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From: bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Bug 203543] Starting with kernel 5.1.0-rc6,  kvm_intel can no longer be loaded in nested kvm/guests
Date: Wed, 08 May 2019 22:14:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bug-203543-28872-mCpNTawwAw@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bug-203543-28872@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/>

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203543

--- Comment #8 from Liran Alon (liran.alon@oracle.com) ---
+Paolo

What are your thoughts on this?
What is the reason that KVM relies on CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING to be exposed
from underlying CPU? How is it critical for it’s functionality?
If it’s because we want to make sure that we hide host PMCs, we should
condition this to be a min requirement of kvm_intel only in case underlying CPU
exposes PMU to begin with.
Do you agree? If yes, I can create the patch to fix this.

-Liran

> On 8 May 2019, at 16:51, bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org wrote:
> 
>
> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__bugzilla.kernel.org_show-5Fbug.cgi-3Fid-3D203543&d=DwIDaQ&c=RoP1YumCXCgaWHvlZYR8PZh8Bv7qIrMUB65eapI_JnE&r=Jk6Q8nNzkQ6LJ6g42qARkg6ryIDGQr-yKXPNGZbpTx0&m=7TirfLMNxYI-3Ygxm3kjDUB49Jwmk8bqD7671wy0hi8&s=Z_L1UqH19zon0ohDrCMU91ixA-Wn_vO7d-fO8s2G3PI&e=
> 
> --- Comment #5 from David Hill (hilld@binarystorm.net) ---
> I can confirm that reverting that commit solves the problem:
> 
> e51bfdb68725 ("KVM: nVMX: Expose RDPMC-exiting only when guest supports PMU”)
> 
> -- 
> You are receiving this mail because:
> You are watching the assignee of the bug.

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-05-08 22:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-07 20:45 [Bug 203543] New: Starting with kernel 5.1.0-rc6, kvm_intel can no longer be loaded in nested kvm/guests bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-07 23:23 ` Liran Alon
2019-05-07 23:29 ` [Bug 203543] " bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-08  4:08 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-08 12:44 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-08 12:46 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-08 13:51 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-08 16:00   ` Liran Alon
2019-05-08 16:21     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-08 16:10 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-08 16:29 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-08 22:14 ` bugzilla-daemon [this message]
2019-05-21 12:57   ` David Hill
2019-05-21 12:57 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-21 13:37 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-21 14:11   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-21 14:17     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-21 14:17 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-21 14:18 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-21 16:02 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-21 18:06 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-05-26 12:11   ` David Hill
2019-05-26 12:11 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-12-01 18:07 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-12-01 21:49 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-12-02  3:20 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-12-02  3:42 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-12-02  4:15 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-12-02  4:27 ` bugzilla-daemon
2019-12-02  4:44 ` bugzilla-daemon

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