From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5CED6C433EF for ; Fri, 24 Jun 2022 14:43:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232244AbiFXOnZ (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Jun 2022 10:43:25 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:43756 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233452AbiFXOnB (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Jun 2022 10:43:01 -0400 Received: from mail-lj1-x22a.google.com (mail-lj1-x22a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 194BB38A0 for ; Fri, 24 Jun 2022 07:43:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x22a.google.com with SMTP id b23so3009597ljh.7 for ; Fri, 24 Jun 2022 07:43:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=c74mHiS9ndNQXugtz6cvlyHO4YfoU5Amna4jcCNFMrs=; b=H/ksdZ6l5zr/vi1yB0rt5Eri5/yAGDIDhJ+WxLtjolC+ufKy6G6zPlGl+RRyQ8X0yb KHR8ASjiTXJXazdAdIrcuZ2Cs25VbGzQxT++z2kemk7qCE31TwlEGNOFZz1VF98ViVgG DVB/LJous1QnTbkIZZt+g4YbndYf5ChpQiC4rpkQ5ReCIQTQumhdcGb/4pood8k+SwZN paHcsBmYu6mMMyQfqBR3cSwe3jcLr2EN+96eNG+ci+lB+YDn35X5J9KksySor56ctnXt T4lmVaUFlX5DI1QNKrmef517KCnrYSiznbpl/5KssWEh9sSpuWq7z0YsqPsbLgD3MCFS uQtw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=c74mHiS9ndNQXugtz6cvlyHO4YfoU5Amna4jcCNFMrs=; b=Qd6mPPvvScUfInRsAzC9ApO0tn9rt/Bwh3Tq6a/hBjvkSWges+QtemzrRaivc1Q8CD RvBYNqQTCQONmZeldbjJaNWFplRZfqtQlDDBrONyZG8ovfHeD+W+qCrORxE//juPT2xs J31ed6+C4+bb2BRrSR818AU+QYGluDOsMxeNgT1qK8T2CSdV4NSRJq4V7ow9Qhlmeab7 CFr9HmucJiQzF/ubS3nwNXi9FJpIo2RUpBrAilk9GOxd05n5c0VpkfDh4byFhgq9W3Q8 IdfG02y6AsBiBoWJe/mTg6+suOgtsuX/9VcqMamrpVKV9GYM3vF5x9cNNIRvPgt0TN7x RAKg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora8VSFNoCMFW51TGe00HlByYmClQZmM6kZrWhooBIEoO/XlhEuP9 HPaVXfUIBLEGEfaI7Pg15LKgSFBrLnlpwqtxB5rT92P2DOhCgsPs X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1vYszCbgCJkIeTLTax5rPL2YqFzl1LowMYrI+vR1nuQeKj/955rGAXK6XhwauP1YAq9QkIKvVeNZu/Zq5Nkw8Y= X-Received: by 2002:a05:651c:1549:b0:258:4386:f6a2 with SMTP id y9-20020a05651c154900b002584386f6a2mr7672748ljp.527.1656081778232; Fri, 24 Jun 2022 07:42:58 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <6d5c899030b113755e6c093e8bb9ad123280edc6.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> In-Reply-To: <6d5c899030b113755e6c093e8bb9ad123280edc6.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> From: Peter Gonda Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2022 08:42:46 -0600 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 24/49] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command To: Ashish Kalra Cc: "the arch/x86 maintainers" , LKML , kvm list , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org, Linux Crypto Mailing List , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Joerg Roedel , "Lendacky, Thomas" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ard Biesheuvel , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Jim Mattson , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Sergio Lopez , Peter Zijlstra , Srinivas Pandruvada , David Rientjes , Dov Murik , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Borislav Petkov , Michael Roth , Vlastimil Babka , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Andi Kleen , Tony Luck , Marc Orr , Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy , Alper Gun , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , jarkko@kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org > > +19. KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START > +------------------------ > + > +The KVM_SNP_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption > +context for the SEV-SNP guest. To create the encryption context, user must > +provide a guest policy, migration agent (if any) and guest OS visible > +workarounds value as defined SEV-SNP specification. > + > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_snp_launch_start > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { > + __u64 policy; /* Guest policy to use. */ > + __u64 ma_uaddr; /* userspace address of migration agent */ > + __u8 ma_en; /* 1 if the migtation agent is enabled */ migration > + __u8 imi_en; /* set IMI to 1. */ > + __u8 gosvw[16]; /* guest OS visible workarounds */ > + }; > + > +See the SEV-SNP specification for further detail on the launch input. > + > References > ========== > > > +static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_snp_decommission data = {}; > + int ret; > + > + /* If context is not created then do nothing */ > + if (!sev->snp_context) > + return 0; > + > + data.gctx_paddr = __sme_pa(sev->snp_context); > + ret = snp_guest_decommission(&data, NULL); Do we have a similar race like in sev_unbind_asid() with DEACTIVATE and WBINVD/DF_FLUSH? The SNP_DECOMMISSION spec looks quite similar to DEACTIVATE. > + if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to release guest context")) > + return ret; > + > + /* free the context page now */ > + snp_free_firmware_page(sev->snp_context); > + sev->snp_context = NULL; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > { > struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;