From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A1D9C4360C for ; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 12:57:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD7FD21721 for ; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 12:57:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730890AbfJHM5W (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Oct 2019 08:57:22 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:6992 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730674AbfJHM5W (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Oct 2019 08:57:22 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098420.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x98CvL06091343 for ; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 08:57:21 -0400 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vgs8jv4ef-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 08 Oct 2019 08:57:19 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 8 Oct 2019 13:57:10 +0100 Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.160]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x98Cv8Ct47448312 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 8 Oct 2019 12:57:08 GMT Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DC03A405F; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 12:57:08 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1B7E4A4060; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 12:57:08 +0000 (GMT) Received: from oc3016276355.ibm.com (unknown [9.152.222.34]) by b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 8 Oct 2019 12:57:08 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] s390: vfio-ap: dynamic configuration support To: Halil Pasic , Tony Krowiak Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, freude@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, cohuck@redhat.com, mjrosato@linux.ibm.com, alex.williamson@redhat.com, kwankhede@nvidia.com, jjherne@linux.ibm.com References: <1568410018-10833-1-git-send-email-akrowiak@linux.ibm.com> <20191008124807.49022238.pasic@linux.ibm.com> From: Pierre Morel Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2019 14:57:07 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20191008124807.49022238.pasic@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19100812-4275-0000-0000-000003701639 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19100812-4276-0000-0000-000038831735 Message-Id: X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-08_05:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910080125 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org On 10/8/19 12:48 PM, Halil Pasic wrote: > On Fri, 13 Sep 2019 17:26:48 -0400 > Tony Krowiak wrote: > >> The current design for AP pass-through does not support making dynamic >> changes to the AP matrix of a running guest resulting in three deficiencies >> this patch series is intended to mitigate: >> >> 1. Adapters, domains and control domains can not be added to or removed >> from a running guest. In order to modify a guest's AP configuration, >> the guest must be terminated; only then can AP resources be assigned >> to or unassigned from the guest's matrix mdev. The new AP configuration >> becomes available to the guest when it is subsequently restarted. >> >> 2. The AP bus's /sys/bus/ap/apmask and /sys/bus/ap/aqmask interfaces can >> be modified by a root user without any restrictions. A change to either >> mask can result in AP queue devices being unbound from the vfio_ap >> device driver and bound to a zcrypt device driver even if a guest is >> using the queues, thus giving the host access to the guest's private >> crypto data and vice versa. >> >> 3. The APQNs derived from the Cartesian product of the APIDs of the >> adapters and APQIs of the domains assigned to a matrix mdev must >> reference an AP queue device bound to the vfio_ap device driver. >> >> This patch series introduces the following changes to the current design >> to alleviate the shortcomings described above as well as to implement more >> of the AP architecture: >> >> 1. A root user will be prevented from making changes to the AP bus's >> /sys/bus/ap/apmask or /sys/bus/ap/aqmask if the ownership of an APQN >> changes from the vfio_ap device driver to a zcrypt driver when the APQN >> is assigned to a matrix mdev. >> >> 2. The sysfs bind/unbind interfaces will be disabled for the vfio_ap >> device driver. >> > Doesn't this have the potential of breaking some userspace stuff that > might be out there? > >> 3. Allow AP resources to be assigned to or removed from a matrix mdev >> while a guest is using it and hot plug the resource into or hot unplug >> the resource from the running guest. > This looks like a natural extension of the interface -- i.e. should not > break any userspace. > >> 4. Allow assignment of an AP adapter or domain to a matrix mdev even if it >> results in assignment of an APQN that does not reference an AP queue >> device bound to the vfio_ap device driver, as long as the APQN is owned >> by the vfio_ap driver. Allowing over-provisioning of AP resources >> better models the architecture which does not preclude assigning AP >> resources that are not yet available in the system. If/when the queue >> becomes available to the host, it will immediately also become available >> to the guest. > Same here -- I don't think this change breaks any userspace. > >> 1. Rationale for changes to AP bus's apmask/aqmask interfaces: >> ---------------------------------------------------------- >> Due to the extremely sensitive nature of cryptographic data, it is >> imperative that great care be taken to ensure that such data is secured. >> Allowing a root user, either inadvertently or maliciously, to configure >> these masks such that a queue is shared between the host and a guest is >> not only avoidable, it is advisable. Just curious: how is it possible to do such a configuration? >> It was suggested that this scenario >> is better handled in user space with management software, but that does >> not preclude a malicious administrator from using the sysfs interfaces >> to gain access to a guest's crypto data. It was also suggested that this >> scenario could be avoided by taking access to the adapter away from the >> guest and zeroing out the queues prior to the vfio_ap driver releasing the >> device; however, stealing an adapter in use from a guest as a by-product >> of an operation is bad and will likely cause problems for the guest >> unnecessarily. It was decided that the most effective solution with the >> least number of negative side effects is to prevent the situation at the >> source. Stealing an adapter in use by a guest, insn't it what is done if we allow to unassign an AP/Domain using the unassign sysfs interface when the mediated device is in use by the guest? >> >> 2. Rationale for disabling bind/unbind interfaces for vfio_ap driver: >> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >> By disabling the bind/unbind interfaces for the vfio_ap device driver, >> the user is forced to use the AP bus's apmask/aqmask interfaces to control >> the probing and removing of AP queues. There are two primary reasons for >> disabling the bind/unbind interfaces for the vfio_ap device driver: >> >> * The device architecture does not provide a means to prevent unbinding >> a device from a device driver, so an AP queue device can be unbound >> from the vfio_ap driver even when the queue is in use by a guest. By >> disabling the unbind interface, the user is forced to use the AP bus's >> apmask/aqmask interfaces which will prevent this. >> > Isn't this fixed by your filtering (if implemented correctly)? BTW I believe > it solves the problem regardless whether the unbind was triggered by the > drivers unbind attribute or by a[pq]mask > >> * Binding of AP queues is controlled by the AP bus /sys/bus/ap/apmask and >> /sys/bus/ap/aqmask interfaces. If the masks indicate that an APQN is >> owned by zcrypt, trying to bind it to the vfio_ap device driver will >> fail; therefore, the bind interface is somewhat redundant and certainly >> unnecessary. >> >> >> >> Tony Krowiak (10): >> s390: vfio-ap: Refactor vfio_ap driver probe and remove callbacks >> s390: vfio-ap: allow assignment of unavailable AP resources to mdev >> device >> s390: vfio-ap: allow hot plug/unplug of AP resources using mdev device >> s390: vfio-ap: filter CRYCB bits for unavailable queue devices >> s390: vfio-ap: sysfs attribute to display the guest CRYCB >> s390: vfio-ap: update guest CRYCB in vfio_ap probe and remove >> callbacks >> s390: zcrypt: driver callback to indicate resource in use >> s390: vfio-ap: implement in-use callback for vfio_ap driver >> s390: vfio-ap: added versioning to vfio_ap module >> s390: vfio-ap: update documentation > I believe it would be worthwhile to reorder the patches (fixes and > re-factoring first, the features). > > Regards, > Halil > >> Documentation/s390/vfio-ap.rst | 899 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- >> drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c | 144 +++++- >> drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h | 4 + >> drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_drv.c | 27 +- >> drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_ops.c | 610 ++++++++++++++--------- >> drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_private.h | 12 +- >> 6 files changed, 1200 insertions(+), 496 deletions(-) >> -- Pierre Morel IBM Lab Boeblingen