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From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Connor Kuehl" <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
	"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>,
	"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	"Eduardo Habkost" <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/6] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2021 09:31:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YO1PbIPXem0E0Bgd@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e68a9760-121f-72ee-f8ae-193b92bde403@linux.ibm.com>

* Dov Murik (dovmurik@linux.ibm.com) wrote:
> Brijesh,
> 
> On 10/07/2021 0:55, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> > SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
> > new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity
> > protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
> > replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
> > encryption environment.
> > 
> > The patches to support the SEV-SNP in Linux kernel and OVMF are available:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210707181506.30489-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com/
> > https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210707183616.5620-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com/
> > https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77335?p=,,,20,0,0,0::Created,,posterid%3A5969970,20,2,20,83891508
> > 
> > The Qemu patches uses the command id added by the SEV-SNP hypervisor
> > patches to bootstrap the SEV-SNP VMs.
> > 
> > TODO:
> >  * Add support to filter CPUID values through the PSP.
> > 
> > Additional resources
> > ---------------------
> > SEV-SNP whitepaper
> > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
> > 
> > APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
> > 
> > GHCB spec:
> > https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
> > 
> > SEV-SNP firmware specification:
> > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
> > 
> > Brijesh Singh (6):
> >   linux-header: add the SNP specific command
> >   i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
> >   i386/sev: initialize SNP context
> >   i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
> >   i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
> >   i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
> > 
> >  docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt |  81 +++++-
> >  linux-headers/linux/kvm.h      |  47 ++++
> >  qapi/qom.json                  |   6 +
> >  target/i386/sev.c              | 498 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  target/i386/sev_i386.h         |   1 +
> >  target/i386/trace-events       |   4 +
> >  6 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> > 
> 
> It might be useful to allow the user to view SNP-related status/settings
> in HMP's `info sev` and QMP's qom-list/qom-get under
> /machine/confidential-guest-support .
> 
> (Not sure whether HMP is deprecated and new stuff should not be added
> there.)

It's still fine to add stuff to HMP, although generally you should be
adding it to QMP as well (unles sit's purely for debug and may change).

Dave

> Particularly confusing is the `policy` attribute which is only relevant
> for SEV / SEV-ES, while there's a new `snp.policy` attribute for SNP...
> Maybe the irrelevant attributes should not be added to the tree when not
> in SNP.
> 
> -Dov
> 
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK


  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-13  8:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-09 21:55 [RFC PATCH 0/6] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-07-09 21:55 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] linux-header: add the SNP specific command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-10 20:32   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-07-12 15:48     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 11:35   ` Dov Murik
2021-07-19 14:40     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-09 21:55 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12  6:09   ` Dov Murik
2021-07-12 14:34   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-12 15:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:16       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-12 14:43   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-07-12 15:56     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:24       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-07-13 13:54         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-13 18:21   ` Eric Blake
     [not found]   ` <87h7gy4990.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-07-14 14:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 19:42     ` Michael Roth
2021-07-20 21:54       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
     [not found]         ` <87h7gnbyqy.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org>
2021-07-22  0:02           ` Michael Roth
2021-07-09 21:55 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] i386/sev: initialize SNP context Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15  9:32   ` Dov Murik
2021-07-15 13:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-09 21:55 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 12:34   ` Dov Murik
2021-07-19 15:27     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-09 21:55 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 17:08   ` Connor Kuehl
2021-07-14 18:52     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15  5:54       ` Dov Murik
2021-07-19 13:00   ` Dov Murik
2021-07-09 21:55 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 17:29   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-14 18:53     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 11:24   ` Dov Murik
2021-07-19 14:45     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 17:00 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Tom Lendacky
2021-07-13  8:05 ` Dov Murik
2021-07-13  8:31   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2021-07-13 13:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-13 14:01   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14  9:52     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-14 14:23       ` Brijesh Singh

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