From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
srutherford@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 20:10:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YIxkTZsblAzUzsf7@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210429104707.203055-3-pbonzini@redhat.com>
On Thu, Apr 29, 2021, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst
> index 57fc4090031a..cf1b0b2099b0 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst
> @@ -383,5 +383,10 @@ MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL:
> data:
> This MSR is available if KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL is present in
> CPUID. Bit 0 represents whether live migration of the guest is allowed.
> +
> When a guest is started, bit 0 will be 1 if the guest has encrypted
> - memory and 0 if the guest does not have encrypted memory.
> + memory and 0 if the guest does not have encrypted memory. If the
> + guest is communicating page encryption status to the host using the
> + ``KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS`` hypercall, it can set bit 0 in this MSR to
> + allow live migration of the guest. The MSR is read-only if
> + ``KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_STATUS`` is not advertised to the guest.
I still don't get the desire to tie MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL to PAGE_ENC_STATUS
in any way shape or form. I can understand making it read-only or dropping
writes if it's not intercepted by userspace, but making it read-only for
non-encrypted guests makes it useful only for encrypted guests, which defeats
the purpose of genericizing the MSR.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index e9c40be9235c..0c2524bbaa84 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -3279,6 +3279,12 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> if (!guest_pv_has(vcpu, KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL))
> return 1;
>
> + /*
> + * This implementation is only good if userspace has *not*
> + * enabled KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS. If userspace
> + * enables KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS it must set up an
> + * MSR filter in order to accept writes that change bit 0.
> + */
> if (data != !static_call(kvm_x86_has_encrypted_memory)(vcpu->kvm))
> return 1;
This behavior doesn't match the documentation.
a. The MSR is not read-only for legacy guests since they can write '0'.
b. The MSR is not read-only if KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_STATUS isn't advertised,
a guest with encrypted memory can write '1' regardless of whether userspace
has enabled KVM_FEATURE_HC_PAGE_STATUS.
c. The MSR is never fully writable, e.g. a guest with encrypted memory can set
bit 0, but not clear it. This doesn't seem intentional?
Why not simply drop writes? E.g.
if (data & ~KVM_MIGRATION_READY)
return 1;
break;
And then do "msr->data = 0;" in the read path. That's just as effective as
making the MSR read-only to force userspace to intercept the MSR if it wants to
do anything useful with the information, and it's easy to document.
> break;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-30 20:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-29 10:47 [PATCH v3 0/2] KVM: x86: guest interface for SEV live migration Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-29 10:47 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] KVM: x86: add MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-29 10:47 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-30 20:10 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-05-01 9:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-03 23:22 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-05-04 8:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-04 17:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-04 20:27 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-04 20:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-04 20:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-04 21:16 ` Steve Rutherford
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