From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4169CC433E6 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2021 08:24:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDF732312D for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2021 08:24:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730963AbhASIYT (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Jan 2021 03:24:19 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:49996 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730917AbhASIYB (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Jan 2021 03:24:01 -0500 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 14B512311C; Tue, 19 Jan 2021 08:23:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1611044587; bh=0U8QFDJFR5fK7I/r3qPDgfxElg/FDdRgMF6RgJJ0I7I=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=typXulixZ+sSSpznFMve41mPUbkCcTYvCwKNvFLCE1s+p2LpjgnX0PkwwyR/1Nb4j ghPmvsnfNKbWVLLFvll+iME5jzA8acE+wDBvmfwJQr9OyobADGkWxI+6PVEAuszqLc On5FPehvVeLX+nc3sD6iNdpjQickb1f/BxuLFJZkKhNqy4rCwi2S8Im6shYjcc7pQT +MT2QTNVpApXD0OxYp7nrvmcxJ+EgzxH5dd/o4Xq7gEo74l2OJ+bp5+xjyXesetJQX XN/4SA42BiJRsVTfmUK7P8w3fC+n8RKi7ig7B6vl+UvPiFLUJ+1bGVSriaXkOpjsk1 qHDaV9lmYTAag== Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 10:23:00 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Kai Huang Cc: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, jethro@fortanix.com, b.thiel@posteo.de, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, corbet@lwn.net Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/26] KVM SGX virtualization support Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Can you send a new version that applies: $ git pw series apply 416463 Applying: x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Applying: x86/sgx: Remove a warn from sgx_free_epc_page() Applying: x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() Applying: x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code Applying: x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Applying: x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Applying: x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c). error: could not build fake ancestor hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch=diff' to see the failed patch Patch failed at 0007 x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue". If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead. To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort". Thanks. /Jarkko On Mon, Jan 18, 2021 at 04:26:21PM +1300, Kai Huang wrote: > --- Disclaimer --- > > These patches were originally written by Sean Christopherson while at Intel. > Now that Sean has left Intel, I (Kai) have taken over getting them upstream. > This series needs more review before it can be merged. It is being posted > publicly and under RFC so Sean and others can review it. Maintainers are safe > ignoring it for now. > > ------------------ > > Hi all, > > This series adds KVM SGX virtualization support. The first 14 patches starting > with x86/sgx or x86/cpu.. are necessary changes to x86 and SGX core/driver to > support KVM SGX virtualization, while the rest are patches to KVM subsystem. > > Please help to review this series. Also I'd like to hear what is the proper > way to merge this series, since it contains change to both x86/SGX and KVM > subsystem. Any feedback is highly appreciated. And please let me know if I > forgot to CC anyone, or anyone wants to be removed from CC. Thanks in advance! > > This series is based against upstream v5.11-rc3. You can also get the code from > upstream branch of kvm-sgx repo on github: > > https://github.com/intel/kvm-sgx.git upstream > > It also requires Qemu changes to create VM with SGX support. You can find Qemu > repo here: > > https://github.com/intel/qemu-sgx.git next > > Please refer to README.md of above qemu-sgx repo for detail on how to create > guest with SGX support. At meantime, for your quick reference you can use below > command to create SGX guest: > > #qemu-system-x86_64 -smp 4 -m 2G -drive file=,if=virtio \ > -cpu host,+sgx_provisionkey \ > -sgx-epc id=epc1,memdev=mem1 \ > -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc > > Please note that the SGX relevant part is: > > -cpu host,+sgx_provisionkey \ > -sgx-epc id=epc1,memdev=mem1 \ > -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc > > And you can change other parameters of your qemu command based on your needs. > > ========= > Changelog: > > (Changelog here is for global changes. Please see each patch's changelog for > changes made to specific patch.) > > v1->v2: > > - Refined this cover letter by addressing comments from Dave and Jarkko. > - The original patch which introduced new X86_FEATURE_SGX1/SGX2 were replaced > by 3 new patches from Sean, following Boris and Sean's discussion. > [RFC PATCH v2 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features > [RFC PATCH v2 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features > [RFC PATCH v2 19/26] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features > - The original patch 1 > x86/sgx: Split out adding EPC page to free list to separate helper > was replaced with 2 new patches from Jarkko > [RFC PATCH v2 02/26] x86/sgx: Remove a warn from sgx_free_epc_page() > [RFC PATCH v2 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() > addressing Jarkko's comments. > - Moved modifying sgx_init() to always initialize sgx_virt_epc_init() out of > patch > x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests > to a separate patch: > [RFC PATCH v2 07/26] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled > to address Dave's comment that patch ordering can be improved due to before > patch "Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support", all SGX, > including SGX virtualization, is actually disabled when SGX LC is not > present. > > KVM part patches are not changed comparing to v1 (except changes due to > X86_FEATURE_SGX1/2 patches). For changes to each x86 patch, please see changelog > in each indudival patch. If no changelog, then no change was made to it. > > ========= > KVM SGX virtualization Overview > > - Virtual EPC > > SGX enclave memory is special and is reserved specifically for enclave use. > In bare-metal SGX enclaves, the kernel allocates enclave pages, copies data > into the pages with privileged instructions, then allows the enclave to start. > In this scenario, only initialized pages already assigned to an enclave are > mapped to userspace. > > In virtualized environments, the hypervisor still needs to do the physical > enclave page allocation. The guest kernel is responsible for the data copying > (among other things). This means that the job of starting an enclave is now > split between hypervisor and guest. > > This series introduces a new misc device: /dev/sgx_virt_epc. This device > allows the host to map *uninitialized* enclave memory into userspace, which > can then be passed into a guest. > > While it might be *possible* to start a host-side enclave with /dev/sgx_enclave > and pass its memory into a guest, it would be wasteful and convoluted. > > Implement the *raw* EPC allocation in the x86 core-SGX subsystem via > /dev/sgx_virt_epc rather than in KVM. Doing so has two major advantages: > > - Does not require changes to KVM's uAPI, e.g. EPC gets handled as > just another memory backend for guests. > > - EPC management is wholly contained in the SGX subsystem, e.g. SGX > does not have to export any symbols, changes to reclaim flows don't > need to be routed through KVM, SGX's dirty laundry doesn't have to > get aired out for the world to see, and so on and so forth. > > The virtual EPC pages allocated to guests are currently not reclaimable. > Reclaiming EPC page used by enclave requires a special reclaim mechanism > separate from normal page reclaim, and that mechanism is not supported > for virutal EPC pages. Due to the complications of handling reclaim > conflicts between guest and host, reclaiming virtual EPC pages is > significantly more complex than basic support for SGX virtualization. > > - Support SGX virtualization without SGX Flexible Launch Control > > SGX hardware supports two "launch control" modes to limit which enclaves can > run. In the "locked" mode, the hardware prevents enclaves from running unless > they are blessed by a third party. In the unlocked mode, the kernel is in > full control of which enclaves can run. The bare-metal SGX code refuses to > launch enclaves unless it is in the unlocked mode. > > This sgx_virt_epc driver does not have such a restriction. This allows guests > which are OK with the locked mode to use SGX, even if the host kernel refuses > to. > > - Support exposing SGX2 > > Due to the same reason above, SGX2 feature detection is added to core SGX code > to allow KVM to expose SGX2 to guest, even currently SGX driver doesn't support > SGX2, because SGX2 can work just fine in guest w/o any interaction to host SGX > driver. > > - Restricit SGX guest access to provisioning key > > To grant guest being able to fully use SGX, guest needs to be able to access > provisioning key. The provisioning key is sensitive, and accessing to it should > be restricted. In bare-metal driver, allowing enclave to access provisioning key > is restricted by being able to open /dev/sgx_provision. > > Add a new KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE to KVM uAPI to extend above mechanism to KVM > guests as well. When userspace hypervisor creates a new VM, the new cap is only > added to VM when userspace hypervisior is able to open /dev/sgx_provision, > following the same role as in bare-metal driver. KVM then traps ECREATE from > guest, and only allows ECREATE with provisioning key bit to run when guest > supports KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE. > > > > Kai Huang (2): > x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is > disabled > x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs > > Sean Christopherson (22): > x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features > x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code > x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests > x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support > x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel > x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h > x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) > x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper > x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM > x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver > KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union > KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) > KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit > KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features > KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features > KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave > KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization > KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions > KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs > KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) > KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC > KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX > attribute > > jarkko@kernel.org (2): > x86/sgx: Remove a warn from sgx_free_epc_page() > x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() > > Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 + > arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 + > arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 + > arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 19 + > .../cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} | 20 + > arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 + > arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 3 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 63 ++- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 17 - > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 15 +- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 29 +- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 23 +- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 67 ++- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 4 +- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 316 ++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.h | 14 + > arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 + > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 89 +++- > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 50 +- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 70 ++- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 5 + > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 462 ++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 34 ++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 1 + > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 4 +- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 171 +++++-- > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 27 +- > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 24 + > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + > tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h | 2 +- > 34 files changed, 1432 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h > rename arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx_arch.h} (96%) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.h > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c > create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h > > -- > 2.29.2 > >