItRfImCUh33Y56YC6ZiutPYzXgohm+7GvOiAYDstmsi8lP2Cc YmPjL9Ln3n/EYxFyZwPy9xuICmGTAQI8j/bSU7kdzDYSWqZpmNdontho+0cvy14ouHsI +3jRLHfNFBJ9RNcR5vxlAnD0LbseJKI3bY0AKaiV4+KmOie8O2iYV5fJqxJr5VvhHxQ7 lGBA== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora++lULjntV2QdWL8Cl7Y2yNKZ8Sdj8PjpPKklMC+bDxR1H6p8RI UJpGFAV0AbUPOEIpt9Vs06pMA0chfLO4L/hc5LZ+xQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1vHj2xpae4EYuioWncsG3+wihbYPjRsIe9kP4YDnqu0eM1AJTOMo7FS7jaD0u82ksjNPyavbXP9+w47JSvyr1I= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6e02:792:b0:2d7:ae5d:e2fd with SMTP id q18-20020a056e02079200b002d7ae5de2fdmr1015080ils.315.1655153941065; Mon, 13 Jun 2022 13:59:01 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20210820155918.7518-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> <20210820155918.7518-24-brijesh.singh@amd.com> In-Reply-To: <20210820155918.7518-24-brijesh.singh@amd.com> From: Alper Gun Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 13:58:50 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 23/45] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command To: Brijesh Singh , Ashish.Kalra@amd.com Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Joerg Roedel , Tom Lendacky , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ard Biesheuvel , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Sergio Lopez , Peter Gonda , Peter Zijlstra , Srinivas Pandruvada , David Rientjes , Dov Murik , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Borislav Petkov , Michael Roth , Vlastimil Babka , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Andi Kleen , tony.luck@intel.com, Marc Orr , sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, Pavan Kumar Paluri Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Aug 20, 2021 at 9:00 AM Brijesh Singh wrote: > > The KVM_SNP_INIT command is used by the hypervisor to initialize the > SEV-SNP platform context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the > first command issued. When creating SEV-SNP guest, the VMM must use this > command instead of the KVM_SEV_INIT or KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. > > The flags value must be zero, it will be extended in future SNP support to > communicate the optional features (such as restricted INT injection etc). > > Co-developed-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri > Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Paluri > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 27 ++++++++++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 + > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 13 ++++++ > 5 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 5c081c8c7164..7b1d32fb99a8 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -427,6 +427,33 @@ issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution. > > Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > +18. KVM_SNP_INIT > +---------------- > + > +The KVM_SNP_INIT command can be used by the hypervisor to initialize SEV-SNP > +context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the first command issued. > + > +Parameters (in/out): struct kvm_snp_init > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_snp_init { > + __u64 flags; > + }; > + > +The flags bitmap is defined as:: > + > + /* enable the restricted injection */ > + #define KVM_SEV_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJET (1<<0) > + > + /* enable the restricted injection timer */ > + #define KVM_SEV_SNP_RESTRICTED_TIMER_INJET (1<<1) > + > +If the specified flags is not supported then return -EOPNOTSUPP, and the supported > +flags are returned. > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > index 44a3f920f886..a39e31845a33 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > @@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area { > #define SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE BIT(1) > #define SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE BIT(2) > > +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE BIT(0) > + > struct vmcb_seg { > u16 selector; > u16 attrib; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 50fddbe56981..93da463545ef 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -235,10 +235,30 @@ static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle) > sev_decommission(handle); > } > > +static int verify_snp_init_flags(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_snp_init params; > + int ret = 0; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + if (params.flags & ~SEV_SNP_SUPPORTED_FLAGS) > + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + > + params.flags = SEV_SNP_SUPPORTED_FLAGS; > + > + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) > + ret = -EFAULT; > + > + return ret; > +} > + > static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > { > + bool es_active = (argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT || argp->id == KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT); > struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > - bool es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT; > + bool snp_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT; > int asid, ret; > > if (kvm->created_vcpus) > @@ -249,12 +269,22 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > > sev->es_active = es_active; > + sev->snp_active = snp_active; > asid = sev_asid_new(sev); > if (asid < 0) > goto e_no_asid; > sev->asid = asid; > > - ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error); > + if (snp_active) { > + ret = verify_snp_init_flags(kvm, argp); > + if (ret) > + goto e_free; > + > + ret = sev_snp_init(&argp->error); > + } else { > + ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error); After SEV INIT_EX support patches, SEV may be initialized in the platform late. In my tests, if SEV has not been initialized in the platform yet, SNP VMs fail with SEV_DF_FLUSH required error. I tried calling SEV_DF_FLUSH right after the SNP platform init but this time it failed later on the SNP launch update command with SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM error. Looks like there is another dependency on SEV platform initialization. Calling sev_platform_init for SNP VMs fixes the problem in our tests. > + } > + > if (ret) > goto e_free; > > @@ -600,6 +630,10 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru; > save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss; > > + /* Enable the SEV-SNP feature */ > + if (sev_snp_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) > + save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE; > + > return 0; > } > > @@ -1532,6 +1566,12 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > } > > switch (sev_cmd.id) { > + case KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT: > + if (!sev_snp_enabled) { > + r = -ENOTTY; > + goto out; > + } > + fallthrough; > case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT: > if (!sev_es_enabled) { > r = -ENOTTY; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 01953522097d..57c3c404b0b3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ enum { > /* TPR and CR2 are always written before VMRUN */ > #define VMCB_ALWAYS_DIRTY_MASK ((1U << VMCB_INTR) | (1U << VMCB_CR2)) > > +/* Supported init feature flags */ > +#define SEV_SNP_SUPPORTED_FLAGS 0x0 > + > struct kvm_sev_info { > bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */ > bool es_active; /* SEV-ES enabled guest */ > @@ -81,6 +84,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > u64 ap_jump_table; /* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */ > struct kvm *enc_context_owner; /* Owner of copied encryption context */ > struct misc_cg *misc_cg; /* For misc cgroup accounting */ > + u64 snp_init_flags; > }; > > struct kvm_svm { > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index d9e4aabcb31a..944e2bf601fe 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1712,6 +1712,9 @@ enum sev_cmd_id { > /* Guest Migration Extension */ > KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL, > > + /* SNP specific commands */ > + KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT, > + > KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, > }; > > @@ -1808,6 +1811,16 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data { > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +/* enable the restricted injection */ > +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJET (1 << 0) > + > +/* enable the restricted injection timer */ > +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_RESTRICTED_TIMER_INJET (1 << 1) > + > +struct kvm_snp_init { > + __u64 flags; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) > -- > 2.17.1 > >