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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/13] x86/sev: Rename global "sev_enabled" flag to "sev_guest"
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 10:02:38 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f6ed8566-6521-92f0-927e-1764d8074ce6@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210109004714.1341275-7-seanjc@google.com>

On 1/8/21 6:47 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Use "guest" instead of "enabled" for the global "running as an SEV guest"
> flag to avoid confusion over whether "sev_enabled" refers to the guest or
> the host.  This will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own
> purposes.
> 
> No functional change intended.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 +-
>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 4 ++--
>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 2 +-
>   3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> index 2f62bbdd9d12..9b3990928674 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
>   
>   extern u64 sme_me_mask;
>   extern u64 sev_status;
> -extern bool sev_enabled;
> +extern bool sev_guest;
>   
>   void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
>   			 unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index bc0833713be9..0f798355de03 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
>   DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
>   
> -bool sev_enabled __section(".data");
> +bool sev_guest __section(".data");
>   
>   /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
>   static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
> @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
>    */
>   bool sme_active(void)
>   {
> -	return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
> +	return sme_me_mask && !sev_guest;
>   }
>   
>   bool sev_active(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> index 6c5eb6f3f14f..91b6b899c02b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
> @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>   
>   		/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
>   		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> -		sev_enabled = true;
> +		sev_guest = true;
>   		physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
>   		return;
>   	}
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-11 16:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-09  0:47 [PATCH 00/13] KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 01/13] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 14:42   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 18:07     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 02/13] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 03/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 10:42   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-01-11 15:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 16:58       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-01-12 22:18         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 15:30   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 05/13] KVM: x86: Override reported SME/SEV feature flags with host mask Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86/sev: Rename global "sev_enabled" flag to "sev_guest" Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 16:02   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2021-01-11 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 17:58       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 20:28         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 07/13] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 16:03   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 08/13] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 09/13] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 10/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 11/13] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 17:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-11 20:59     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 12/13] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:47 ` [PATCH 13/13] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used Sean Christopherson

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