* [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down [not found] <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> @ 2019-08-20 0:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 22:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett 2 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 0:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: jmorris Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Matthew Garrett, Matthew Garrett, David Howells, Kees Cook, linux-acpi From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> --- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c index b2ef4c2ec955..7031307becd7 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -29,6 +30,11 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, struct acpi_table_header table; acpi_status status; + int ret; + + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES); + if (ret) + return ret; if (!(*ppos)) { /* parse the table header to get the table length */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 010637a79eac..390e39395112 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS, LOCKDOWN_IOPORT, LOCKDOWN_MSR, + LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index b1c1c72440d5..6d44db0ddffa 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", + [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; -- 2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 22:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Rafael J. Wysocki @ 2019-08-20 22:07 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Matthew Garrett Cc: jmorris, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Matthew Garrett, Matthew Garrett, David Howells, Kees Cook, linux-acpi On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 2:17:50 AM CEST Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> > > custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making > it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. > Disable it if the kernel is locked down. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> > --- > drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/security.h | 1 + > security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + > 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c > index b2ef4c2ec955..7031307becd7 100644 > --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c > +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > #include <linux/debugfs.h> > #include <linux/acpi.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > > #include "internal.h" > > @@ -29,6 +30,11 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, > > struct acpi_table_header table; > acpi_status status; > + int ret; > + > + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > > if (!(*ppos)) { > /* parse the table header to get the table length */ > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 010637a79eac..390e39395112 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { > LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS, > LOCKDOWN_IOPORT, > LOCKDOWN_MSR, > + LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES, > LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, > }; > diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > index b1c1c72440d5..6d44db0ddffa 100644 > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { > [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", > [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", > [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", > + [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", > [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", > [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", > }; > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down [not found] <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 0:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett 2 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 0:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: jmorris Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Josh Boyer, David Howells, Matthew Garrett, Kees Cook, Dave Young, linux-acpi From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware. Reject the option when the kernel is locked down. This requires some reworking of the existing RSDP command line logic, since the early boot code also makes use of a command-line passed RSDP when locating the SRAT table before the lockdown code has been initialised. This is achieved by separating the command line RSDP path in the early boot code from the generic RSDP path, and then copying the command line RSDP into boot params in the kernel proper if lockdown is not enabled. If lockdown is enabled and an RSDP is provided on the command line, this will only be used when parsing SRAT (which shouldn't permit kernel code execution) and will be ignored in the rest of the kernel. (Modified by Matthew Garrett in order to handle the early boot RSDP environment) Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 1 + drivers/acpi/osl.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/acpi.h | 6 ++++++ 7 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c index ad84239e595e..e726e9b44bb1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct mem_vector immovable_mem[MAX_NUMNODES*2]; */ #define MAX_ADDR_LEN 19 -static acpi_physical_address get_acpi_rsdp(void) +static acpi_physical_address get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp(void) { acpi_physical_address addr = 0; @@ -215,10 +215,7 @@ acpi_physical_address get_rsdp_addr(void) { acpi_physical_address pa; - pa = get_acpi_rsdp(); - - if (!pa) - pa = boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; + pa = boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; if (!pa) pa = efi_get_rsdp_addr(); @@ -240,7 +237,17 @@ static unsigned long get_acpi_srat_table(void) char arg[10]; u8 *entry; - rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)(long)boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; + /* + * Check whether we were given an RSDP on the command line. We don't + * stash this in boot params because the kernel itself may have + * different ideas about whether to trust a command-line parameter. + */ + rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp(); + + if (!rsdp) + rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)(long) + boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; + if (!rsdp) return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h index aac686e1e005..bc9693c9107e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h @@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void) return !!acpi_lapic; } +#define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER +static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) +{ + x86_init.acpi.set_root_pointer(addr); +} + #define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void) { @@ -125,6 +131,7 @@ static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void) void acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init(void); +void x86_default_set_root_pointer(u64 addr); u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void); #else /* !CONFIG_ACPI */ @@ -138,6 +145,8 @@ static inline void disable_acpi(void) { } static inline void acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init(void) { } +static inline void x86_default_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) { } + static inline u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void) { return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h index b85a7c54c6a1..d584128435cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h @@ -134,10 +134,12 @@ struct x86_hyper_init { /** * struct x86_init_acpi - x86 ACPI init functions + * @set_root_poitner: set RSDP address * @get_root_pointer: get RSDP address * @reduced_hw_early_init: hardware reduced platform early init */ struct x86_init_acpi { + void (*set_root_pointer)(u64 addr); u64 (*get_root_pointer)(void); void (*reduced_hw_early_init)(void); }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c index 17b33ef604f3..04205ce127a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c @@ -1760,6 +1760,11 @@ void __init arch_reserve_mem_area(acpi_physical_address addr, size_t size) e820__update_table_print(); } +void x86_default_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) +{ + boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr = addr; +} + u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void) { return boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c index 50a2b492fdd6..d0b8f5585a73 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct x86_init_ops x86_init __initdata = { }, .acpi = { + .set_root_pointer = x86_default_set_root_pointer, .get_root_pointer = x86_default_get_root_pointer, .reduced_hw_early_init = acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init, }, diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c index cc7507091dec..b7c3aeb175dd 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/semaphore.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -180,8 +181,19 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void) acpi_physical_address pa; #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC - if (acpi_rsdp) + /* + * We may have been provided with an RSDP on the command line, + * but if a malicious user has done so they may be pointing us + * at modified ACPI tables that could alter kernel behaviour - + * so, we check the lockdown status before making use of + * it. If we trust it then also stash it in an architecture + * specific location (if appropriate) so it can be carried + * over further kexec()s. + */ + if (acpi_rsdp && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES)) { + acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(acpi_rsdp); return acpi_rsdp; + } #endif pa = acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(); if (pa) diff --git a/include/linux/acpi.h b/include/linux/acpi.h index d315d86844e4..268a4d91f54c 100644 --- a/include/linux/acpi.h +++ b/include/linux/acpi.h @@ -632,6 +632,12 @@ bool acpi_gtdt_c3stop(int type); int acpi_arch_timer_mem_init(struct arch_timer_mem *timer_mem, int *timer_count); #endif +#ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER +static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) +{ +} +#endif + #ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void) { -- 2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Rafael J. Wysocki @ 2019-08-20 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Matthew Garrett Cc: jmorris, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Josh Boyer, David Howells, Matthew Garrett, Kees Cook, Dave Young, linux-acpi On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 2:17:51 AM CEST Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> > > This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which > makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware. Reject > the option when the kernel is locked down. This requires some reworking > of the existing RSDP command line logic, since the early boot code also > makes use of a command-line passed RSDP when locating the SRAT table > before the lockdown code has been initialised. This is achieved by > separating the command line RSDP path in the early boot code from the > generic RSDP path, and then copying the command line RSDP into boot > params in the kernel proper if lockdown is not enabled. If lockdown is > enabled and an RSDP is provided on the command line, this will only be > used when parsing SRAT (which shouldn't permit kernel code execution) > and will be ignored in the rest of the kernel. > > (Modified by Matthew Garrett in order to handle the early boot RSDP > environment) > > Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> > cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ > arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 9 +++++++++ > arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 ++ > arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 5 +++++ > arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 1 + > drivers/acpi/osl.c | 14 +++++++++++++- > include/linux/acpi.h | 6 ++++++ > 7 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c > index ad84239e595e..e726e9b44bb1 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c > +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c > @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct mem_vector immovable_mem[MAX_NUMNODES*2]; > */ > #define MAX_ADDR_LEN 19 > > -static acpi_physical_address get_acpi_rsdp(void) > +static acpi_physical_address get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp(void) > { > acpi_physical_address addr = 0; > > @@ -215,10 +215,7 @@ acpi_physical_address get_rsdp_addr(void) > { > acpi_physical_address pa; > > - pa = get_acpi_rsdp(); > - > - if (!pa) > - pa = boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; > + pa = boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; > > if (!pa) > pa = efi_get_rsdp_addr(); > @@ -240,7 +237,17 @@ static unsigned long get_acpi_srat_table(void) > char arg[10]; > u8 *entry; > > - rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)(long)boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; > + /* > + * Check whether we were given an RSDP on the command line. We don't > + * stash this in boot params because the kernel itself may have > + * different ideas about whether to trust a command-line parameter. > + */ > + rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp(); > + > + if (!rsdp) > + rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)(long) > + boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; > + > if (!rsdp) > return 0; > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h > index aac686e1e005..bc9693c9107e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h > @@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void) > return !!acpi_lapic; > } > > +#define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER > +static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) > +{ > + x86_init.acpi.set_root_pointer(addr); > +} > + > #define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER > static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void) > { > @@ -125,6 +131,7 @@ static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void) > > void acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init(void); > > +void x86_default_set_root_pointer(u64 addr); > u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void); > > #else /* !CONFIG_ACPI */ > @@ -138,6 +145,8 @@ static inline void disable_acpi(void) { } > > static inline void acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init(void) { } > > +static inline void x86_default_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) { } > + > static inline u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void) > { > return 0; > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h > index b85a7c54c6a1..d584128435cb 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h > @@ -134,10 +134,12 @@ struct x86_hyper_init { > > /** > * struct x86_init_acpi - x86 ACPI init functions > + * @set_root_poitner: set RSDP address > * @get_root_pointer: get RSDP address > * @reduced_hw_early_init: hardware reduced platform early init > */ > struct x86_init_acpi { > + void (*set_root_pointer)(u64 addr); > u64 (*get_root_pointer)(void); > void (*reduced_hw_early_init)(void); > }; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c > index 17b33ef604f3..04205ce127a1 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c > @@ -1760,6 +1760,11 @@ void __init arch_reserve_mem_area(acpi_physical_address addr, size_t size) > e820__update_table_print(); > } > > +void x86_default_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) > +{ > + boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr = addr; > +} > + > u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer(void) > { > return boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c > index 50a2b492fdd6..d0b8f5585a73 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c > @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct x86_init_ops x86_init __initdata = { > }, > > .acpi = { > + .set_root_pointer = x86_default_set_root_pointer, > .get_root_pointer = x86_default_get_root_pointer, > .reduced_hw_early_init = acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init, > }, > diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c > index cc7507091dec..b7c3aeb175dd 100644 > --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c > +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ > #include <linux/list.h> > #include <linux/jiffies.h> > #include <linux/semaphore.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > > #include <asm/io.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > @@ -180,8 +181,19 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void) > acpi_physical_address pa; > > #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC > - if (acpi_rsdp) > + /* > + * We may have been provided with an RSDP on the command line, > + * but if a malicious user has done so they may be pointing us > + * at modified ACPI tables that could alter kernel behaviour - > + * so, we check the lockdown status before making use of > + * it. If we trust it then also stash it in an architecture > + * specific location (if appropriate) so it can be carried > + * over further kexec()s. > + */ > + if (acpi_rsdp && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES)) { > + acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(acpi_rsdp); > return acpi_rsdp; > + } > #endif > pa = acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(); > if (pa) > diff --git a/include/linux/acpi.h b/include/linux/acpi.h > index d315d86844e4..268a4d91f54c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/acpi.h > +++ b/include/linux/acpi.h > @@ -632,6 +632,12 @@ bool acpi_gtdt_c3stop(int type); > int acpi_arch_timer_mem_init(struct arch_timer_mem *timer_mem, int *timer_count); > #endif > > +#ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER > +static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer(u64 addr) > +{ > +} > +#endif > + > #ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER > static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void) > { > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down [not found] <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 0:17 ` Matthew Garrett 2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 0:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: jmorris Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Linn Crosetto, David Howells, Matthew Garrett, Kees Cook, linux-acpi From: Linn Crosetto <lcrosetto@gmail.com> >From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt): If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an instrumented, modified one. When lockdown is enabled, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <lcrosetto@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> --- drivers/acpi/tables.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c index de974322a197..b7c29a11c0c1 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/earlycpio.h> #include <linux/initrd.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h" #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT @@ -577,6 +578,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void) if (table_nr == 0) return; + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES)) { + pr_notice("kernel is locked down, ignoring table override\n"); + return; + } + acpi_tables_addr = memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS, all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE); -- 2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down 2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett @ 2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Rafael J. Wysocki @ 2019-08-20 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Matthew Garrett Cc: jmorris, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-api, Linn Crosetto, David Howells, Matthew Garrett, Kees Cook, linux-acpi On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 2:17:52 AM CEST Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Linn Crosetto <lcrosetto@gmail.com> > > >From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt): > > If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible > to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an > instrumented, modified one. > > When lockdown is enabled, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated > changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, > so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down. > > Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <lcrosetto@gmail.com> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> > --- > drivers/acpi/tables.c | 6 ++++++ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c > index de974322a197..b7c29a11c0c1 100644 > --- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c > +++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ > #include <linux/memblock.h> > #include <linux/earlycpio.h> > #include <linux/initrd.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include "internal.h" > > #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT > @@ -577,6 +578,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void) > if (table_nr == 0) > return; > > + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES)) { > + pr_notice("kernel is locked down, ignoring table override\n"); > + return; > + } > + > acpi_tables_addr = > memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS, > all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE); > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-08-20 22:08 UTC | newest]
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[not found] <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2019-08-20 0:17 ` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-20 22:08 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
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