From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
To: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Cc: "kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2 v2] KVM: nVMX: Rollback MSR-load if VM-entry fails due to VM-entry MSR-loading
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 15:28:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALMp9eTZkY_E9AC_c-cdmdqksSZHiw4cMEtORvmxx4x=TNCBfw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191015000446.8099-3-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
On Mon, Oct 14, 2019 at 5:40 PM Krish Sadhukhan
<krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> If VM-entry fails due to VM-entry MSR-loading, the MSRs of the nested guests
> need to be rolled back to their previous state in order for the guest to not
> be in an inconsistent state.
This change seems overly simplistic, and it also breaks the existing ABI.
> Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Karl Heubaum <karl.heubaum@oracle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 26 +++++++++++++++-----
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 8 +++++++
> 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> index cebdcb105ea8..bd8e7af5c1e5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_failValid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
> }
>
> -static void nested_vmx_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 indicator)
> +void nested_vmx_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 indicator)
> {
> /* TODO: not to reset guest simply here. */
> kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
> @@ -894,11 +894,13 @@ static u32 nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * as possible, process all valid entries before failing rather than precheck
> * for a capacity violation.
> */
> -static u32 nested_vmx_load_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
> +static u32 nested_vmx_load_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count,
> + bool save)
> {
> u32 i;
> struct vmx_msr_entry e;
> u32 max_msr_list_size = nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu);
> + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
>
> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> if (unlikely(i >= max_msr_list_size))
> @@ -917,6 +919,16 @@ static u32 nested_vmx_load_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
> __func__, i, e.index, e.reserved);
> goto fail;
> }
> + if (save) {
> + vmx->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup[i].index = e.index;
> + if (kvm_get_msr(vcpu, e.index,
> + &(vmx->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup[i].data))) {
> + pr_debug_ratelimited(
> + "%s cannot read MSR (%u, 0x%x)\n",
> + __func__, i, e.index);
> + goto fail;
This breaks the ABI, by requiring that all MSRs in the MSR-load list
have to be readable. Some, like IA32_PRED_CMD, are not.
> + }
> + }
> if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, e.index, e.value)) {
> pr_debug_ratelimited(
> "%s cannot write MSR (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
> @@ -926,6 +938,7 @@ static u32 nested_vmx_load_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
> }
> return 0;
> fail:
> + kfree(vmx->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup);
> return i + 1;
> }
>
> @@ -973,6 +986,26 @@ static int nested_vmx_store_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +int nested_vmx_rollback_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 count)
> +{
> + u32 i;
> + struct msr_data msr;
> + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
I wonder if this loop should go in the other direction, in case there
are dependencies among the MSR settings.
> + msr.host_initiated = false;
> + msr.index = vmx->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup[i].index;
> + msr.data = vmx->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup[i].data;
> + if (kvm_set_msr(vcpu, msr.index, msr.data)) {
> + pr_debug_ratelimited(
> + "%s WRMSR failed (%u, 0x%x, 0x%llx)\n",
> + __func__, i, msr.index, msr.data);
> + return -EINVAL;
This doesn't work with time-related MSRs, like
IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER. Rather than "rolling back" to an earlier
value, you need to be able to negate the effect of the load that
should never have happened. Similarly, I don't think this works with
IA32_TSC_DEADLINE, if the original deadline has passed before you
saved it. I believe that writing a deadline in the past will result in
a spurious interrupt.
> + }
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static bool nested_cr3_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
> {
> unsigned long invalid_mask;
> @@ -3102,9 +3135,18 @@ int nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool from_vmentry)
> goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
>
> if (from_vmentry) {
> + u32 count = vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count;
> +
> + /* Save guest MSRs before we load them */
> + vmx->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup =
> + kcalloc(count, sizeof(struct msr_data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!vmx->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup)
> + goto vmentry_fail_vmexit_guest_mode;
> +
Should the backup memory be allocated in advance, so that we don't
have this unarchitected VM-entry failure? If not, should this be
deferred until after the attempted VM-entry to vmcs02, to avoid
introducing yet another priority inversion?
> exit_qual = nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu,
> vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr,
> - vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count);
> + vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count,
> + true);
> if (exit_qual) {
> /*
> * According to section “VM Entries” in Intel SDM
> @@ -3940,7 +3982,7 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
>
> if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr,
> - vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count))
> + vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count, false))
> nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL);
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
> index bb51ec8cf7da..f951b2b338d2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ int nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool from_vmentry);
> bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason);
> void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
> u32 exit_intr_info, unsigned long exit_qualification);
> +void nested_vmx_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 indicator);
> +int nested_vmx_rollback_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 count);
> void nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> int vmx_set_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 data);
> int vmx_get_vmx_msr(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata);
> @@ -66,7 +68,6 @@ static inline int nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> {
> u32 exit_qual;
> u32 exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
> - struct vmx_msr_entry *addr;
>
> /*
> * At this point, the exit interruption info in exit_intr_info
> @@ -85,11 +86,24 @@ static inline int nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>
> exit_qual = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
>
> - addr = __va(vmcs_read64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR));
> - if (addr && addr->index == MSR_FS_BASE &&
> - (exit_reason == (VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY |
> - EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL))) {
> - exit_qual = (to_vmx(vcpu))->nested.invalid_msr_load_exit_qual;
> + if (exit_reason == (VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY |
> + EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL)) {
> +
> + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
> + struct vmx_msr_entry *addr;
> +
> + if (nested_vmx_rollback_msr(vcpu,
> + vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count)) {
> + nested_vmx_abort(vcpu,
> + VMX_ABORT_SAVE_GUEST_MSR_FAIL);
> +
> + kfree(to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vm_entry_msr_load_backup);
> + }
Are we leaking the backup memory when the rollback succeeds?
> +
> + addr = __va(vmcs_read64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR));
> + if (addr && addr->index == MSR_FS_BASE)
> + exit_qual =
> + (to_vmx(vcpu))->nested.invalid_msr_load_exit_qual;
> }
>
> nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason, exit_intr_info, exit_qual);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index ee7f40abd199..9a7c118036be 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -189,6 +189,14 @@ struct nested_vmx {
> * due to invalid VM-entry MSR-load area in vmcs12.
> */
> u32 invalid_msr_load_exit_qual;
> +
> + /*
> + * This is used for backing up the MSRs of nested guests when
> + * those MSRs are loaded from VM-entry MSR-load area on VM-entry.
> + * If VM-entry fails due to VM-entry MSR-loading, we roll back
> + * the MSRs to the values saved here.
> + */
> + struct msr_data *vm_entry_msr_load_backup;
> };
>
> struct vcpu_vmx {
> --
> 2.20.1
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-15 22:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-15 0:04 [PATCH 0/2 v2] KVM: nVMX: Defer error from VM-entry MSR-load area to until after hardware verifies VMCS guest state-area Krish Sadhukhan
2019-10-15 0:04 ` [PATCH 1/2 " Krish Sadhukhan
2019-10-15 0:04 ` [PATCH 2/2 v2] KVM: nVMX: Rollback MSR-load if VM-entry fails due to VM-entry MSR-loading Krish Sadhukhan
2019-10-15 22:28 ` Jim Mattson [this message]
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