From: Andy Lutomirski <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <email@example.com>, Sean Christopherson <firstname.lastname@example.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <email@example.com>, Dave Hansen <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Peter Zijlstra <email@example.com>, Jim Mattson <firstname.lastname@example.org>, David Rientjes <email@example.com>, "Edgecombe, Rick P" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Kleen, Andi" <email@example.com>, "Yamahata, Isaku" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Erdem Aktas <email@example.com>, Steve Rutherford <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Peter Gonda <email@example.com>, David Hildenbrand <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Chao Peng <email@example.com>, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com Subject: Re: [RFCv2 13/13] KVM: unmap guest memory using poisoned pages Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2021 10:16:49 -0700 Message-ID: <firstname.lastname@example.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210521123148.a3t4uh4iezm6ax47@box> On 5/21/21 5:31 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > Hi Sean, > > The core patch of the approach we've discussed before is below. It > introduce a new page type with the required semantics. > > The full patchset can be found here: > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kas/linux.git kvm-unmapped-guest-only > > but only the patch below is relevant for TDX. QEMU patch is attached. > > CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_PROTECTED_MEMORY has to be changed to what is appropriate > for TDX and FOLL_GUEST has to be used in hva_to_pfn_slow() when running > TDX guest. > > When page get inserted into private sept we must make sure it is > PageGuest() or SIGBUS otherwise. Inserting PageGuest() into shared is > fine, but the page will not be accessible from userspace. I may have missed a detail, and I think Sean almost said this, but: I don't think that a single bit like this is sufficient. A KVM host can contain more than one TDX guest, and, to reliably avoid machine checks, I think we need to make sure that secure pages are only ever mapped into the guest to which they belong, as well as to the right GPA. If a KVM user host process creates a PageGuest page, what stops it from being mapped into two different guests? The refcount? After contemplating this a bit, I have a somewhat different suggestion, at least for TDX. In TDX, a guest logically has two entirely separate physical address spaces: the secure address space and the shared address space. They are managed separately, they have different contents, etc. Normally one would expect a given numerical address (with the secure selector bit masked off) to only exist in one of the two spaces, but nothing in the architecture fundamentally requires this. And switching a page between the secure and shared states is a heavyweight operation. So what if KVM actually treated them completely separately? The secure address space doesn't have any of the complex properties that the shared address space has. There are no paravirt pages there, no KSM pages there, no forked pages there, no MAP_ANONYMOUS pages there, no MMIO pages there, etc. There could be a KVM API to allocate and deallocate a secure page, and that would be it. This could be inefficient if a guest does a bunch of MapGPA calls and makes the shared address space highly sparse. That could potentially be mitigated by allowing a (shared) user memory region to come with a bitmap of which pages are actually mapped. Pages in the unmapped areas are holes, and KVM won't look through to the QEMU page tables. Does this make any sense? It would completely eliminate all this PageGuest stuff -- a secure page would be backed by a *kernel* allocation (potentially a pageable allocation a la tmpfs if TDX ever learns how to swap, but that's no currently possible nor would it be user visible), so the kernel can straightforwardly guarantee that user pagetables will not contain references to secure pages and that GUP will not be called on them. I'm not sure how this would map to SEV. Certainly, with some degree of host vs guest cooperation, SEV could work the same way, and the migration support is pushing SEV in that direction.
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-04-16 15:40 [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 01/13] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 02/13] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2021-04-19 10:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 03/13] x86/kvm: Make DMA pages shared Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 04/13] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 16:21 ` Dave Hansen 2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 05/13] x86/kvmclock: Share hvclock memory with the host Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 06/13] x86/realmode: Share trampoline area if KVM memory protection enabled Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-19 16:49 ` Dave Hansen 2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 07/13] mm: Add hwpoison_entry_to_pfn() and hwpoison_entry_to_page() Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 08/13] mm/gup: Add FOLL_ALLOW_POISONED Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 09/13] shmem: Fail shmem_getpage_gfp() on poisoned pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 10/13] mm: Keep page reference for hwpoison entries Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 11/13] mm: Replace hwpoison entry with present PTE if page got unpoisoned Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 12/13] KVM: passdown struct kvm to hva_to_pfn_slow() Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 13/13] KVM: unmap guest memory using poisoned pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-04-19 11:32 ` Xiaoyao Li 2021-04-19 14:26 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-19 16:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-04-19 16:40 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-19 18:09 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-04-19 18:12 ` David Hildenbrand 2021-04-19 18:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-19 20:09 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-04-19 22:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-20 17:13 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-05-21 12:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-05-26 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-05-31 20:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-06-02 17:51 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-06-02 23:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-06-03 19:46 ` Sean Christopherson 2021-06-04 14:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-06-04 17:16 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message] 2021-06-04 17:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2021-04-16 16:46 ` [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping Matthew Wilcox
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ --firstname.lastname@example.org \ --email@example.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
KVM Archive on lore.kernel.org Archives are clonable: git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/0 kvm/git/0.git # If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may # initialize and index your mirror using the following commands: public-inbox-init -V2 kvm kvm/ https://lore.kernel.org/kvm \ firstname.lastname@example.org public-inbox-index kvm Example config snippet for mirrors Newsgroup available over NNTP: nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/org.kernel.vger.kvm AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git