From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, joro@8bytes.org,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, srutherford@google.com,
venu.busireddy@oracle.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed
Date: Fri, 14 May 2021 09:33:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YJ4n2Ypmq/7U1znM@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210513043441.GA28019@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 04:34:41AM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> What's the use of notification of a partial page list, even a single
> incorrect guest page encryption status can crash the guest/migrated
> guest.
Ok, so explain to me how this looks from the user standpoint: she starts
migrating the guest, it fails to lookup an address, there's nothing
saying where it failed but the guest crashed.
Do you think this is user-friendly?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-14 7:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-23 15:57 [PATCH v2 0/4] Add guest support for SEV live migration Ashish Kalra
2021-04-23 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL Ashish Kalra
2021-04-23 16:31 ` Jim Mattson
2021-04-23 17:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-23 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-05-12 13:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-12 15:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-12 16:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-13 6:57 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-05-13 8:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-13 13:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-05-13 4:34 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-05-14 7:33 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-05-14 8:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-14 9:05 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-05-14 9:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-14 10:05 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-05-14 10:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-18 2:01 ` Steve Rutherford
2021-05-19 12:06 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-05-19 13:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-14 9:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-05-14 9:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-14 9:33 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-05-19 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-19 23:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-23 15:59 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-05-12 13:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-12 14:53 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2021-05-13 4:36 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-23 15:59 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-04-30 7:19 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Add guest support for SEV live migration Ashish Kalra
2021-04-30 7:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
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