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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	kernel-team@android.com, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3/9] KVM: arm64: Move kvm_get_hyp_vector() out of header file
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 15:58:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201026155833.24847-4-will@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201026155833.24847-1-will@kernel.org>

kvm_get_hyp_vector() has only one caller, so move it out of kvm_mmu.h
and inline it into a new function, cpu_set_hyp_vector(), for setting
the vector.

Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 43 -----------------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c             | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
index 331394306cce..23182e7d9413 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -208,52 +208,9 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/*
- * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways,
- * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present:
- *
- * - If the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, the hardening sequence is
- *   placed in one of the vector slots, which is executed before jumping
- *   to the real vectors.
- *
- * - If the CPU also has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, the slot
- *   containing the hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page,
- *   and executed before jumping to the real vectors.
- *
- * - If the CPU only has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, then an
- *   empty slot is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and
- *   executed before jumping to the real vectors.
- *
- * Note that ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is somewhat incompatible with
- * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system
- * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored.
- */
 extern void *__kvm_bp_vect_base;
 extern int __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
 
-static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
-{
-	struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
-	void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
-	int slot = -1;
-
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) {
-		vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
-		slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
-	}
-
-	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) && !has_vhe()) {
-		vect = __kvm_bp_vect_base;
-		if (slot == -1)
-			slot = __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
-	}
-
-	if (slot != -1)
-		vect += slot * SZ_2K;
-
-	return vect;
-}
-
 #define kvm_phys_to_vttbr(addr)		phys_to_ttbr(addr)
 
 static __always_inline u64 kvm_get_vttbr(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index 322b0e5157cb..60adaf19d1a8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1356,13 +1356,55 @@ static void cpu_hyp_reset(void)
 		__hyp_reset_vectors();
 }
 
+/*
+ * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways,
+ * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present:
+ *
+ * - If the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, the hardening sequence is
+ *   placed in one of the vector slots, which is executed before jumping
+ *   to the real vectors.
+ *
+ * - If the CPU also has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, the slot
+ *   containing the hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page,
+ *   and executed before jumping to the real vectors.
+ *
+ * - If the CPU only has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, then an
+ *   empty slot is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and
+ *   executed before jumping to the real vectors.
+ *
+ * Note that ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS is somewhat incompatible with
+ * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system
+ * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored.
+ */
+static void cpu_set_hyp_vector(void)
+{
+	struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
+	void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
+	int slot = -1;
+
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) {
+		vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
+		slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
+	}
+
+	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS) && !has_vhe()) {
+		vect = __kvm_bp_vect_base;
+		if (slot == -1)
+			slot = __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
+	}
+
+	if (slot != -1)
+		vect += slot * SZ_2K;
+
+	*this_cpu_ptr_hyp_sym(kvm_hyp_vector) = (unsigned long)vect;
+}
+
 static void cpu_hyp_reinit(void)
 {
 	kvm_init_host_cpu_context(&this_cpu_ptr_hyp_sym(kvm_host_data)->host_ctxt);
 
 	cpu_hyp_reset();
-
-	*this_cpu_ptr_hyp_sym(kvm_hyp_vector) = (unsigned long)kvm_get_hyp_vector();
+	cpu_set_hyp_vector();
 
 	if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode())
 		kvm_timer_init_vhe();
-- 
2.29.0.rc2.309.g374f81d7ae-goog

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-10-26 15:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-26 15:58 [PATCH 0/9] Rework hyp vector handling Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 1/9] KVM: arm64: Remove redundant Spectre-v2 code from kvm_map_vector() Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 2/9] KVM: arm64: Tidy up kvm_map_vector() Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM: arm64: Make BP hardening globals static instead Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: arm64: Move BP hardening helpers into spectre.h Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: arm64: Re-jig logic when patching hardened hyp vectors Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 7/9] KVM: arm64: Allocate hyp vectors statically Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 8/9] arm64: spectre: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS to ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A Will Deacon
2020-10-26 15:58 ` [PATCH 9/9] arm64: spectre: Consolidate spectre-v3a detection Will Deacon

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