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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de, sironi@amazon.de,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org, jmattson@google.com,
	rkrcmar@redhat.com, arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 09:27:42 +0100
Message-ID: <ef5f1242-c050-3259-8c48-b3797f8c248f@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1518305967-31356-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

On 11/02/2018 00:39, David Woodhouse wrote:
> Using retpoline ensures the kernel is safe because it doesn't contain
> any indirect branches, but firmware still can — and we make calls into
> firmware at runtime. Where the IBRS microcode support is available, use
> that before calling into firmware.
> 
> While doing that, I noticed that we were calling C functions without
> telling the compiler about the call-clobbered registers. Stop that.
> 
> This also contains the always_inline fix for the performance problem
> introduced by retpoline in KVM code, and fixes some other issues with
> the per-vCPU KVM handling for the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
> 
> Finally, update the microcode blacklist to reflect the latest
> information from Intel.
> 
> v2: Drop IBRS_ALL patch for the time being
>     Add KVM MSR fixes (karahmed)
>     Update microcode blacklist
> 
> 
> 
> David Woodhouse (4):
>   x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist
>   Revert "x86/speculation: Simplify
>     indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()"
>   KVM: x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in
>     slot_handle_level_range()
>   x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware
> 
> KarimAllah Ahmed (2):
>   X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs
>   KVM/nVMX: Set the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS if we have a valid L02 MSR
>     bitmap
> 
>  arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h           |  6 ++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |  1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h           | 17 +++++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h     |  3 ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 18 +++++++++++-------
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c          |  4 ----
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c                   | 10 +++++-----
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                   |  7 ++++---
>  drivers/watchdog/hpwdt.c             |  3 +++
>  10 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
> 

Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

  parent reply index

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-10 23:39 David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist David Woodhouse
2018-02-12  9:50   ` Darren Kenny
2018-02-12 14:16   ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-12 14:32     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] Revert "x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()" David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range() David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] KVM/nVMX: Set the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS if we have a valid L02 MSR bitmap David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 10:19   ` Ingo Molnar
     [not found]     ` <1518345844.3677.365.camel@amazon.co.uk>
2018-02-11 10:55       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 11:46   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-11 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates Ingo Molnar
     [not found] ` <1518362359-1005-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
2018-02-11 18:50   ` [PATCH] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details Ingo Molnar
2018-02-11 19:25     ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 19:43       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-12 15:30         ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13  8:04           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-12  8:27 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-02-13  7:59   ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates Ingo Molnar

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