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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Cc: dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>,
	richard.henderson@linaro.org, berrange@redhat.com,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com,
	Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, thuth@redhat.com,
	mst@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com,
	andi.kleen@intel.com, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 10:48:30 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YCXCTs9fAJV/f7z/@yekko.fritz.box> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210210162530.GA84305@dt>

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On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 10:25:30AM -0600, Venu Busireddy wrote:
> On 2021-02-02 15:13:09 +1100, David Gibson wrote:
> > The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
> > confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
> > initialization.  Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
> > initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
> > initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
> > 
> > However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
> > properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
> > common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
> > initialized if it was requested.
> > 
> > This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
> > base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
> > qemu_machine_creation_done().
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> > Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
> > ---
> >  include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  softmmu/vl.c                              | 10 ++++++++++
> >  target/i386/sev.c                         |  2 ++
> >  3 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> > index 3db6380e63..5dcf602047 100644
> > --- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> > +++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
> > @@ -27,6 +27,30 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
> >  
> >  struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
> >      Object parent;
> > +
> > +    /*
> > +     * ready: flag set by CGS initialization code once it's ready to
> > +     *        start executing instructions in a potentially-secure
> > +     *        guest
> > +     *
> > +     * The definition here is a bit fuzzy, because this is essentially
> > +     * part of a self-sanity-check, rather than a strict mechanism.
> > +     *
> > +     * It's not fasible to have a single point in the common machine
> 
> Just a nit pick.
> 
> s/fasible/feasible/

Already fixed in the version that got merged.

> > +     * init path to configure confidential guest support, because
> > +     * different mechanisms have different interdependencies requiring
> > +     * initialization in different places, often in arch or machine
> > +     * type specific code.  It's also usually not possible to check
> > +     * for invalid configurations until that initialization code.
> > +     * That means it would be very easy to have a bug allowing CGS
> > +     * init to be bypassed entirely in certain configurations.
> > +     *
> > +     * Silently ignoring a requested security feature would be bad, so
> > +     * to avoid that we check late in init that this 'ready' flag is
> > +     * set if CGS was requested.  If the CGS init hasn't happened, and
> > +     * so 'ready' is not set, we'll abort.
> > +     */
> > +    bool ready;
> >  };
> >  
> >  typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
> > diff --git a/softmmu/vl.c b/softmmu/vl.c
> > index 1b464e3474..1869ed54a9 100644
> > --- a/softmmu/vl.c
> > +++ b/softmmu/vl.c
> > @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
> >  #include "qemu/plugin.h"
> >  #include "qemu/queue.h"
> >  #include "sysemu/arch_init.h"
> > +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h"
> >  
> >  #include "ui/qemu-spice.h"
> >  #include "qapi/string-input-visitor.h"
> > @@ -2497,6 +2498,8 @@ static void qemu_create_cli_devices(void)
> >  
> >  static void qemu_machine_creation_done(void)
> >  {
> > +    MachineState *machine = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine());
> > +
> >      /* Did we create any drives that we failed to create a device for? */
> >      drive_check_orphaned();
> >  
> > @@ -2516,6 +2519,13 @@ static void qemu_machine_creation_done(void)
> >  
> >      qdev_machine_creation_done();
> >  
> > +    if (machine->cgs) {
> > +        /*
> > +         * Verify that Confidential Guest Support has actually been initialized
> > +         */
> > +        assert(machine->cgs->ready);
> > +    }
> > +
> >      if (foreach_device_config(DEV_GDB, gdbserver_start) < 0) {
> >          exit(1);
> >      }
> > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> > index 590cb31fa8..f9e9b5d8ae 100644
> > --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> > @@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
> >      qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify);
> >      qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev);
> >  
> > +    cgs->ready = true;
> > +
> >      return 0;
> >  err:
> >      sev_guest = NULL;
> 

-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-12  1:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-02  4:13 [PATCH v8 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson
2021-02-03 10:42   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-02-03 16:15   ` Greg Kurz
2021-02-04  2:45     ` David Gibson
2021-02-10 16:25   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-02-11 23:48     ` David Gibson [this message]
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2021-02-03 16:19   ` Greg Kurz
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson
2021-02-03 17:50   ` Greg Kurz
2021-02-04  2:47     ` David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2021-02-02 23:06   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-02-03  4:53     ` David Gibson
2021-02-02  4:13 ` [PATCH v8 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson
2021-02-03  9:05   ` Christian Borntraeger

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