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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"jethro@fortanix.com" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"wanpengli@tencent.com" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"b.thiel@posteo.de" <b.thiel@posteo.de>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"jarkko@kernel.org" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"joro@8bytes.org" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"jmattson@google.com" <jmattson@google.com>,
	"vkuznets@redhat.com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM SGX virtualization support
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 09:36:23 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YBrfF0XQvzQf9PhR@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f50ac476-71f2-60d4-5008-672365f4d554@intel.com>

On Wed, Feb 03, 2021, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 2/2/21 3:56 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >> I seem to remember much stronger language in the SDM about this.  I've
> >> always thought of SGX as a big unrecoverable machine-check party waiting
> >> to happen.
> >>
> >> I'll ask around internally at Intel and see what folks say.  Basically,
> >> should we be afraid of a big bad EPC access?
> > If bad accesses to the EPC can cause machine checks, then EPC should never be
> > mapped into userspace, i.e. the SGX driver should never have been merged.
> 
> The SDM doesn't define the behavior well enough.  I'll try to get that
> fixed.
> 
> But, there is some documentation of the abort page semantics:
> 
> > https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx-linux/2.10/docs/Intel_SGX_Developer_Reference_Linux_2.10_Open_Source.pdf
> 
> Basically, writes get dropped and reads get all 1's on all the
> implementations in the wild.  I actually would have much rather gotten a
> fault, but oh well.
> 
> It sounds like we need to at least modify KVM to make sure not to map
> and access EPC addresses.

Why?  KVM will read garbage, but KVM needs to be careful with the data it reads,
irrespective of SGX, because the data is user/guest controlled even in the happy
case.

I'm not at all opposed to preventing KVM from accessing EPC, but I really don't
want to add a special check in KVM to avoid reading EPC.  KVM generally isn't
aware of physical backings, and the relevant KVM code is shared between all
architectures.

> We might even want to add some VM_WARN_ON()s in the code that creates kernel
> mappings to catch these mappings if they happen anywhere else.

One thought for handling this would be to extend __ioremap_check_other() to flag
EPC in some way, and then disallow memremap() to EPC.  A clever way to do that
without disallowing SGX's initial memremap() would be to tap into SGX's
sgx_epc_sections array, as the per-section check would activate only after each
section is initialized/map by SGX.

Disallowing memremap(), without warning, would address the KVM flow (the
memremap() in __kvm_map_gfn()) without forcing KVM to explicitly check for EPC.

E.g. something like:

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index c519fc5f6948..f263f3554f27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list);

 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_reclaimer_lock);

+bool is_sgx_epc(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+       resource_size_t end = addr + size - 1;
+       int i;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) {
+               if (<check for overlap with sgx_epc_sections[i])
+                       return true;
+       }
+
+       return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * Reset dirty EPC pages to uninitialized state. Laundry can be left with SECS
  * pages whose child pages blocked EREMOVE.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 9e5ccc56f8e0..145fc6fc6bc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
  */
 struct ioremap_desc {
        unsigned int flags;
+       bool sgx_epc;
 };

 /*
@@ -110,8 +111,14 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
  * The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), but must
  * be mapped encrypted when SEV is active.
  */
-static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
+static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
+                                 struct ioremap_desc *desc)
 {
+       if (sgx_is_epc(addr, size)) {
+               desc->sgx_epc = true;
+               return;
+       }
+
        if (!sev_active())
                return;

@@ -155,7 +162,7 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,

        walk_mem_res(start, end, desc, __ioremap_collect_map_flags);

-       __ioremap_check_other(addr, desc);
+       __ioremap_check_other(addr, size, desc);
 }

 /*
@@ -210,6 +217,13 @@ __ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
                return NULL;
        }

+       /*
+        * Don't allow mapping SGX EPC, it's not accessible via normal reads
+        * and writes.
+        */
+       if (io_desc.epc)
+               return NULL;
+
        /*
         * Mappings have to be page-aligned
         */


  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-03 17:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-26 10:10 [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM SGX virtualization support Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:29 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:34   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 23:18     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 13:20       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01  0:01         ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:17           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03  1:09             ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:56           ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-02 18:00             ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-02 18:03               ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-02 18:42                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03  1:05                   ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 13:11   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:35   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-30 13:22   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01  0:08     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/27] x86/sgx: Remove a warn from sgx_free_epc_page() Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:39   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 16:30     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-27  1:08     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27  1:12       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27  1:26         ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01  0:11           ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 10:03             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/27] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE " Kai Huang
2021-01-26 16:04   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27  1:25     ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 18:00       ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-02 19:25         ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 19:02       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26  9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/27] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code Kai Huang
2021-01-26 15:49   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27  0:00     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27  0:21       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27  0:52         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Kai Huang
2021-01-26 16:19   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27  0:16     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27  0:27       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27  0:48         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:41   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:30 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/27] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Kai Huang
2021-01-26 16:26   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 17:00     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-26 23:54       ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26 23:56     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27  0:18       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-27  2:02         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-27 17:13           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-30 14:42   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01  5:38     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/27] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled Kai Huang
2021-01-26 17:03   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26 18:10     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-01-26 23:25       ` Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:45   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01  5:40     ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01 15:25       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-01 17:23         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02  0:12           ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 23:10             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 23:07         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 17:32       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 18:20         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 23:16           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03  0:49             ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 22:02               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03 22:59                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  1:39                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04  2:59                     ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04  3:05                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04  3:09                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04  3:20                           ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 14:51                             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04 22:41                               ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-04 22:56                                 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-05  2:08                                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-05  3:00                                   ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-02 18:49         ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 23:17           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/27] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:46   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/27] x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/27] x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/27] x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:48   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/27] x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01  1:17     ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01 21:22       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/27] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:51   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01  0:17     ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:20       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 20:35         ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04  3:53   ` Kai Huang
2021-02-05  0:32     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-05  1:39       ` Huang, Kai
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/27] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver Kai Huang
2021-01-30 14:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union Kai Huang
2021-01-30 15:00   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-01  0:32     ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 17:24       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-02 19:23         ` Kai Huang
2021-02-02 22:41           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-03  0:42             ` Kai Huang
2021-02-01 17:12     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 22:38       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Kai Huang
2021-02-03  0:52   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-02-03  1:36     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03  9:11       ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 17:07         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:11           ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 18:47   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-02-03 19:36     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:29       ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 23:36         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:45           ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 23:59             ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  0:11               ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04  2:01                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Kai Huang
2021-01-26  9:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Kai Huang
2021-02-02 22:21 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM SGX virtualization support Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-02-02 22:33   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 23:21     ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-02 23:56       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03  0:43         ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-03 15:10         ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-03 17:36           ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-02-03 17:43             ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-02-03 17:46               ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-03 23:09                 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-03 23:32                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-03 23:37                     ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-04  0:04                       ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04  0:28                         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04  3:18                           ` Kai Huang
2021-02-04 16:28                             ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-04 16:48                               ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-05 12:32                                 ` Kai Huang
2021-02-05 16:51                                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-02 22:36   ` Dave Hansen

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