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From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>, Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 01/15] KVM: arm64: Harden __ctxt_sys_reg() against out-of-range values
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 11:29:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240419102935.1935571-2-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240419102935.1935571-1-maz@kernel.org>

The unsuspecting kernel tinkerer can be easily confused into
writing something that looks like this:

	ikey.lo = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1);

which seems vaguely sensible, until you realise that the second
parameter is the encoding of a sysreg, and not the index into
the vcpu sysreg file... Debugging what happens in this case is
an interesting exercise in head<->wall interactions.

As they often say: "Any resemblance to actual persons, living
or dead, or actual events is purely coincidental".

In order to save people's time, add some compile-time hardening
that will at least weed out the "stupidly out of range" values.
This will *not* catch anything that isn't a compile-time constant.

Reviewed-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 9e8a496fb284..e24bd876ec9a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
  * Don't bother with VNCR-based accesses in the nVHE code, it has no
  * business dealing with NV.
  */
-static inline u64 *__ctxt_sys_reg(const struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt, int r)
+static inline u64 *___ctxt_sys_reg(const struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt, int r)
 {
 #if !defined (__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__)
 	if (unlikely(cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_NESTED_VIRT) &&
@@ -906,6 +906,13 @@ static inline u64 *__ctxt_sys_reg(const struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt, int r)
 	return (u64 *)&ctxt->sys_regs[r];
 }
 
+#define __ctxt_sys_reg(c,r)						\
+	({								\
+	    	BUILD_BUG_ON(__builtin_constant_p(r) &&			\
+			     (r) >= NR_SYS_REGS);			\
+		___ctxt_sys_reg(c, r);					\
+	})
+
 #define ctxt_sys_reg(c,r)	(*__ctxt_sys_reg(c,r))
 
 u64 kvm_vcpu_sanitise_vncr_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *, enum vcpu_sysreg);
-- 
2.39.2


  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-19 10:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-19 10:29 [PATCH v4 00/15] KVM/arm64: Add NV support for ERET and PAuth Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] KVM: arm64: Add helpers for ESR_ELx_ERET_ISS_ERET* Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] KVM: arm64: Constraint PAuth support to consistent implementations Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Drop VCPU_HYP_CONTEXT flag Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Configure HCR_EL2 for FEAT_NV2 Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Add trap forwarding for ERET and SMC Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Fast-track 'InHost' exception returns Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Honor HFGITR_EL2.ERET being set Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle HCR_EL2.{API,APK} independently Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Reinject PAC exceptions caused by HCR_EL2.API==0 Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Add kvm_has_pauth() helper Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Add emulation for ERETAx instructions Marc Zyngier
2024-04-23  9:22   ` Jon Hunter
2024-04-23  9:40     ` Zenghui Yu
2024-04-23 11:42       ` Marc Zyngier
2024-04-23 12:30         ` Jon Hunter
2024-04-23 12:09       ` Jon Hunter
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle ERETA[AB] instructions Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] KVM: arm64: nv: Advertise support for PAuth Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 10:29 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] KVM: arm64: Drop trapping of PAuth instructions/keys Marc Zyngier
2024-04-19 17:59 ` [PATCH v4 00/15] KVM/arm64: Add NV support for ERET and PAuth Oliver Upton
2024-04-20 11:49   ` Marc Zyngier
2024-04-20 12:18 ` Marc Zyngier

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