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* [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
@ 2020-04-13 21:15 Waiman Long
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
                   ` (4 more replies)
  0 siblings, 5 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-13 21:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches, Matthew Wilcox,
	David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, Waiman Long,
	linux-crypto, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt,
	linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs,
	netdev, linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

This patchset makes a global rename of the kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
to highlight the fact buffer clearing is only needed if the data objects
contain sensitive information like encrpytion key. The fact that kzfree()
uses memset() to do the clearing isn't totally safe either as compiler
may compile out the clearing in their optimizer. Instead, the new
kfree_sensitive() uses memzero_explicit() which won't get compiled out.

Waiman Long (2):
  mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()

 arch/s390/crypto/prng.c                       |  4 +--
 arch/x86/power/hibernate.c                    |  2 +-
 crypto/adiantum.c                             |  2 +-
 crypto/ahash.c                                |  4 +--
 crypto/api.c                                  |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c        |  4 +--
 crypto/deflate.c                              |  2 +-
 crypto/drbg.c                                 | 10 +++---
 crypto/ecc.c                                  |  8 ++---
 crypto/ecdh.c                                 |  2 +-
 crypto/gcm.c                                  |  2 +-
 crypto/gf128mul.c                             |  4 +--
 crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c                  |  2 +-
 crypto/rng.c                                  |  2 +-
 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c                         |  6 ++--
 crypto/seqiv.c                                |  2 +-
 crypto/shash.c                                |  2 +-
 crypto/skcipher.c                             |  2 +-
 crypto/testmgr.c                              |  6 ++--
 crypto/zstd.c                                 |  2 +-
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 17 +++-------
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 18 +++-------
 drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 14 +++-----
 drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c                    |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c                 | 28 +++++++--------
 drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c        |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c  | 12 +++----
 drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c     |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c        |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c           |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c                |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c          |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c              |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c                |  8 ++---
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c         |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +-
 drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c            |  2 +-
 .../crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c  |  6 ++--
 .../marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h       |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c             |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c                        |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c    | 12 +++----
 drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c    |  2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c                         | 34 +++++++++----------
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c                     |  6 ++--
 drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c                         |  6 ++--
 .../hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c         |  2 +-
 .../net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c    |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c                    |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c                 |  4 +--
 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c                  |  2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c  |  2 +-
 .../net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c  |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c  |  4 +--
 drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h                  |  4 +--
 drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c            |  2 +-
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c |  2 +-
 drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c        |  2 +-
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c      |  2 +-
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c                              |  2 +-
 fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c                         |  2 +-
 fs/cifs/connect.c                             | 10 +++---
 fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c                           |  2 +-
 fs/cifs/misc.c                                |  8 ++---
 fs/crypto/keyring.c                           |  6 ++--
 fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c                       |  4 +--
 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c                        |  4 +--
 fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c                       |  2 +-
 include/crypto/aead.h                         |  2 +-
 include/crypto/akcipher.h                     |  2 +-
 include/crypto/gf128mul.h                     |  2 +-
 include/crypto/hash.h                         |  2 +-
 include/crypto/internal/acompress.h           |  2 +-
 include/crypto/kpp.h                          |  2 +-
 include/crypto/skcipher.h                     |  2 +-
 include/linux/slab.h                          |  2 +-
 lib/mpi/mpiutil.c                             |  6 ++--
 lib/test_kasan.c                              |  6 ++--
 mm/slab_common.c                              | 10 +++---
 net/atm/mpoa_caches.c                         |  4 +--
 net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c                   |  6 ++--
 net/bluetooth/smp.c                           | 24 ++++++-------
 net/core/sock.c                               |  2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c                       |  2 +-
 net/mac80211/aead_api.c                       |  4 +--
 net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c                       |  2 +-
 net/mac80211/key.c                            |  2 +-
 net/mac802154/llsec.c                         | 20 +++++------
 net/sctp/auth.c                               |  2 +-
 net/sctp/socket.c                             |  2 +-
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c         |  4 +--
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c           |  6 ++--
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c           |  2 +-
 net/tipc/crypto.c                             | 10 +++---
 net/wireless/core.c                           |  2 +-
 net/wireless/ibss.c                           |  4 +--
 net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c            |  2 +-
 net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c             |  2 +-
 net/wireless/nl80211.c                        | 24 ++++++-------
 net/wireless/sme.c                            |  6 ++--
 net/wireless/util.c                           |  2 +-
 net/wireless/wext-sme.c                       |  2 +-
 scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci       |  4 +--
 scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci      |  4 +--
 scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci           |  6 ++--
 scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci       |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/domain.c                    |  4 +--
 security/apparmor/include/file.h              |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy.c                    | 24 ++++++-------
 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c                 |  6 ++--
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c             | 14 ++++----
 security/keys/big_key.c                       |  6 ++--
 security/keys/dh.c                            | 14 ++++----
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      | 14 ++++----
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c     | 34 +++++++++----------
 security/keys/user_defined.c                  |  6 ++--
 117 files changed, 332 insertions(+), 358 deletions(-)

-- 
2.18.1


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-13 21:15 ` Waiman Long
  2020-04-14  0:29   ` David Rientjes
                     ` (5 more replies)
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 6 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-13 21:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches, Matthew Wilcox,
	David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, Waiman Long,
	linux-crypto, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt,
	linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs,
	netdev, linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the
recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API
more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the
memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/\bkzfree\b/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and the
use of memzero_explicit() instead of memset().

Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
 arch/s390/crypto/prng.c                       |  4 +--
 arch/x86/power/hibernate.c                    |  2 +-
 crypto/adiantum.c                             |  2 +-
 crypto/ahash.c                                |  4 +--
 crypto/api.c                                  |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c        |  4 +--
 crypto/deflate.c                              |  2 +-
 crypto/drbg.c                                 | 10 +++---
 crypto/ecc.c                                  |  8 ++---
 crypto/ecdh.c                                 |  2 +-
 crypto/gcm.c                                  |  2 +-
 crypto/gf128mul.c                             |  4 +--
 crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c                  |  2 +-
 crypto/rng.c                                  |  2 +-
 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c                         |  6 ++--
 crypto/seqiv.c                                |  2 +-
 crypto/shash.c                                |  2 +-
 crypto/skcipher.c                             |  2 +-
 crypto/testmgr.c                              |  6 ++--
 crypto/zstd.c                                 |  2 +-
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      |  2 +-
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c                    |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c                 | 28 +++++++--------
 drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c        |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c  | 12 +++----
 drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c     |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c        |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c           |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c                |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c          |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c              |  6 ++--
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c                |  8 ++---
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c         |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c            |  2 +-
 .../crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c  |  6 ++--
 .../marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h       |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c             |  2 +-
 drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c                        |  4 +--
 drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c    | 12 +++----
 drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c    |  2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c                         | 34 +++++++++----------
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c                     |  6 ++--
 drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c                         |  6 ++--
 .../hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c         |  2 +-
 .../net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c    |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c                    |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c                 |  4 +--
 drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c                  |  2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c  |  2 +-
 .../net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c  |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c  |  4 +--
 drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h                  |  4 +--
 drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c            |  2 +-
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c |  2 +-
 drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c        |  2 +-
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c      |  2 +-
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c                              |  2 +-
 fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c                         |  2 +-
 fs/cifs/connect.c                             | 10 +++---
 fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c                           |  2 +-
 fs/cifs/misc.c                                |  8 ++---
 fs/crypto/keyring.c                           |  6 ++--
 fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c                       |  4 +--
 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c                        |  4 +--
 fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c                       |  2 +-
 include/crypto/aead.h                         |  2 +-
 include/crypto/akcipher.h                     |  2 +-
 include/crypto/gf128mul.h                     |  2 +-
 include/crypto/hash.h                         |  2 +-
 include/crypto/internal/acompress.h           |  2 +-
 include/crypto/kpp.h                          |  2 +-
 include/crypto/skcipher.h                     |  2 +-
 include/linux/slab.h                          |  2 +-
 lib/mpi/mpiutil.c                             |  6 ++--
 lib/test_kasan.c                              |  6 ++--
 mm/slab_common.c                              | 10 +++---
 net/atm/mpoa_caches.c                         |  4 +--
 net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c                   |  6 ++--
 net/bluetooth/smp.c                           | 24 ++++++-------
 net/core/sock.c                               |  2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c                       |  2 +-
 net/mac80211/aead_api.c                       |  4 +--
 net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c                       |  2 +-
 net/mac80211/key.c                            |  2 +-
 net/mac802154/llsec.c                         | 20 +++++------
 net/sctp/auth.c                               |  2 +-
 net/sctp/socket.c                             |  2 +-
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c         |  4 +--
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c           |  6 ++--
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c           |  2 +-
 net/tipc/crypto.c                             | 10 +++---
 net/wireless/core.c                           |  2 +-
 net/wireless/ibss.c                           |  4 +--
 net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c            |  2 +-
 net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c             |  2 +-
 net/wireless/nl80211.c                        | 24 ++++++-------
 net/wireless/sme.c                            |  6 ++--
 net/wireless/util.c                           |  2 +-
 net/wireless/wext-sme.c                       |  2 +-
 scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci       |  4 +--
 scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci      |  4 +--
 scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci           |  6 ++--
 scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci       |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/domain.c                    |  4 +--
 security/apparmor/include/file.h              |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy.c                    | 24 ++++++-------
 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c                 |  6 ++--
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c             | 14 ++++----
 security/keys/big_key.c                       |  6 ++--
 security/keys/dh.c                            | 14 ++++----
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      | 14 ++++----
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c     | 34 +++++++++----------
 security/keys/user_defined.c                  |  6 ++--
 116 files changed, 323 insertions(+), 323 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
index d977643fa627..04caac037b7a 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static void prng_tdes_deinstantiate(void)
 {
 	pr_debug("The prng module stopped "
 		 "after running in triple DES mode\n");
-	kzfree(prng_data);
+	kfree_sensitive(prng_data);
 }
 
 
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int __init prng_sha512_instantiate(void)
 static void prng_sha512_deinstantiate(void)
 {
 	pr_debug("The prng module stopped after running in SHA-512 mode\n");
-	kzfree(prng_data);
+	kfree_sensitive(prng_data);
 }
 
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
index fc413717a45f..45e8b775b88e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int get_e820_md5(struct e820_table *table, void *buf)
 	if (crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)table, size, buf))
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 
 free_tfm:
 	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
diff --git a/crypto/adiantum.c b/crypto/adiantum.c
index cf2b9f4103dd..b7824e214961 100644
--- a/crypto/adiantum.c
+++ b/crypto/adiantum.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static int adiantum_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	keyp += NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE;
 	WARN_ON(keyp != &data->derived_keys[ARRAY_SIZE(data->derived_keys)]);
 out:
-	kzfree(data);
+	kfree_sensitive(data);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/ahash.c b/crypto/ahash.c
index 68a0f0cb75c4..d9d65d1cc669 100644
--- a/crypto/ahash.c
+++ b/crypto/ahash.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static int ahash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	ret = tfm->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
-	kzfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void ahash_restore_req(struct ahash_request *req, int err)
 	req->priv = NULL;
 
 	/* Free the req->priv.priv from the ADJUSTED request. */
-	kzfree(priv);
+	kfree_sensitive(priv);
 }
 
 static void ahash_notify_einprogress(struct ahash_request *req)
diff --git a/crypto/api.c b/crypto/api.c
index 7d71a9b10e5f..5fa4fac4bd02 100644
--- a/crypto/api.c
+++ b/crypto/api.c
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ void crypto_destroy_tfm(void *mem, struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 		alg->cra_exit(tfm);
 	crypto_exit_ops(tfm);
 	crypto_mod_put(alg);
-	kzfree(mem);
+	kfree_sensitive(mem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_destroy_tfm);
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index cc9dbcecaaca..7553ab18db89 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
 	}
 
 error:
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 error_no_desc:
 	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
 	kleave(" = %d", ret);
@@ -447,6 +447,6 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 	ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
 
 error:
-	kzfree(ctx.digest);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx.digest);
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/deflate.c b/crypto/deflate.c
index 4c0e6c9d942a..b2a46f6dc961 100644
--- a/crypto/deflate.c
+++ b/crypto/deflate.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void __deflate_exit(void *ctx)
 static void deflate_free_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
 {
 	__deflate_exit(ctx);
-	kzfree(ctx);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
 }
 
 static void deflate_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index b6929eb5f565..2e4b2189636e 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1206,19 +1206,19 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	if (!drbg)
 		return;
-	kzfree(drbg->Vbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(drbg->Vbuf);
 	drbg->Vbuf = NULL;
 	drbg->V = NULL;
-	kzfree(drbg->Cbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(drbg->Cbuf);
 	drbg->Cbuf = NULL;
 	drbg->C = NULL;
-	kzfree(drbg->scratchpadbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(drbg->scratchpadbuf);
 	drbg->scratchpadbuf = NULL;
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
 	drbg->d_ops = NULL;
 	drbg->core = NULL;
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
-		kzfree(drbg->prev);
+		kfree_sensitive(drbg->prev);
 		drbg->prev = NULL;
 		drbg->fips_primed = false;
 	}
@@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	struct sdesc *sdesc = (struct sdesc *)drbg->priv_data;
 	if (sdesc) {
 		crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
-		kzfree(sdesc);
+		kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	}
 	drbg->priv_data = NULL;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
index 02d35be7702b..37540332c1f3 100644
--- a/crypto/ecc.c
+++ b/crypto/ecc.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static u64 *ecc_alloc_digits_space(unsigned int ndigits)
 
 static void ecc_free_digits_space(u64 *space)
 {
-	kzfree(space);
+	kfree_sensitive(space);
 }
 
 static struct ecc_point *ecc_alloc_point(unsigned int ndigits)
@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ static void ecc_free_point(struct ecc_point *p)
 	if (!p)
 		return;
 
-	kzfree(p->x);
-	kzfree(p->y);
-	kzfree(p);
+	kfree_sensitive(p->x);
+	kfree_sensitive(p->y);
+	kfree_sensitive(p);
 }
 
 static void vli_clear(u64 *vli, unsigned int ndigits)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh.c b/crypto/ecdh.c
index bd599053a8c4..b0232d6ab4ce 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int ecdh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
 
 	/* fall through */
 free_all:
-	kzfree(shared_secret);
+	kfree_sensitive(shared_secret);
 free_pubkey:
 	kfree(public_key);
 	return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/gcm.c b/crypto/gcm.c
index 0103d28c541e..5c2fbb08be56 100644
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
 			       CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	err = crypto_ahash_setkey(ghash, (u8 *)&data->hash, sizeof(be128));
 out:
-	kzfree(data);
+	kfree_sensitive(data);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/gf128mul.c b/crypto/gf128mul.c
index a4b1c026aaee..a69ae3e6c16c 100644
--- a/crypto/gf128mul.c
+++ b/crypto/gf128mul.c
@@ -304,8 +304,8 @@ void gf128mul_free_64k(struct gf128mul_64k *t)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		kzfree(t->t[i]);
-	kzfree(t);
+		kfree_sensitive(t->t[i]);
+	kfree_sensitive(t);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_free_64k);
 
diff --git a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
index a5ce8f96790f..bc5f969360ae 100644
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
 
 void jent_zfree(void *ptr)
 {
-	kzfree(ptr);
+	kfree_sensitive(ptr);
 }
 
 int jent_fips_enabled(void)
diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index 1490d210f1a1..a888d84b524a 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
 	err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
 	crypto_stats_rng_seed(alg, err);
 out:
-	kzfree(buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_rng_reset);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
index d31031de51bc..6c992eb5c72f 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 	sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst,
 			    sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, ctx->key_size),
 			    out_buf, ctx->key_size);
-	kzfree(out_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(out_buf);
 
 out:
 	req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 				out_buf + pos, req->dst_len);
 
 done:
-	kzfree(req_ctx->out_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 		   req->dst_len) != 0)
 		err = -EKEYREJECTED;
 done:
-	kzfree(req_ctx->out_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/seqiv.c b/crypto/seqiv.c
index f124b9b54e15..27b2387bc972 100644
--- a/crypto/seqiv.c
+++ b/crypto/seqiv.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err)
 	memcpy(req->iv, subreq->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
 
 out:
-	kzfree(subreq->iv);
+	kfree_sensitive(subreq->iv);
 }
 
 static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base,
diff --git a/crypto/shash.c b/crypto/shash.c
index c075b26c2a1d..fcd8d8c5408b 100644
--- a/crypto/shash.c
+++ b/crypto/shash.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int shash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	err = shash->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
-	kzfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c
index 7221def7b9a7..1c4a0d2132c3 100644
--- a/crypto/skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static int skcipher_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	ret = cipher->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
-	kzfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 6863f911fcee..23c27fc96394 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
 	kfree(vec.plaintext);
 	kfree(vec.digest);
 	crypto_free_shash(generic_tfm);
-	kzfree(generic_desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(generic_desc);
 	return err;
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
@@ -3665,7 +3665,7 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test, int pr,
 	if (IS_ERR(drng)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for "
 		       "%s\n", driver);
-		kzfree(buf);
+		kfree_sensitive(buf);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
@@ -3712,7 +3712,7 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test, int pr,
 
 outbuf:
 	crypto_free_rng(drng);
-	kzfree(buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/zstd.c b/crypto/zstd.c
index 5a3ff258d8f7..1a3309f066f7 100644
--- a/crypto/zstd.c
+++ b/crypto/zstd.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void __zstd_exit(void *ctx)
 static void zstd_free_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
 {
 	__zstd_exit(ctx);
-	kzfree(ctx);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
 }
 
 static void zstd_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
index a5fd8975f3d3..aa4e8fdc2b32 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static int sun8i_ce_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
 		offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
 		if (rctx->op_dir & CE_DECRYPTION) {
 			memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
-			kzfree(backup_iv);
+			kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
 		} else {
 			scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
 						 ivsize, 0);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
index 84d52fc3a2da..5246ef4f5430 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
 			if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
 				memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
 				memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
-				kzfree(backup_iv);
+				kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
 			} else {
 				scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
 							 ivsize, 0);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
index 9819dd50fbad..fd1269900d67 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
@@ -254,8 +254,8 @@ static int meson_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
 		}
 	}
 theend:
-	kzfree(bkeyiv);
-	kzfree(backup_iv);
+	kfree_sensitive(bkeyiv);
+	kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c b/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c
index ff02cc05affb..9bd8e5167be3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void atmel_ecdh_done(struct atmel_i2c_work_data *work_data, void *areq,
 
 	/* fall through */
 free_work_data:
-	kzfree(work_data);
+	kfree_sensitive(work_data);
 	kpp_request_complete(req, status);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
index 4fcae37a2e33..203bcd66f8b0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
@@ -850,14 +850,14 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec(struct akcipher_request *req)
 
 static void caam_rsa_free_key(struct caam_rsa_key *key)
 {
-	kzfree(key->d);
-	kzfree(key->p);
-	kzfree(key->q);
-	kzfree(key->dp);
-	kzfree(key->dq);
-	kzfree(key->qinv);
-	kzfree(key->tmp1);
-	kzfree(key->tmp2);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->d);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->p);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->q);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->dp);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->dq);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->qinv);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->tmp1);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->tmp2);
 	kfree(key->e);
 	kfree(key->n);
 	memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
@@ -1014,17 +1014,17 @@ static void caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx,
 	return;
 
 free_dq:
-	kzfree(rsa_key->dq);
+	kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dq);
 free_dp:
-	kzfree(rsa_key->dp);
+	kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dp);
 free_tmp2:
-	kzfree(rsa_key->tmp2);
+	kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp2);
 free_tmp1:
-	kzfree(rsa_key->tmp1);
+	kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp1);
 free_q:
-	kzfree(rsa_key->q);
+	kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->q);
 free_p:
-	kzfree(rsa_key->p);
+	kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->p);
 }
 
 static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c
index 0f72e9abdefe..a15245992cf9 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void cleanup_worker_threads(struct cpt_vf *cptvf)
 	for (i = 0; i < cptvf->nr_queues; i++)
 		tasklet_kill(&cwqe_info->vq_wqe[i].twork);
 
-	kzfree(cwqe_info);
+	kfree_sensitive(cwqe_info);
 	cptvf->wqe_info = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static void free_pending_queues(struct pending_qinfo *pqinfo)
 			continue;
 
 		/* free single queue */
-		kzfree((queue->head));
+		kfree_sensitive((queue->head));
 
 		queue->front = 0;
 		queue->rear = 0;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void free_command_queues(struct cpt_vf *cptvf,
 			chunk->head = NULL;
 			chunk->dma_addr = 0;
 			hlist_del(&chunk->nextchunk);
-			kzfree(chunk);
+			kfree_sensitive(chunk);
 		}
 
 		queue->nchunks = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c
index 7a24019356b5..472dbc2d7c5c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c
@@ -305,12 +305,12 @@ static void do_request_cleanup(struct cpt_vf *cptvf,
 		}
 	}
 
-	kzfree(info->scatter_components);
-	kzfree(info->gather_components);
-	kzfree(info->out_buffer);
-	kzfree(info->in_buffer);
-	kzfree((void *)info->completion_addr);
-	kzfree(info);
+	kfree_sensitive(info->scatter_components);
+	kfree_sensitive(info->gather_components);
+	kfree_sensitive(info->out_buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(info->in_buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive((void *)info->completion_addr);
+	kfree_sensitive(info);
 }
 
 static void do_post_process(struct cpt_vf *cptvf, struct cpt_info_buffer *info)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c b/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c
index 5cbc64b851b9..a5cdc2b48bd6 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static void nitrox_free_aqm_queues(struct nitrox_device *ndev)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ndev->nr_queues; i++) {
 		nitrox_cmdq_cleanup(ndev->aqmq[i]);
-		kzfree(ndev->aqmq[i]);
+		kfree_sensitive(ndev->aqmq[i]);
 		ndev->aqmq[i] = NULL;
 	}
 }
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static int nitrox_alloc_aqm_queues(struct nitrox_device *ndev)
 
 		err = nitrox_cmdq_init(cmdq, AQM_Q_ALIGN_BYTES);
 		if (err) {
-			kzfree(cmdq);
+			kfree_sensitive(cmdq);
 			goto aqmq_fail;
 		}
 		ndev->aqmq[i] = cmdq;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c
index 4985bc812b0e..7df71fcebe8f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void *zip_alloc_scomp_ctx_deflate(struct crypto_scomp *tfm)
 	ret = zip_ctx_init(zip_ctx, 0);
 
 	if (ret) {
-		kzfree(zip_ctx);
+		kfree_sensitive(zip_ctx);
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 	}
 
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ void *zip_alloc_scomp_ctx_lzs(struct crypto_scomp *tfm)
 	ret = zip_ctx_init(zip_ctx, 1);
 
 	if (ret) {
-		kzfree(zip_ctx);
+		kfree_sensitive(zip_ctx);
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 	}
 
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ void zip_free_scomp_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
 	struct zip_kernel_ctx *zip_ctx = ctx;
 
 	zip_ctx_exit(zip_ctx);
-	kzfree(zip_ctx);
+	kfree_sensitive(zip_ctx);
 }
 
 int zip_scomp_compress(struct crypto_scomp *tfm,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c
index 649c91d60401..1223ac70aea2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c
@@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ static int ccp_check_key_length(unsigned int len)
 static void ccp_rsa_free_key_bufs(struct ccp_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	/* Clean up old key data */
-	kzfree(ctx->u.rsa.e_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->u.rsa.e_buf);
 	ctx->u.rsa.e_buf = NULL;
 	ctx->u.rsa.e_len = 0;
-	kzfree(ctx->u.rsa.n_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->u.rsa.n_buf);
 	ctx->u.rsa.n_buf = NULL;
 	ctx->u.rsa.n_len = 0;
-	kzfree(ctx->u.rsa.d_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->u.rsa.d_buf);
 	ctx->u.rsa.d_buf = NULL;
 	ctx->u.rsa.d_len = 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
index 1cf51edbc4b9..35794c7271fb 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *authkey,
 		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, key_dma_addr)) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
 				key, keylen);
-			kzfree(key);
+			kfree_sensitive(key);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		if (keylen > blocksize) {
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *authkey,
 	if (key_dma_addr)
 		dma_unmap_single(dev, key_dma_addr, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 
-	kzfree(key);
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
 
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
index b2bd093e7013..a5e041d9d2cf 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req)
 	if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr) {
 		dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr,
 				 hw_iv_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
-		kzfree(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
+		kfree_sensitive(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
 	}
 
 	/* Release pool */
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int cc_aead_chain_iv(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
 	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Mapping iv %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
 			hw_iv_size, req->iv);
-		kzfree(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
+		kfree_sensitive(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
 		areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv = NULL;
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto chain_iv_exit;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
index a84335328f37..f380a4b5e32b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static void cc_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 		&ctx_p->user.key_dma_addr);
 
 	/* Free key buffer in context */
-	kzfree(ctx_p->user.key);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx_p->user.key);
 	dev_dbg(dev, "Free key buffer in context. key=@%p\n", ctx_p->user.key);
 }
 
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static void cc_cipher_complete(struct device *dev, void *cc_req, int err)
 		/* Not a BACKLOG notification */
 		cc_unmap_cipher_request(dev, req_ctx, ivsize, src, dst);
 		memcpy(req->iv, req_ctx->iv, ivsize);
-		kzfree(req_ctx->iv);
+		kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->iv);
 	}
 
 	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static int cc_cipher_process(struct skcipher_request *req,
 
 exit_process:
 	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY) {
-		kzfree(req_ctx->iv);
+		kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->iv);
 	}
 
 	return rc;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
index d5310783af15..683c9a430e11 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ static int cc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash, const u8 *key,
 		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr)) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
 				ctx->key_params.key, keylen);
-			kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+			kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		dev_dbg(dev, "mapping key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static int cc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash, const u8 *key,
 			&ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr, ctx->key_params.keylen);
 	}
 
-	kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static int cc_xcbc_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash,
 	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
 			key, keylen);
-		kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+		kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	dev_dbg(dev, "mapping key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ static int cc_xcbc_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash,
 	dev_dbg(dev, "Unmapped key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
 		&ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr, ctx->key_params.keylen);
 
-	kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
 
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c
index 1d7649ecf44e..33fb27745d52 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void cc_req_mgr_fini(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata)
 	/* Kill tasklet */
 	tasklet_kill(&req_mgr_h->comptask);
 #endif
-	kzfree(req_mgr_h);
+	kfree_sensitive(req_mgr_h);
 	drvdata->request_mgr_handle = NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c
index b971284332b6..2fdd3d55ed08 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static int mv_cesa_ahmac_pad_init(struct ahash_request *req,
 		}
 
 		/* Set the memory region to 0 to avoid any leak. */
-		kzfree(keydup);
+		kfree_sensitive(keydup);
 
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c
index a91860b5dc77..ffd33121bb55 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void cleanup_worker_threads(struct otx_cptvf *cptvf)
 	for (i = 0; i < cptvf->num_queues; i++)
 		tasklet_kill(&cwqe_info->vq_wqe[i].twork);
 
-	kzfree(cwqe_info);
+	kfree_sensitive(cwqe_info);
 	cptvf->wqe_info = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static void free_pending_queues(struct otx_cpt_pending_qinfo *pqinfo)
 			continue;
 
 		/* free single queue */
-		kzfree((queue->head));
+		kfree_sensitive((queue->head));
 		queue->front = 0;
 		queue->rear = 0;
 		queue->qlen = 0;
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static void free_command_queues(struct otx_cptvf *cptvf,
 			chunk->head = NULL;
 			chunk->dma_addr = 0;
 			list_del(&chunk->nextchunk);
-			kzfree(chunk);
+			kfree_sensitive(chunk);
 		}
 		queue->num_chunks = 0;
 		queue->idx = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h
index a4c9ff730b13..cfaaf8e2f9c2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static inline void do_request_cleanup(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 						 DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
 		}
 	}
-	kzfree(info);
+	kfree_sensitive(info);
 }
 
 struct otx_cptvf_wqe;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
index 78d660d963e2..5c71f85da7e2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
 	mtk_aes_write_state_be(ctx->key + ctx->keylen, data->hash,
 			       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 out:
-	kzfree(data);
+	kfree_sensitive(data);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
index f03c238f5a31..40882d6d52c1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ void nx_crypto_ctx_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	kzfree(nx_ctx->kmem);
+	kfree_sensitive(nx_ctx->kmem);
 	nx_ctx->csbcpb = NULL;
 	nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead = NULL;
 	nx_ctx->in_sg = NULL;
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ void nx_crypto_ctx_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
 {
 	struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
 
-	kzfree(nx_ctx->kmem);
+	kfree_sensitive(nx_ctx->kmem);
 }
 
 static int nx_probe(struct vio_dev *viodev, const struct vio_device_id *id)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
index fd045e64972a..bc575d63dee6 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_alg_skcipher_init_session(
 				num_in, vcrypto, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		spin_unlock(&vcrypto->ctrl_lock);
-		kzfree(cipher_key);
+		kfree_sensitive(cipher_key);
 		return err;
 	}
 	virtqueue_kick(vcrypto->ctrl_vq);
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_alg_skcipher_init_session(
 		spin_unlock(&vcrypto->ctrl_lock);
 		pr_err("virtio_crypto: Create session failed status: %u\n",
 			le32_to_cpu(vcrypto->input.status));
-		kzfree(cipher_key);
+		kfree_sensitive(cipher_key);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_alg_skcipher_init_session(
 
 	spin_unlock(&vcrypto->ctrl_lock);
 
-	kzfree(cipher_key);
+	kfree_sensitive(cipher_key);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -466,9 +466,9 @@ __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req(struct virtio_crypto_sym_request *vc_sym_req,
 	return 0;
 
 free_iv:
-	kzfree(iv);
+	kfree_sensitive(iv);
 free:
-	kzfree(req_data);
+	kfree_sensitive(req_data);
 	kfree(sgs);
 	return err;
 }
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_skcipher_finalize_req(
 					 AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
 	crypto_finalize_skcipher_request(vc_sym_req->base.dataq->engine,
 					   req, err);
-	kzfree(vc_sym_req->iv);
+	kfree_sensitive(vc_sym_req->iv);
 	virtcrypto_clear_request(&vc_sym_req->base);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
index c8a962c62663..ba8a19c72391 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ void
 virtcrypto_clear_request(struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req)
 {
 	if (vc_req) {
-		kzfree(vc_req->req_data);
+		kfree_sensitive(vc_req->req_data);
 		kfree(vc_req->sgs);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 3df90daba89e..2423eade2ae6 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
 		crypto_free_shash(lmk->hash_tfm);
 	lmk->hash_tfm = NULL;
 
-	kzfree(lmk->seed);
+	kfree_sensitive(lmk->seed);
 	lmk->seed = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -556,9 +556,9 @@ static void crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
 {
 	struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
 
-	kzfree(tcw->iv_seed);
+	kfree_sensitive(tcw->iv_seed);
 	tcw->iv_seed = NULL;
-	kzfree(tcw->whitening);
+	kfree_sensitive(tcw->whitening);
 	tcw->whitening = NULL;
 
 	if (tcw->crc32_tfm && !IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm))
@@ -992,8 +992,8 @@ static int crypt_iv_elephant(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_crypt_request *d
 
 	kunmap_atomic(data);
 out:
-	kzfree(ks);
-	kzfree(es);
+	kfree_sensitive(ks);
+	kfree_sensitive(es);
 	skcipher_request_free(req);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 	key = request_key(key_string[0] == 'l' ? &key_type_logon : &key_type_user,
 			  key_desc + 1, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-		kzfree(new_key_string);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
 		return PTR_ERR(key);
 	}
 
@@ -2257,14 +2257,14 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 	if (!ukp) {
 		up_read(&key->sem);
 		key_put(key);
-		kzfree(new_key_string);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
 		return -EKEYREVOKED;
 	}
 
 	if (cc->key_size != ukp->datalen) {
 		up_read(&key->sem);
 		key_put(key);
-		kzfree(new_key_string);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -2280,10 +2280,10 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
 
 	if (!ret) {
 		set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
-		kzfree(cc->key_string);
+		kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
 		cc->key_string = new_key_string;
 	} else
-		kzfree(new_key_string);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -2344,7 +2344,7 @@ static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
 	clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
 
 	/* wipe references to any kernel keyring key */
-	kzfree(cc->key_string);
+	kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
 	cc->key_string = NULL;
 
 	/* Decode key from its hex representation. */
@@ -2376,7 +2376,7 @@ static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc)
 			return r;
 	}
 
-	kzfree(cc->key_string);
+	kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
 	cc->key_string = NULL;
 	r = crypt_setkey(cc);
 	memset(&cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
@@ -2455,15 +2455,15 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
 	if (cc->dev)
 		dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
 
-	kzfree(cc->cipher_string);
-	kzfree(cc->key_string);
-	kzfree(cc->cipher_auth);
-	kzfree(cc->authenc_key);
+	kfree_sensitive(cc->cipher_string);
+	kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
+	kfree_sensitive(cc->cipher_auth);
+	kfree_sensitive(cc->authenc_key);
 
 	mutex_destroy(&cc->bio_alloc_lock);
 
 	/* Must zero key material before freeing */
-	kzfree(cc);
+	kfree_sensitive(cc);
 
 	spin_lock(&dm_crypt_clients_lock);
 	WARN_ON(!dm_crypt_clients_n);
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
index 4094c47eca7f..d08ef3c0d148 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
@@ -3409,8 +3409,8 @@ static struct scatterlist **dm_integrity_alloc_journal_scatterlist(struct dm_int
 
 static void free_alg(struct alg_spec *a)
 {
-	kzfree(a->alg_string);
-	kzfree(a->key);
+	kfree_sensitive(a->alg_string);
+	kfree_sensitive(a->key);
 	memset(a, 0, sizeof *a);
 }
 
@@ -4341,7 +4341,7 @@ static void dm_integrity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
 		for (i = 0; i < ic->journal_sections; i++) {
 			struct skcipher_request *req = ic->sk_requests[i];
 			if (req) {
-				kzfree(req->iv);
+				kfree_sensitive(req->iv);
 				skcipher_request_free(req);
 			}
 		}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c b/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c
index 2ed23c99f59f..beda69075a97 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void *alloc_dma_buffer(struct vio_dev *vdev, size_t size,
 
 	if (dma_mapping_error(&vdev->dev, *dma_handle)) {
 		*dma_handle = 0;
-		kzfree(buffer);
+		kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static void free_dma_buffer(struct vio_dev *vdev, size_t size, void *vaddr,
 	dma_unmap_single(&vdev->dev, dma_handle, size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
 
 	/* deallocate memory */
-	kzfree(vaddr);
+	kfree_sensitive(vaddr);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static int ibmvmc_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hmc->lock, flags);
 	}
 
-	kzfree(session);
+	kfree_sensitive(session);
 
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c
index 7f24fcb4f96a..965ada2e9d24 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static void hclge_free_vector_ring_chain(struct hnae3_ring_chain_node *head)
 
 	while (chain) {
 		chain_tmp = chain->next;
-		kzfree(chain);
+		kfree_sensitive(chain);
 		chain = chain_tmp;
 	}
 }
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c
index 113f6087c7c9..e567f4ab8a79 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c
@@ -960,9 +960,9 @@ int ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 *msgbuf, u32 vf)
 	return 0;
 
 err_aead:
-	kzfree(xs->aead);
+	kfree_sensitive(xs->aead);
 err_xs:
-	kzfree(xs);
+	kfree_sensitive(xs);
 err_out:
 	msgbuf[1] = err;
 	return err;
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ int ixgbe_ipsec_vf_del_sa(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32 *msgbuf, u32 vf)
 	ixgbe_ipsec_del_sa(xs);
 
 	/* remove the xs that was made-up in the add request */
-	kzfree(xs);
+	kfree_sensitive(xs);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
index de3b57d09d0c..208f6e24f37c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void *mppe_alloc(unsigned char *options, int optlen)
 	kfree(state->sha1_digest);
 	if (state->sha1) {
 		crypto_free_shash(state->sha1->tfm);
-		kzfree(state->sha1);
+		kfree_sensitive(state->sha1);
 	}
 	kfree(state);
 out:
@@ -238,8 +238,8 @@ static void mppe_free(void *arg)
 	if (state) {
 		kfree(state->sha1_digest);
 		crypto_free_shash(state->sha1->tfm);
-		kzfree(state->sha1);
-		kzfree(state);
+		kfree_sensitive(state->sha1);
+		kfree_sensitive(state);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
index 708dc61c974f..596eb3be2d9e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer *peer)
 
 static void keypair_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 {
-	kzfree(container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu));
+	kfree_sensitive(container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu));
 }
 
 static void keypair_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
@@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake *handshake,
 			handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
 			&handshake->entry, &new_keypair->entry);
 	} else {
-		kzfree(new_keypair);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_keypair);
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock_bh();
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
index 1d634bd3038f..b3b6370e6b95 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static void rcu_release(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 	/* The final zeroing takes care of clearing any remaining handshake key
 	 * material and other potentially sensitive information.
 	 */
-	kzfree(peer);
+	kfree_sensitive(peer);
 }
 
 static void kref_release(struct kref *refcount)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c
index 8c29071cb415..82b449c249a4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c
@@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ static void iwl_pcie_rx_handle_rb(struct iwl_trans *trans,
 					   &rxcb, rxq->id);
 
 		if (reclaim) {
-			kzfree(txq->entries[cmd_index].free_buf);
+			kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[cmd_index].free_buf);
 			txq->entries[cmd_index].free_buf = NULL;
 		}
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
index 86fc00167817..022f7a069295 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ static int iwl_pcie_gen2_enqueue_hcmd(struct iwl_trans *trans,
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(IWL_TFH_NUM_TBS > sizeof(out_meta->tbs) * BITS_PER_BYTE);
 	out_meta->flags = cmd->flags;
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(txq->entries[idx].free_buf))
-		kzfree(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
+		kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
 	txq->entries[idx].free_buf = dup_buf;
 
 	trace_iwlwifi_dev_hcmd(trans->dev, cmd, cmd_size, &out_cmd->hdr_wide);
@@ -1254,8 +1254,8 @@ static void iwl_pcie_gen2_txq_free(struct iwl_trans *trans, int txq_id)
 	/* De-alloc array of command/tx buffers */
 	if (txq_id == trans_pcie->cmd_queue)
 		for (i = 0; i < txq->n_window; i++) {
-			kzfree(txq->entries[i].cmd);
-			kzfree(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
+			kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].cmd);
+			kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
 		}
 	del_timer_sync(&txq->stuck_timer);
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
index 4582d418ba4d..aa8277df2f17 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
@@ -724,8 +724,8 @@ static void iwl_pcie_txq_free(struct iwl_trans *trans, int txq_id)
 	/* De-alloc array of command/tx buffers */
 	if (txq_id == trans_pcie->cmd_queue)
 		for (i = 0; i < txq->n_window; i++) {
-			kzfree(txq->entries[i].cmd);
-			kzfree(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
+			kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].cmd);
+			kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
 		}
 
 	/* De-alloc circular buffer of TFDs */
@@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ static int iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd(struct iwl_trans *trans,
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(IWL_TFH_NUM_TBS > sizeof(out_meta->tbs) * BITS_PER_BYTE);
 	out_meta->flags = cmd->flags;
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(txq->entries[idx].free_buf))
-		kzfree(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
+		kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
 	txq->entries[idx].free_buf = dup_buf;
 
 	trace_iwlwifi_dev_hcmd(trans->dev, cmd, cmd_size, &out_cmd->hdr_wide);
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c
index 1d4dae422106..7b6c4ae8ddb3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static int orinoco_set_key(struct orinoco_private *priv, int index,
 			   enum orinoco_alg alg, const u8 *key, int key_len,
 			   const u8 *seq, int seq_len)
 {
-	kzfree(priv->keys[index].key);
-	kzfree(priv->keys[index].seq);
+	kfree_sensitive(priv->keys[index].key);
+	kfree_sensitive(priv->keys[index].seq);
 
 	if (key_len) {
 		priv->keys[index].key = kzalloc(key_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h
index 8e8e37b6c0ee..99125e29b2c6 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h
@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ static inline void ap_init_message(struct ap_message *ap_msg)
  */
 static inline void ap_release_message(struct ap_message *ap_msg)
 {
-	kzfree(ap_msg->message);
-	kzfree(ap_msg->private);
+	kfree_sensitive(ap_msg->message);
+	kfree_sensitive(ap_msg->private);
 }
 
 #define for_each_ap_card(_ac) \
diff --git a/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c b/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c
index 2666f9e30c15..d70b671b06aa 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ michael_mic(u8 *key, u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 priority, u8 *result)
 	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, data + 12, len - 12, result);
 
 err_free_desc:
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 
 err_free_tfm:
 	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
index 5ebf691bd743..9d7eb027a213 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -2251,7 +2251,7 @@ static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad)
 
 static void aes_encrypt_deinit(void *ctx)
 {
-	kzfree(ctx);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
 }
 
 
diff --git a/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c b/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c
index b809c0015c0c..7b091c5a2984 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t p80211knetdev_hard_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 failed:
 	/* Free up the WEP buffer if it's not the same as the skb */
 	if ((p80211_wep.data) && (p80211_wep.data != skb->data))
-		kzfree(p80211_wep.data);
+		kfree_sensitive(p80211_wep.data);
 
 	/* we always free the skb here, never in a lower level. */
 	if (!result)
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
index 0e54627d9aa8..62d912b79c61 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
 	pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_R=0x%s\n", response);
 	auth_ret = 0;
 out:
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 	if (tfm)
 		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
 	kfree(initiatorchg);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index 40b729dce91c..eab3f8510426 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
 	btrfs_put_root(root);
 out_free:
 	btrfs_free_path(path);
-	kzfree(subvol_info);
+	kfree_sensitive(subvol_info);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
index 97b7497c13ef..c6baca36b74c 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
 	ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
 
 	memzero_explicit(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
-	kzfree(ctx_arc4);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx_arc4);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 95b3ab0ca8c0..cdeac9d66e26 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -2177,7 +2177,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname,
 			tmp_end++;
 			if (!(tmp_end < end && tmp_end[1] == delim)) {
 				/* No it is not. Set the password to NULL */
-				kzfree(vol->password);
+				kfree_sensitive(vol->password);
 				vol->password = NULL;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -2215,7 +2215,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname,
 					options = end;
 			}
 
-			kzfree(vol->password);
+			kfree_sensitive(vol->password);
 			/* Now build new password string */
 			temp_len = strlen(value);
 			vol->password = kzalloc(temp_len+1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
 			kfree(vol->username);
 			vol->username = NULL;
-			kzfree(vol->password);
+			kfree_sensitive(vol->password);
 			vol->password = NULL;
 			goto out_key_put;
 		}
@@ -4212,7 +4212,7 @@ void
 cifs_cleanup_volume_info_contents(struct smb_vol *volume_info)
 {
 	kfree(volume_info->username);
-	kzfree(volume_info->password);
+	kfree_sensitive(volume_info->password);
 	kfree(volume_info->UNC);
 	kfree(volume_info->domainname);
 	kfree(volume_info->iocharset);
@@ -5337,7 +5337,7 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, kuid_t fsuid)
 
 out:
 	kfree(vol_info->username);
-	kzfree(vol_info->password);
+	kfree_sensitive(vol_info->password);
 	kfree(vol_info);
 
 	return tcon;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c
index a67f88bf7ae1..a0223b47dc1b 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ static int dup_vol(struct smb_vol *vol, struct smb_vol *new)
 err_free_unc:
 	kfree(new->UNC);
 err_free_password:
-	kzfree(new->password);
+	kfree_sensitive(new->password);
 err_free_username:
 	kfree(new->username);
 	kfree(new);
diff --git a/fs/cifs/misc.c b/fs/cifs/misc.c
index a456febd4109..503810e9cb76 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/misc.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/misc.c
@@ -100,12 +100,12 @@ sesInfoFree(struct cifs_ses *buf_to_free)
 	kfree(buf_to_free->serverOS);
 	kfree(buf_to_free->serverDomain);
 	kfree(buf_to_free->serverNOS);
-	kzfree(buf_to_free->password);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free->password);
 	kfree(buf_to_free->user_name);
 	kfree(buf_to_free->domainName);
-	kzfree(buf_to_free->auth_key.response);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free->auth_key.response);
 	kfree(buf_to_free->iface_list);
-	kzfree(buf_to_free);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free);
 }
 
 struct cifs_tcon *
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ tconInfoFree(struct cifs_tcon *buf_to_free)
 	}
 	atomic_dec(&tconInfoAllocCount);
 	kfree(buf_to_free->nativeFileSystem);
-	kzfree(buf_to_free->password);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free->password);
 	kfree(buf_to_free->crfid.fid);
 #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL
 	kfree(buf_to_free->dfs_path);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index ab41b25d4fa1..41460c6331e4 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
 	}
 
 	key_put(mk->mk_users);
-	kzfree(mk);
+	kfree_sensitive(mk);
 }
 
 static inline bool valid_key_spec(const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse(
 					struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+	kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
 }
 
 static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe(const struct key *key,
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe(const struct key *key,
 
 static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
-	kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
 }
 
 static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_provisioning = {
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
index 801b48c0cd7f..c8a930f8faf2 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static void free_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk)
 {
 	if (dk) {
 		crypto_free_skcipher(dk->dk_ctfm);
-		kzfree(dk);
+		kfree_sensitive(dk);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int setup_v1_file_key_derived(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 
 	err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key);
 out:
-	kzfree(derived_key);
+	kfree_sensitive(derived_key);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index af3eb02bbca1..f6a17d259db7 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
 out_release_free_unlock:
 	crypto_free_shash(s->hash_tfm);
 out_free_unlock:
-	kzfree(s->block_aligned_filename);
+	kfree_sensitive(s->block_aligned_filename);
 out_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(s->tfm_mutex);
 out:
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
 		key_put(auth_tok_key);
 	}
 	skcipher_request_free(s->skcipher_req);
-	kzfree(s->hash_desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(s->hash_desc);
 	kfree(s);
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
index 8646ba76def3..c0dfd9647627 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon)
 	}
 	hlist_del(&daemon->euid_chain);
 	mutex_unlock(&daemon->mux);
-	kzfree(daemon);
+	kfree_sensitive(daemon);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/include/crypto/aead.h b/include/crypto/aead.h
index 62c68550aab6..c32a6f5664e9 100644
--- a/include/crypto/aead.h
+++ b/include/crypto/aead.h
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ static inline struct aead_request *aead_request_alloc(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
  */
 static inline void aead_request_free(struct aead_request *req)
 {
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/crypto/akcipher.h b/include/crypto/akcipher.h
index 6924b091adec..1d3aa252caba 100644
--- a/include/crypto/akcipher.h
+++ b/include/crypto/akcipher.h
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline struct akcipher_request *akcipher_request_alloc(
  */
 static inline void akcipher_request_free(struct akcipher_request *req)
 {
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/crypto/gf128mul.h b/include/crypto/gf128mul.h
index fa0a63d298dc..81330c6446f6 100644
--- a/include/crypto/gf128mul.h
+++ b/include/crypto/gf128mul.h
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ void gf128mul_4k_bbe(be128 *a, const struct gf128mul_4k *t);
 void gf128mul_x8_ble(le128 *r, const le128 *x);
 static inline void gf128mul_free_4k(struct gf128mul_4k *t)
 {
-	kzfree(t);
+	kfree_sensitive(t);
 }
 
 
diff --git a/include/crypto/hash.h b/include/crypto/hash.h
index cee446c59497..cef16b7d153e 100644
--- a/include/crypto/hash.h
+++ b/include/crypto/hash.h
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static inline struct ahash_request *ahash_request_alloc(
  */
 static inline void ahash_request_free(struct ahash_request *req)
 {
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 }
 
 static inline void ahash_request_zero(struct ahash_request *req)
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h b/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h
index cf478681b53e..cfc47e18820f 100644
--- a/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static inline struct acomp_req *__acomp_request_alloc(struct crypto_acomp *tfm)
 
 static inline void __acomp_request_free(struct acomp_req *req)
 {
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/crypto/kpp.h b/include/crypto/kpp.h
index cd9a9b500624..88b591215d5c 100644
--- a/include/crypto/kpp.h
+++ b/include/crypto/kpp.h
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static inline struct kpp_request *kpp_request_alloc(struct crypto_kpp *tfm,
  */
 static inline void kpp_request_free(struct kpp_request *req)
 {
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/crypto/skcipher.h b/include/crypto/skcipher.h
index 141e7690f9c3..1013c9cbae69 100644
--- a/include/crypto/skcipher.h
+++ b/include/crypto/skcipher.h
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static inline struct skcipher_request *skcipher_request_alloc(
  */
 static inline void skcipher_request_free(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 }
 
 static inline void skcipher_request_zero(struct skcipher_request *req)
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 6d454886bcaf..7f2018943997 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ void memcg_deactivate_kmem_caches(struct mem_cgroup *, struct mem_cgroup *);
  */
 void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
 void kfree(const void *);
-void kzfree(const void *);
+void kfree_sensitive(const void *);
 size_t __ksize(const void *);
 size_t ksize(const void *);
 
diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
index 20ed0f766787..4cd2b335cb7f 100644
--- a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
+++ b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void mpi_free_limb_space(mpi_ptr_t a)
 	if (!a)
 		return;
 
-	kzfree(a);
+	kfree_sensitive(a);
 }
 
 void mpi_assign_limb_space(MPI a, mpi_ptr_t ap, unsigned nlimbs)
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int mpi_resize(MPI a, unsigned nlimbs)
 		if (!p)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		memcpy(p, a->d, a->alloced * sizeof(mpi_limb_t));
-		kzfree(a->d);
+		kfree_sensitive(a->d);
 		a->d = p;
 	} else {
 		a->d = kcalloc(nlimbs, sizeof(mpi_limb_t), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ void mpi_free(MPI a)
 		return;
 
 	if (a->flags & 4)
-		kzfree(a->d);
+		kfree_sensitive(a->d);
 	else
 		mpi_free_limb_space(a->d);
 
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index e3087d90e00d..a1c82aa68a33 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -757,15 +757,15 @@ static noinline void __init kmalloc_double_kzfree(void)
 	char *ptr;
 	size_t size = 16;
 
-	pr_info("double-free (kzfree)\n");
+	pr_info("double-free (kfree_sensitive)\n");
 	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ptr) {
 		pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
 		return;
 	}
 
-	kzfree(ptr);
-	kzfree(ptr);
+	kfree_sensitive(ptr);
+	kfree_sensitive(ptr);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 23c7500eea7d..c08bc7eb20bd 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1707,17 +1707,17 @@ void *krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(krealloc);
 
 /**
- * kzfree - like kfree but zero memory
+ * kfree_sensitive - Clear sensitive information in memory before freeing
  * @p: object to free memory of
  *
  * The memory of the object @p points to is zeroed before freed.
- * If @p is %NULL, kzfree() does nothing.
+ * If @p is %NULL, kfree_sensitive() does nothing.
  *
  * Note: this function zeroes the whole allocated buffer which can be a good
  * deal bigger than the requested buffer size passed to kmalloc(). So be
  * careful when using this function in performance sensitive code.
  */
-void kzfree(const void *p)
+void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
 {
 	size_t ks;
 	void *mem = (void *)p;
@@ -1725,10 +1725,10 @@ void kzfree(const void *p)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem)))
 		return;
 	ks = ksize(mem);
-	memset(mem, 0, ks);
+	memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
 	kfree(mem);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
 
 /**
  * ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object
diff --git a/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c b/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c
index 3286f9d527d3..f7a2f0e41105 100644
--- a/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c
+++ b/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static int cache_hit(in_cache_entry *entry, struct mpoa_client *mpc)
 static void in_cache_put(in_cache_entry *entry)
 {
 	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&entry->use)) {
-		kzfree(entry);
+		kfree_sensitive(entry);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static eg_cache_entry *eg_cache_get_by_src_ip(__be32 ipaddr,
 static void eg_cache_put(eg_cache_entry *entry)
 {
 	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&entry->use)) {
-		kzfree(entry);
+		kfree_sensitive(entry);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index 2155ce802877..3226fe02e875 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
 free_all:
 	kpp_request_free(req);
 free_tmp:
-	kzfree(tmp);
+	kfree_sensitive(tmp);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 private_key[32])
 	err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
 	/* fall through */
 free_all:
-	kzfree(buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
 free_tmp:
-	kzfree(tmp);
+	kfree_sensitive(tmp);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 1476a91ce935..445ec3d09b01 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -753,9 +753,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
 	mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
 
-	kzfree(smp->csrk);
-	kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
-	kzfree(smp->link_key);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
 
 	crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
 	crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	}
 
 	chan->data = NULL;
-	kzfree(smp);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp);
 	hci_conn_drop(hcon);
 }
 
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
 
 		if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
-			kzfree(smp->link_key);
+			kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
 			smp->link_key = NULL;
 			return;
 		}
@@ -1158,14 +1158,14 @@ static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
 
 		if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
-			kzfree(smp->link_key);
+			kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
 			smp->link_key = NULL;
 			return;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
-		kzfree(smp->link_key);
+		kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
 		smp->link_key = NULL;
 		return;
 	}
@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 free_shash:
 	crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
 zfree_smp:
-	kzfree(smp);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -3263,7 +3263,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
 	tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
 		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
-		kzfree(smp);
+		kfree_sensitive(smp);
 		return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
 	}
 
@@ -3271,7 +3271,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
 		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
 		crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
-		kzfree(smp);
+		kfree_sensitive(smp);
 		return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
 	}
 
@@ -3285,7 +3285,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
 		if (smp) {
 			crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
 			crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
-			kzfree(smp);
+			kfree_sensitive(smp);
 		}
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
@@ -3332,7 +3332,7 @@ static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 		chan->data = NULL;
 		crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
 		crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
-		kzfree(smp);
+		kfree_sensitive(smp);
 	}
 
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index ce1d8dce9b7a..e20a672afee5 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -2182,7 +2182,7 @@ static inline void __sock_kfree_s(struct sock *sk, void *mem, int size,
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mem))
 		return;
 	if (nullify)
-		kzfree(mem);
+		kfree_sensitive(mem);
 	else
 		kfree(mem);
 	atomic_sub(size, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
index 19ad9586c720..c1a54f3d58f5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
 	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx =
 	    container_of(head, struct tcp_fastopen_context, rcu);
 
-	kzfree(ctx);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
 }
 
 void tcp_fastopen_destroy_cipher(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aead_api.c b/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
index c5fe95e49c68..d7b3d905d535 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int aead_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
 	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
 
 	crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
-	kzfree(aead_req);
+	kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int aead_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
 	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
 
 	err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
-	kzfree(aead_req);
+	kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
index 16ba09cb5def..6f3b3a0cc10a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce,
 	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, GMAC_AAD_LEN + data_len);
 
 	crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
-	kzfree(aead_req);
+	kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 8f403c1bb908..6bb765721862 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key *key)
 		ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
 		break;
 	}
-	kzfree(key);
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
 }
 
 static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
index c079ee69d3d0..585d33144c33 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void mac802154_llsec_destroy(struct mac802154_llsec *sec)
 
 		msl = container_of(sl, struct mac802154_llsec_seclevel, level);
 		list_del(&sl->list);
-		kzfree(msl);
+		kfree_sensitive(msl);
 	}
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, dn, &sec->table.devices, list) {
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ void mac802154_llsec_destroy(struct mac802154_llsec *sec)
 		mkey = container_of(key->key, struct mac802154_llsec_key, key);
 		list_del(&key->list);
 		llsec_key_put(mkey);
-		kzfree(key);
+		kfree_sensitive(key);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ llsec_key_alloc(const struct ieee802154_llsec_key *template)
 		if (key->tfm[i])
 			crypto_free_aead(key->tfm[i]);
 
-	kzfree(key);
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static void llsec_key_release(struct kref *ref)
 		crypto_free_aead(key->tfm[i]);
 
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(key->tfm0);
-	kzfree(key);
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
 }
 
 static struct mac802154_llsec_key*
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_key_add(struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
 	return 0;
 
 fail:
-	kzfree(new);
+	kfree_sensitive(new);
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
@@ -341,10 +341,10 @@ static void llsec_dev_free(struct mac802154_llsec_device *dev)
 				      devkey);
 
 		list_del(&pos->list);
-		kzfree(devkey);
+		kfree_sensitive(devkey);
 	}
 
-	kzfree(dev);
+	kfree_sensitive(dev);
 }
 
 int mac802154_llsec_dev_add(struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ llsec_do_encrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
 
 	rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
 
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
 
 	rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
 
-	kzfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - authlen);
 
 	return rc;
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ llsec_update_devkey_record(struct mac802154_llsec_device *dev,
 		if (!devkey)
 			list_add_rcu(&next->devkey.list, &dev->dev.keys);
 		else
-			kzfree(next);
+			kfree_sensitive(next);
 
 		spin_unlock_bh(&dev->lock);
 	}
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 4278764d82b8..3a22e1747712 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void sctp_auth_key_put(struct sctp_auth_bytes *key)
 		return;
 
 	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&key->refcnt)) {
-		kzfree(key);
+		kfree_sensitive(key);
 		SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(keys);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 827a9903ee28..3392d18a7e44 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -3748,7 +3748,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
 	}
 
 out:
-	kzfree(authkey);
+	kfree_sensitive(authkey);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index 6f2d30d7b766..19bb244d2444 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
 	err = 0;
 
 out_err:
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 	crypto_free_shash(hmac);
 	dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
 	return err;
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
 	err = 0;
 
 out_err:
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 	crypto_free_shash(hmac);
 	dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
 	return err;
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
index 3b7f721c023b..726c076950c0 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
@@ -228,11 +228,11 @@ u32 krb5_derive_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
 	ret = 0;
 
 err_free_raw:
-	kzfree(rawkey);
+	kfree_sensitive(rawkey);
 err_free_out:
-	kzfree(outblockdata);
+	kfree_sensitive(outblockdata);
 err_free_in:
-	kzfree(inblockdata);
+	kfree_sensitive(inblockdata);
 err_free_cipher:
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
 err_return:
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
index 75b3c2e9e8f8..a84a5b289484 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ context_derive_keys_rc4(struct krb5_ctx *ctx)
 	desc->tfm = hmac;
 
 	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sigkeyconstant, slen, ctx->cksum);
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_err_free_hmac;
 	/*
diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c
index c8c47fc72653..001bcb0f2480 100644
--- a/net/tipc/crypto.c
+++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
 	/* Allocate per-cpu TFM entry pointer */
 	tmp->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu(struct tipc_tfm *);
 	if (!tmp->tfm_entry) {
-		kzfree(tmp);
+		kfree_sensitive(tmp);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct tipc_aead_key *ukey,
 	/* Not any TFM is allocated? */
 	if (!tfm_cnt) {
 		free_percpu(tmp->tfm_entry);
-		kzfree(tmp);
+		kfree_sensitive(tmp);
 		return err;
 	}
 
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static int tipc_aead_clone(struct tipc_aead **dst, struct tipc_aead *src)
 
 	aead->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_tfm *, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (unlikely(!aead->tfm_entry)) {
-		kzfree(aead);
+		kfree_sensitive(aead);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ int tipc_crypto_start(struct tipc_crypto **crypto, struct net *net,
 	/* Allocate statistic structure */
 	c->stats = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_crypto_stats, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!c->stats) {
-		kzfree(c);
+		kfree_sensitive(c);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ void tipc_crypto_stop(struct tipc_crypto **crypto)
 	free_percpu(c->stats);
 
 	*crypto = NULL;
-	kzfree(c);
+	kfree_sensitive(c);
 }
 
 void tipc_crypto_timeout(struct tipc_crypto *rx)
diff --git a/net/wireless/core.c b/net/wireless/core.c
index 341402b4f178..cd2c982c5317 100644
--- a/net/wireless/core.c
+++ b/net/wireless/core.c
@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ static void __cfg80211_unregister_wdev(struct wireless_dev *wdev, bool sync)
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CFG80211_WEXT
-	kzfree(wdev->wext.keys);
+	kfree_sensitive(wdev->wext.keys);
 	wdev->wext.keys = NULL;
 #endif
 	/* only initialized if we have a netdev */
diff --git a/net/wireless/ibss.c b/net/wireless/ibss.c
index ae8fe66a9bb8..a0621bb76d8e 100644
--- a/net/wireless/ibss.c
+++ b/net/wireless/ibss.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int __cfg80211_join_ibss(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(wdev->connect_keys))
-		kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+		kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
 	wdev->connect_keys = connkeys;
 
 	wdev->ibss_fixed = params->channel_fixed;
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static void __cfg80211_clear_ibss(struct net_device *dev, bool nowext)
 
 	ASSERT_WDEV_LOCK(wdev);
 
-	kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+	kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
 	wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
 
 	rdev_set_qos_map(rdev, dev, NULL);
diff --git a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c
index f5e842ba7673..1b4d6c87a5c5 100644
--- a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c
+++ b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void lib80211_tkip_deinit(void *priv)
 		crypto_free_shash(_priv->tx_tfm_michael);
 		crypto_free_shash(_priv->rx_tfm_michael);
 	}
-	kzfree(priv);
+	kfree_sensitive(priv);
 }
 
 static inline u16 RotR1(u16 val)
diff --git a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c
index dafc6f3571db..6ab9957b8f96 100644
--- a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c
+++ b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void *lib80211_wep_init(int keyidx)
 
 static void lib80211_wep_deinit(void *priv)
 {
-	kzfree(priv);
+	kfree_sensitive(priv);
 }
 
 /* Add WEP IV/key info to a frame that has at least 4 bytes of headroom */
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 5fa402144cda..c1b37c798907 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -9783,7 +9783,7 @@ static int nl80211_join_ibss(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 		if ((ibss.chandef.width != NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_20_NOHT) &&
 		    no_ht) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -9795,7 +9795,7 @@ static int nl80211_join_ibss(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		int r = validate_pae_over_nl80211(rdev, info);
 
 		if (r < 0) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			return r;
 		}
 
@@ -9808,7 +9808,7 @@ static int nl80211_join_ibss(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	wdev_lock(dev->ieee80211_ptr);
 	err = __cfg80211_join_ibss(rdev, dev, &ibss, connkeys);
 	if (err)
-		kzfree(connkeys);
+		kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 	else if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER])
 		dev->ieee80211_ptr->conn_owner_nlportid = info->snd_portid;
 	wdev_unlock(dev->ieee80211_ptr);
@@ -10228,7 +10228,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY]) {
 		if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY_MASK]) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		memcpy(&connect.ht_capa,
@@ -10246,7 +10246,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_VHT_CAPABILITY]) {
 		if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_VHT_CAPABILITY_MASK]) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		memcpy(&connect.vht_capa,
@@ -10260,7 +10260,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		       (rdev->wiphy.features & NL80211_FEATURE_QUIET)) &&
 		    !wiphy_ext_feature_isset(&rdev->wiphy,
 					     NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_RRM)) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		connect.flags |= ASSOC_REQ_USE_RRM;
@@ -10268,21 +10268,21 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	connect.pbss = nla_get_flag(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_PBSS]);
 	if (connect.pbss && !rdev->wiphy.bands[NL80211_BAND_60GHZ]) {
-		kzfree(connkeys);
+		kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
 	if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_BSS_SELECT]) {
 		/* bss selection makes no sense if bssid is set */
 		if (connect.bssid) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		err = parse_bss_select(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_BSS_SELECT],
 				       wiphy, &connect.bss_select);
 		if (err) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			return err;
 		}
 	}
@@ -10312,13 +10312,13 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		   info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_FILS_ERP_REALM] ||
 		   info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_FILS_ERP_NEXT_SEQ_NUM] ||
 		   info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_FILS_ERP_RRK]) {
-		kzfree(connkeys);
+		kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (nla_get_flag(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_EXTERNAL_AUTH_SUPPORT])) {
 		if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER]) {
-			kzfree(connkeys);
+			kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 			GENL_SET_ERR_MSG(info,
 					 "external auth requires connection ownership");
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -10331,7 +10331,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	err = cfg80211_connect(rdev, dev, &connect, connkeys,
 			       connect.prev_bssid);
 	if (err)
-		kzfree(connkeys);
+		kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
 
 	if (!err && info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER]) {
 		dev->ieee80211_ptr->conn_owner_nlportid = info->snd_portid;
diff --git a/net/wireless/sme.c b/net/wireless/sme.c
index ac3e60aa1fc8..8e60d5a6236c 100644
--- a/net/wireless/sme.c
+++ b/net/wireless/sme.c
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ void __cfg80211_connect_result(struct net_device *dev,
 	}
 
 	if (cr->status != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
-		kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+		kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
 		wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
 		wdev->ssid_len = 0;
 		wdev->conn_owner_nlportid = 0;
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ void __cfg80211_disconnected(struct net_device *dev, const u8 *ie,
 	wdev->current_bss = NULL;
 	wdev->ssid_len = 0;
 	wdev->conn_owner_nlportid = 0;
-	kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+	kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
 	wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
 
 	nl80211_send_disconnected(rdev, dev, reason, ie, ie_len, from_ap);
@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ int cfg80211_disconnect(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
 
 	ASSERT_WDEV_LOCK(wdev);
 
-	kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+	kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
 	wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
 
 	wdev->conn_owner_nlportid = 0;
diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c
index 6590efbbcbb9..ea172bc244c2 100644
--- a/net/wireless/util.c
+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ void cfg80211_upload_connect_keys(struct wireless_dev *wdev)
 		}
 	}
 
-	kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+	kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
 	wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-sme.c b/net/wireless/wext-sme.c
index 73fd0eae08ca..73df23570d43 100644
--- a/net/wireless/wext-sme.c
+++ b/net/wireless/wext-sme.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int cfg80211_mgd_wext_connect(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
 	err = cfg80211_connect(rdev, wdev->netdev,
 			       &wdev->wext.connect, ck, prev_bssid);
 	if (err)
-		kzfree(ck);
+		kfree_sensitive(ck);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci b/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci
index 3357bf4dbd7c..da80050b91ff 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ position p;
 (
  kfree@p(x)
 |
- kzfree@p(x)
+ kfree_sensitive@p(x)
 |
  krealloc@p(x, ...)
 |
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ position p != safe.p;
 (
 * kfree@p(x)
 |
-* kzfree@p(x)
+* kfree_sensitive@p(x)
 |
 * krealloc@p(x, ...)
 |
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci b/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci
index b3290c4ee239..2045391e36a0 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ expression E;
 (
   kfree(E);
 |
-  kzfree(E);
+  kfree_sensitive(E);
 |
   debugfs_remove(E);
 |
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ position p;
 @@
 
 * if (E != NULL)
-*	\(kfree@p\|kzfree@p\|debugfs_remove@p\|debugfs_remove_recursive@p\|
+*	\(kfree@p\|kfree_sensitive@p\|debugfs_remove@p\|debugfs_remove_recursive@p\|
 *         usb_free_urb@p\|kmem_cache_destroy@p\|mempool_destroy@p\|
 *         dma_pool_destroy@p\)(E);
 
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci
index e9d50e718e46..168568386034 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ position p1;
 (
 * kfree@p1(E)
 |
-* kzfree@p1(E)
+* kfree_sensitive@p1(E)
 )
 
 @print expression@
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ while (1) { ...
 (
 * kfree@ok(E)
 |
-* kzfree@ok(E)
+* kfree_sensitive@ok(E)
 )
   ... when != break;
       when != goto l;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ position free.p1!=loop.ok,p2!={print.p,sz.p};
 (
 * kfree@p1(E,...)
 |
-* kzfree@p1(E,...)
+* kfree_sensitive@p1(E,...)
 )
 ...
 (
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci
index cfaf308328d8..142af6337a04 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ position p;
 (
 * kfree@p(&e->f)
 |
-* kzfree@p(&e->f)
+* kfree_sensitive@p(&e->f)
 )
 
 @script:python depends on org@
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6ceb74e0f789..9e9d4411b96e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
 			return;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
-			kzfree(domain->table[i]);
-		kzfree(domain->table);
+			kfree_sensitive(domain->table[i]);
+		kfree_sensitive(domain->table);
 		domain->table = NULL;
 	}
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index aff26fc71407..d4f8948517d9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx) {
 		aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
-		kzfree(ctx);
+		kfree_sensitive(ctx);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 269f2f53c0b1..4ab00ab060f1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
 {
 	struct aa_data *data = ptr;
 
-	kzfree(data->data);
-	kzfree(data->key);
-	kzfree(data);
+	kfree_sensitive(data->data);
+	kfree_sensitive(data->key);
+	kfree_sensitive(data);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -217,19 +217,19 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_put_profile(rcu_access_pointer(profile->parent));
 
 	aa_put_ns(profile->ns);
-	kzfree(profile->rename);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->rename);
 
 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++)
-		kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]);
-	kzfree(profile->xattrs);
+		kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs[i]);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs);
 	for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++)
-		kzfree(profile->secmark[i].label);
-	kzfree(profile->secmark);
-	kzfree(profile->dirname);
+		kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark[i].label);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->dirname);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 
@@ -237,13 +237,13 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 		rht = profile->data;
 		profile->data = NULL;
 		rhashtable_free_and_destroy(rht, aa_free_data, NULL);
-		kzfree(rht);
+		kfree_sensitive(rht);
 	}
 
-	kzfree(profile->hash);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile->hash);
 	aa_put_loaddata(profile->rawdata);
 
-	kzfree(profile);
+	kfree_sensitive(profile);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
index d7ef540027a5..70921d95fb40 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name)
 	return ns;
 
 fail_unconfined:
-	kzfree(ns->base.hname);
+	kfree_sensitive(ns->base.hname);
 fail_ns:
-	kzfree(ns);
+	kfree_sensitive(ns);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
 
 	ns->unconfined->ns = NULL;
 	aa_free_profile(ns->unconfined);
-	kzfree(ns);
+	kfree_sensitive(ns);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 2d743c004bc4..5cfbdc6ad106 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work)
 		aa_put_ns(ns);
 	}
 
-	kzfree(d->hash);
-	kzfree(d->name);
+	kfree_sensitive(d->hash);
+	kfree_sensitive(d->name);
 	kvfree(d->data);
-	kzfree(d);
+	kfree_sensitive(d);
 }
 
 void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 		while (unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) {
 			data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!data) {
-				kzfree(key);
+				kfree_sensitive(key);
 				goto fail;
 			}
 
@@ -898,8 +898,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 			data->size = unpack_blob(e, &data->data, NULL);
 			data->data = kvmemdup(data->data, data->size);
 			if (data->size && !data->data) {
-				kzfree(data->key);
-				kzfree(data);
+				kfree_sensitive(data->key);
+				kfree_sensitive(data);
 				goto fail;
 			}
 
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent)
 		aa_put_profile(ent->old);
 		aa_put_profile(ent->new);
 		kfree(ent->ns_name);
-		kzfree(ent);
+		kfree_sensitive(ent);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 82008f900930..a50094ee405a 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 err_fput:
 	fput(file);
 err_enckey:
-	kzfree(enckey);
+	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
 error:
 	big_key_free_buffer(buf);
 	return ret;
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 		path_put(path);
 	}
-	kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+	kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
 		path->mnt = NULL;
 		path->dentry = NULL;
 	}
-	kzfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
 	key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index c4c629bb1c03..1abfa70ed6e1 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ static ssize_t dh_data_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, void **data)
 
 static void dh_free_data(struct dh *dh)
 {
-	kzfree(dh->key);
-	kzfree(dh->p);
-	kzfree(dh->g);
+	kfree_sensitive(dh->key);
+	kfree_sensitive(dh->p);
+	kfree_sensitive(dh->g);
 }
 
 struct dh_completion {
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
 	if (sdesc->shash.tfm)
 		crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
 
-	kzfree(sdesc);
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
 err:
-	kzfree(outbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -395,11 +395,11 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
 out6:
 	kpp_request_free(req);
 out5:
-	kzfree(outbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
 out4:
 	crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
 out3:
-	kzfree(secret);
+	kfree_sensitive(secret);
 out2:
 	dh_free_data(&dh_inputs);
 out1:
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index f6797ba44bf7..4b4c1d8c1494 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
 	memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
 	       master_keylen);
 	ret = calc_hash(hash_tfm, derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
-	kzfree(derived_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(derived_buf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -824,13 +824,13 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
 			     decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		kzfree(epayload);
+		kfree_sensitive(epayload);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
 out:
-	kzfree(datablob);
+	kfree_sensitive(datablob);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
 
 	epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
-	kzfree(epayload);
+	kfree_sensitive(epayload);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
 	call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
 out:
-	kzfree(buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
 	memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
 
 	memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len);
-	kzfree(ascii_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(ascii_buf);
 
 	return asciiblob_len;
 out:
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
  */
 static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
-	kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
 }
 
 struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 8001ab07e63b..b9fe02e5f84f 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
 	}
 
 	ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
-	kzfree(sdesc);
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 	if (!ret)
 		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
 out:
-	kzfree(sdesc);
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 				  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
 				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
 out:
-	kzfree(sdesc);
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
 	if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 out:
-	kzfree(sdesc);
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
 	if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 out:
-	kzfree(sdesc);
+	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
 		*bloblen = storedsize;
 	}
 out:
-	kzfree(td);
+	kfree_sensitive(td);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1031,12 +1031,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
 		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
 out:
-	kzfree(datablob);
-	kzfree(options);
+	kfree_sensitive(datablob);
+	kfree_sensitive(options);
 	if (!ret)
 		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
 	else
-		kzfree(payload);
+		kfree_sensitive(payload);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 	struct trusted_key_payload *p;
 
 	p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
-	kzfree(p);
+	kfree_sensitive(p);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1087,13 +1087,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
 	if (ret != Opt_update) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		kzfree(new_p);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_p);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		kzfree(new_p);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_p);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1107,22 +1107,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 	ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
-		kzfree(new_p);
+		kfree_sensitive(new_p);
 		goto out;
 	}
 	if (new_o->pcrlock) {
 		ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
-			kzfree(new_p);
+			kfree_sensitive(new_p);
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
 	call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
 out:
-	kzfree(datablob);
-	kzfree(new_o);
+	kfree_sensitive(datablob);
+	kfree_sensitive(new_o);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
  */
 static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
-	kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
 }
 
 struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 07d4287e9084..749e2a4dcb13 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
  */
 void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+	kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
 
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
 	struct user_key_payload *payload;
 
 	payload = container_of(head, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
-	kzfree(payload);
+	kfree_sensitive(payload);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ void user_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
 	struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
 
-	kzfree(upayload);
+	kfree_sensitive(upayload);
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
-- 
2.18.1


_______________________________________________
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linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-13 21:15 [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() Waiman Long
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-13 21:15 ` Waiman Long
  2020-04-13 21:31   ` Joe Perches
  2020-04-13 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 " Waiman Long
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  4 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-13 21:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches, Matthew Wilcox,
	David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, Waiman Long,
	linux-crypto, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt,
	linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs,
	netdev, linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
 .../crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c  | 15 +++------------
 .../crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c  | 16 +++-------------
 drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c      | 10 ++--------
 drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c     |  3 +--
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
index aa4e8fdc2b32..46c10c7ca6d0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
@@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 	pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
 }
@@ -391,10 +388,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
@@ -416,10 +410,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	free_sensitive(op->key, op->keylen);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
index 5246ef4f5430..7e09a923cbaf 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
@@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
 			offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
 			if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
 				memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
-				memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
 				kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
 			} else {
 				scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
@@ -367,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ss_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 	pm_runtime_put_sync(op->ss->dev);
 }
@@ -392,10 +388,7 @@ int sun8i_ss_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(ss->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
@@ -418,10 +411,7 @@ int sun8i_ss_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
index fd1269900d67..f424397fbba4 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
@@ -341,10 +341,7 @@ void meson_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct meson_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key)
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 }
 
@@ -368,10 +365,7 @@ int meson_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(mc->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
index 43962bc709c6..4a2d162914de 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
@@ -1081,8 +1081,7 @@ static int safexcel_hmac_init_pad(struct ahash_request *areq,
 		}
 
 		/* Avoid leaking */
-		memzero_explicit(keydup, keylen);
-		kfree(keydup);
+		kfree_sensitive(keydup);
 
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-- 
2.18.1


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linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-13 21:31   ` Joe Perches
  2020-04-13 21:52     ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Joe Perches @ 2020-04-13 21:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long, Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Matthew Wilcox,
	David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, linux-crypto,
	linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek,
	linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, netdev,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

On Mon, 2020-04-13 at 17:15 -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
> is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites.

2 bits of trivia:

> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
[]
> @@ -391,10 +388,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	op->keylen = keylen;
>  	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>  	if (!op->key)

It might be a defect to set op->keylen before the kmemdup succeeds.

> @@ -416,10 +410,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	free_sensitive(op->key, op->keylen);

Why not kfree_sensitive(op->key) ?



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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-13 21:31   ` Joe Perches
@ 2020-04-13 21:52     ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-13 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Joe Perches, Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Matthew Wilcox,
	David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, linux-crypto,
	linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek,
	linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, netdev,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

On 4/13/20 5:31 PM, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-04-13 at 17:15 -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
>> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
>> is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
>> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites.
> 2 bits of trivia:
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> []
>> @@ -391,10 +388,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>>  		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>>  		return -EINVAL;
>>  	}
>> -	if (op->key) {
>> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
>> -		kfree(op->key);
>> -	}
>> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>>  	op->keylen = keylen;
>>  	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>>  	if (!op->key)
> It might be a defect to set op->keylen before the kmemdup succeeds.
It could be. I can move it down after the op->key check.
>> @@ -416,10 +410,7 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>>  	if (err)
>>  		return err;
>>  
>> -	if (op->key) {
>> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
>> -		kfree(op->key);
>> -	}
>> +	free_sensitive(op->key, op->keylen);
> Why not kfree_sensitive(op->key) ?

Oh, it is a bug. I will send out v2 to fix that.

Thanks for spotting it.

Cheers,
Longman


>
>


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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-13 21:15 [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() Waiman Long
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-13 22:28 ` Waiman Long
  2020-04-14  6:08   ` Christophe Leroy
  2020-04-14 13:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() David Howells
  2020-04-14 20:02 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
  4 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-13 22:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches, Matthew Wilcox,
	David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, Waiman Long,
	linux-crypto, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt,
	linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs,
	netdev, linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
the setting of keylen is also moved down after the key pointer check.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 19 +++++-------------
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 20 +++++--------------
 drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 12 +++--------
 drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +--
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
index aa4e8fdc2b32..8358fac98719 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
@@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 	pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
 }
@@ -391,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
-	op->keylen = keylen;
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	op->keylen = keylen;
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
@@ -416,14 +410,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
-	op->keylen = keylen;
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	op->keylen = keylen;
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
index 5246ef4f5430..0495fbc27fcc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
@@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
 			offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
 			if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
 				memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
-				memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
 				kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
 			} else {
 				scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
@@ -367,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ss_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 	pm_runtime_put_sync(op->ss->dev);
 }
@@ -392,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ss_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(ss->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
-	op->keylen = keylen;
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	op->keylen = keylen;
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
@@ -418,14 +411,11 @@ int sun8i_ss_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
-	op->keylen = keylen;
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	op->keylen = keylen;
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
index fd1269900d67..6aa9ce7bbbd4 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
@@ -341,10 +341,7 @@ void meson_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct meson_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 }
 
@@ -368,14 +365,11 @@ int meson_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(mc->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
-	op->keylen = keylen;
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!op->key)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	op->keylen = keylen;
 
 	return crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(op->fallback_tfm, key, keylen);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
index 43962bc709c6..4a2d162914de 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
@@ -1081,8 +1081,7 @@ static int safexcel_hmac_init_pad(struct ahash_request *areq,
 		}
 
 		/* Avoid leaking */
-		memzero_explicit(keydup, keylen);
-		kfree(keydup);
+		kfree_sensitive(keydup);
 
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-- 
2.18.1


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-14  0:29   ` David Rientjes
  2020-04-14  8:32   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
                     ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Rientjes @ 2020-04-14  0:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, Linus Torvalds, intel-wired-lan,
	Serge E. Hallyn, linux-wpan, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, netdev, linux-wireless,
	linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth, linux-security-module,
	target-devel, tipc-discussion, linux-crypto, linux-ppp,
	Joe Perches, Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, wireguard

On Mon, 13 Apr 2020, Waiman Long wrote:

> As said by Linus:
> 
>   A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
>   Otherwise it's actively misleading.
> 
>   In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
>   caller wants.
> 
>   In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
>   future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
>   something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
> 
> The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
> that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
> objects.
> 
> Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the
> recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API
> more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the
> memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
> 
> The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
> 
>   git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
>   xargs sed -i 's/\bkzfree\b/kfree_sensitive/'
> 
> followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and the
> use of memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
> 
> Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>

Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-13 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 " Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-14  6:08   ` Christophe Leroy
  2020-04-14 16:24     ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Christophe Leroy @ 2020-04-14  6:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long, Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches,
	Matthew Wilcox, David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, linux-crypto,
	linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek,
	linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, netdev,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs



Le 14/04/2020 à 00:28, Waiman Long a écrit :
> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
> is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
> the setting of keylen is also moved down after the key pointer check.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
> ---
>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 19 +++++-------------
>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 20 +++++--------------
>   drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 12 +++--------
>   drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +--
>   4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> index aa4e8fdc2b32..8358fac98719 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> @@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>   {
>   	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>   
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>   	pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
>   }
> @@ -391,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>   		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   	}
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> -	op->keylen = keylen;
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>   	if (!op->key)
>   		return -ENOMEM;
> +	op->keylen = keylen;

Does it matter at all to ensure op->keylen is not set when of->key is 
NULL ? I'm not sure.

But if it does, then op->keylen should be set to 0 when freeing op->key.

>   
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> @@ -416,14 +410,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>   	if (err)
>   		return err;
>   
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> -	op->keylen = keylen;
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>   	if (!op->key)
>   		return -ENOMEM;
> +	op->keylen = keylen;

Same comment as above.

>   
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> index 5246ef4f5430..0495fbc27fcc 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> @@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
>   			offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
>   			if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
>   				memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
> -				memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
>   				kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
>   			} else {
>   				scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
> @@ -367,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ss_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>   {
>   	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>   
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>   	pm_runtime_put_sync(op->ss->dev);
>   }
> @@ -392,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ss_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>   		dev_dbg(ss->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   	}
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> -	op->keylen = keylen;
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>   	if (!op->key)
>   		return -ENOMEM;
> +	op->keylen = keylen;

Same comment as above.

>   
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> @@ -418,14 +411,11 @@ int sun8i_ss_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   	}
>   
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> -	op->keylen = keylen;
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>   	if (!op->key)
>   		return -ENOMEM;
> +	op->keylen = keylen;

Same comment as above.

>   
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>   	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> index fd1269900d67..6aa9ce7bbbd4 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> @@ -341,10 +341,7 @@ void meson_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>   {
>   	struct meson_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>   
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>   }
>   
> @@ -368,14 +365,11 @@ int meson_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>   		dev_dbg(mc->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   	}
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> -	op->keylen = keylen;
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>   	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>   	if (!op->key)
>   		return -ENOMEM;
> +	op->keylen = keylen;

Same comment as above.

>   
>   	return crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(op->fallback_tfm, key, keylen);
>   }
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
> index 43962bc709c6..4a2d162914de 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
> @@ -1081,8 +1081,7 @@ static int safexcel_hmac_init_pad(struct ahash_request *areq,
>   		}
>   
>   		/* Avoid leaking */
> -		memzero_explicit(keydup, keylen);
> -		kfree(keydup);
> +		kfree_sensitive(keydup);
>   
>   		if (ret)
>   			return ret;
> 


Christophe

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linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
  2020-04-14  0:29   ` David Rientjes
@ 2020-04-14  8:32   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
  2020-04-14  9:01   ` Michal Hocko
                     ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2020-04-14  8:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long, Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches,
	Matthew Wilcox, David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, linux-crypto,
	linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek,
	linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, netdev,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

On 4/13/20 3:15 PM, Waiman Long wrote:
> As said by Linus:
> 
>    A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
>    Otherwise it's actively misleading.
> 
>    In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
>    caller wants.
> 
>    In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
>    future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
>    something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
> 
> The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
> that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
> objects.
> 
> Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the
> recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API
> more explicit. 

Seems reasonable to me. One bikeshed, that you can safely discard and 
ignore as a mere bikeshed: kfree_memzero or kfree_scrub or 
kfree_{someverb} seems like a better function name, as it describes what 
the function does, rather than "_sensitive" that suggests something 
about the data maybe but who knows what that entails. If you disagree, 
not a big deal either way.

 > In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the
 > memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

This had occurred to me momentarily a number of years ago, but I was 
under the impression that the kernel presumes extern function calls to 
always imply a compiler barrier, making it difficult for the compiler to 
reason about what happens in/after kfree, in order to be able to 
optimize out the preceding memset. With LTO, that rule obviously 
changes. I guess new code should be written with cross-object 
optimizations in mind now a days? [Meanwhile, it would be sort of 
interesting to teach gcc about kfree to enable additional scary 
optimizations...]

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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
  2020-04-14  0:29   ` David Rientjes
  2020-04-14  8:32   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
@ 2020-04-14  9:01   ` Michal Hocko
  2020-04-14 12:48   ` David Sterba
                     ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Michal Hocko @ 2020-04-14  9:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan,
	David Rientjes, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, Linus Torvalds, linux-wireless,
	linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth, linux-security-module,
	target-devel, tipc-discussion, linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches,
	Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, wireguard, linux-ppp

On Mon 13-04-20 17:15:49, Waiman Long wrote:
> As said by Linus:
> 
>   A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
>   Otherwise it's actively misleading.
> 
>   In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
>   caller wants.
> 
>   In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
>   future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
>   something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
> 
> The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
> that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
> objects.
> 
> Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the
> recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API
> more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the
> memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
> 
> The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
> 
>   git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
>   xargs sed -i 's/\bkzfree\b/kfree_sensitive/'
> 
> followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and the
> use of memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
> 
> Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>

Makes sense. I haven't checked all the conversions and will rely on the
script doing the right thing. The core MM part is correct.

Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs

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linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
                     ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-04-14  9:01   ` Michal Hocko
@ 2020-04-14 12:48   ` David Sterba
  2020-04-14 18:26     ` Waiman Long
  2020-04-15  5:01   ` Johannes Weiner
  2020-06-15 18:07   ` Dan Carpenter
  5 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Sterba @ 2020-04-14 12:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan,
	David Rientjes, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, Linus Torvalds, linux-wireless,
	linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth, linux-security-module,
	target-devel, tipc-discussion, linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches,
	Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, wireguard, linux-ppp

On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 05:15:49PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
>  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c                              |  2 +-


> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
> index 40b729dce91c..eab3f8510426 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
> @@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
>  	btrfs_put_root(root);
>  out_free:
>  	btrfs_free_path(path);
> -	kzfree(subvol_info);
> +	kfree_sensitive(subvol_info);

This is not in a sensitive context so please switch it to plain kfree.
With that you have my acked-by. Thanks.

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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() Waiman Long
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-04-13 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 " Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-14 13:06 ` David Howells
  2020-04-14 20:02 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2020-04-14 13:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long, herbert
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan,
	David Rientjes, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, Linus Torvalds, linux-wireless,
	linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth, linux-security-module,
	target-devel, tipc-discussion, linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches,
	Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, wireguard, linux-ppp

Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> wrote:

> As said by Linus:
> 
>   A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
>   Otherwise it's actively misleading.
> 
>   In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
>   caller wants.
> 
>   In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
>   future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
>   something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
> 
> The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
> that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
> objects.
> 
> Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the
> recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API
> more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the
> memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
> 
> The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
> 
>   git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
>   xargs sed -i 's/\bkzfree\b/kfree_sensitive/'
> 
> followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and the
> use of memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
> 
> Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>

Since this changes a lot of crypto stuff, does it make sense for it to go via
the crypto tree?

Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>


_______________________________________________
linux-amlogic mailing list
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-14  6:08   ` Christophe Leroy
@ 2020-04-14 16:24     ` Waiman Long
  2020-04-14 19:16       ` Michal Suchánek
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-14 16:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Christophe Leroy, Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches,
	Matthew Wilcox, David Rientjes
  Cc: samba-technical, virtualization, linux-mm, linux-sctp,
	target-devel, linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86,
	kasan-dev, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan, linux-crypto,
	linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs, linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek,
	linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, netdev,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, keyrings, tipc-discussion, wireguard,
	linux-ppp, linux-integrity, linuxppc-dev, linux-btrfs

On 4/14/20 2:08 AM, Christophe Leroy wrote:
>
>
> Le 14/04/2020 à 00:28, Waiman Long a écrit :
>> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
>> is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
>> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
>> the setting of keylen is also moved down after the key pointer check.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 19 +++++-------------
>>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 20 +++++--------------
>>   drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 12 +++--------
>>   drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +--
>>   4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>> b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>> index aa4e8fdc2b32..8358fac98719 100644
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>> @@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>>   {
>>       struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>>   -    if (op->key) {
>> -        memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
>> -        kfree(op->key);
>> -    }
>> +    kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>>       crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>>       pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
>>   }
>> @@ -391,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher
>> *tfm, const u8 *key,
>>           dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>>           return -EINVAL;
>>       }
>> -    if (op->key) {
>> -        memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
>> -        kfree(op->key);
>> -    }
>> -    op->keylen = keylen;
>> +    kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>>       op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>>       if (!op->key)
>>           return -ENOMEM;
>> +    op->keylen = keylen;
>
> Does it matter at all to ensure op->keylen is not set when of->key is
> NULL ? I'm not sure.
>
> But if it does, then op->keylen should be set to 0 when freeing op->key. 

My thinking is that if memory allocation fails, we just don't touch
anything and return an error code. I will not explicitly set keylen to 0
in this case unless it is specified in the API documentation.

Cheers,
Longman


_______________________________________________
linux-amlogic mailing list
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-14 12:48   ` David Sterba
@ 2020-04-14 18:26     ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-14 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dsterba, Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches,
	Matthew Wilcox, David Rientjes, linux-mm, keyrings, linux-kernel,
	x86, linux-crypto, linux-s390, linux-pm, linux-stm32,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-amlogic, linux-mediatek, linuxppc-dev,
	virtualization, netdev, intel-wired-lan, linux-ppp, wireguard,
	linux-wireless, devel, linux-scsi, target-devel, linux-btrfs,
	linux-cifs, samba-technical, linux-fscrypt, ecryptfs, kasan-dev,
	linux-bluetooth, linux-wpan, linux-sctp, linux-nfs,
	tipc-discussion, cocci, linux-security-module, linux-integrity

On 4/14/20 8:48 AM, David Sterba wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 05:15:49PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
>>  fs/btrfs/ioctl.c                              |  2 +-
>
>> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
>> index 40b729dce91c..eab3f8510426 100644
>> --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
>> +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
>> @@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
>>  	btrfs_put_root(root);
>>  out_free:
>>  	btrfs_free_path(path);
>> -	kzfree(subvol_info);
>> +	kfree_sensitive(subvol_info);
> This is not in a sensitive context so please switch it to plain kfree.
> With that you have my acked-by. Thanks.
>
Thanks for letting me know about. I think I will send it out as a
separate patch.

Cheers,
Longman


_______________________________________________
linux-amlogic mailing list
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-14 16:24     ` Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-14 19:16       ` Michal Suchánek
  2020-04-14 19:37         ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Michal Suchánek @ 2020-04-14 19:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan,
	David Rientjes, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, Christophe Leroy, linux-cifs, Linus Torvalds,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, target-devel, tipc-discussion,
	linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches, Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev,
	wireguard, linux-ppp

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 12:24:36PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 4/14/20 2:08 AM, Christophe Leroy wrote:
> >
> >
> > Le 14/04/2020 à 00:28, Waiman Long a écrit :
> >> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
> >> is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
> >> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
> >> the setting of keylen is also moved down after the key pointer check.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
> >> ---
> >>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 19 +++++-------------
> >>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 20 +++++--------------
> >>   drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 12 +++--------
> >>   drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +--
> >>   4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> >> b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> >> index aa4e8fdc2b32..8358fac98719 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> >> @@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
> >>   {
> >>       struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> >>   -    if (op->key) {
> >> -        memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> >> -        kfree(op->key);
> >> -    }
> >> +    kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> >>       crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
> >>       pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
> >>   }
> >> @@ -391,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher
> >> *tfm, const u8 *key,
> >>           dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
> >>           return -EINVAL;
> >>       }
> >> -    if (op->key) {
> >> -        memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> >> -        kfree(op->key);
> >> -    }
> >> -    op->keylen = keylen;
> >> +    kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> >>       op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> >>       if (!op->key)
> >>           return -ENOMEM;
> >> +    op->keylen = keylen;
> >
> > Does it matter at all to ensure op->keylen is not set when of->key is
> > NULL ? I'm not sure.
> >
> > But if it does, then op->keylen should be set to 0 when freeing op->key. 
> 
> My thinking is that if memory allocation fails, we just don't touch
> anything and return an error code. I will not explicitly set keylen to 0
> in this case unless it is specified in the API documentation.
You already freed the key by now so not touching anything is not
possible. The key is set to NULL on allocation failure so setting keylen
to 0 should be redundant. However, setting keylen to 0 is consisent with
not having a key, and it avoids the possibility of leaking the length
later should that ever cause any problem.

Thanks

Michal

_______________________________________________
linux-amlogic mailing list
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-14 19:16       ` Michal Suchánek
@ 2020-04-14 19:37         ` Waiman Long
  2020-04-14 19:44           ` Joe Perches
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-14 19:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Michal Suchánek
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan,
	David Rientjes, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, Christophe Leroy, linux-cifs, Linus Torvalds,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, target-devel, tipc-discussion,
	linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches, Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev,
	wireguard, linux-ppp

On 4/14/20 3:16 PM, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 12:24:36PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
>> On 4/14/20 2:08 AM, Christophe Leroy wrote:
>>>
>>> Le 14/04/2020 à 00:28, Waiman Long a écrit :
>>>> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
>>>> is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
>>>> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
>>>> the setting of keylen is also moved down after the key pointer check.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 19 +++++-------------
>>>>   .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 20 +++++--------------
>>>>   drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 12 +++--------
>>>>   drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +--
>>>>   4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>>>> b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>>>> index aa4e8fdc2b32..8358fac98719 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
>>>> @@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>>>>   {
>>>>       struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>>>>   -    if (op->key) {
>>>> -        memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
>>>> -        kfree(op->key);
>>>> -    }
>>>> +    kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>>>>       crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>>>>       pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
>>>>   }
>>>> @@ -391,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher
>>>> *tfm, const u8 *key,
>>>>           dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>>>>           return -EINVAL;
>>>>       }
>>>> -    if (op->key) {
>>>> -        memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
>>>> -        kfree(op->key);
>>>> -    }
>>>> -    op->keylen = keylen;
>>>> +    kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>>>>       op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
>>>>       if (!op->key)
>>>>           return -ENOMEM;
>>>> +    op->keylen = keylen;
>>> Does it matter at all to ensure op->keylen is not set when of->key is
>>> NULL ? I'm not sure.
>>>
>>> But if it does, then op->keylen should be set to 0 when freeing op->key. 
>> My thinking is that if memory allocation fails, we just don't touch
>> anything and return an error code. I will not explicitly set keylen to 0
>> in this case unless it is specified in the API documentation.
> You already freed the key by now so not touching anything is not
> possible. The key is set to NULL on allocation failure so setting keylen
> to 0 should be redundant. However, setting keylen to 0 is consisent with
> not having a key, and it avoids the possibility of leaking the length
> later should that ever cause any problem.

OK, I can change it to clear the key length when the allocation failed
which isn't likely.

Cheers,
Longman



_______________________________________________
linux-amlogic mailing list
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-14 19:37         ` Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-14 19:44           ` Joe Perches
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Joe Perches @ 2020-04-14 19:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long, Michal Suchánek
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan,
	David Rientjes, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, Christophe Leroy, linux-cifs, Linus Torvalds,
	linux-wireless, linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth,
	linux-security-module, target-devel, tipc-discussion,
	linux-crypto, netdev, Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, wireguard,
	linux-ppp

On Tue, 2020-04-14 at 15:37 -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> OK, I can change it to clear the key length when the allocation failed
> which isn't likely.


Perhaps:

	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
	op->key = NULL;
	op->keylen = 0;

but I don't know that it impacts any possible state.



_______________________________________________
linux-amlogic mailing list
linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v3 2/3] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-13 21:15 [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() Waiman Long
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-04-14 13:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() David Howells
@ 2020-04-14 20:02 ` Waiman Long
  2020-04-16  9:06   ` Corentin Labbe
  4 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-04-14 20:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, Linus Torvalds, Joe Perches, Matthew Wilcox,
	David Rientjes, Corentin Labbe, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
	Chen-Yu Tsai
  Cc: linux-kernel, linux-mm, keyrings, linux-crypto, Waiman Long,
	linux-amlogic, linux-arm-kernel

Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(),
there is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
keylen is cleared if key memory allocation fails.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 23 +++++++-----------
 .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 24 +++++++------------
 drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 14 ++++-------
 drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +--
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
index aa4e8fdc2b32..a2bac10d2876 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
@@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 	pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
 }
@@ -391,14 +388,13 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
-	if (!op->key)
+	if (unlikely(!op->key)) {
+		op->keylen = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
@@ -416,14 +412,13 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
-	if (!op->key)
+	if (unlikely(!op->key)) {
+		op->keylen = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
index 5246ef4f5430..a24d567a6c36 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
@@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
 			offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
 			if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
 				memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
-				memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
 				kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
 			} else {
 				scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
@@ -367,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ss_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 	pm_runtime_put_sync(op->ss->dev);
 }
@@ -392,14 +388,13 @@ int sun8i_ss_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(ss->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
-	if (!op->key)
+	if (unlikely(!op->key))
+		op->keylen = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
@@ -418,14 +413,13 @@ int sun8i_ss_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
-	if (!op->key)
+	if (unlikely(!op->key))
+		op->keylen = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
index fd1269900d67..5312bad7534e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
@@ -341,10 +341,7 @@ void meson_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
 	struct meson_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
 }
 
@@ -368,14 +365,13 @@ int meson_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 		dev_dbg(mc->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (op->key) {
-		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
-		kfree(op->key);
-	}
+	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
 	op->keylen = keylen;
 	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
-	if (!op->key)
+	if (unlikely(!op->key))
+		op->keylen = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	return crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(op->fallback_tfm, key, keylen);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
index 43962bc709c6..4a2d162914de 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
@@ -1081,8 +1081,7 @@ static int safexcel_hmac_init_pad(struct ahash_request *areq,
 		}
 
 		/* Avoid leaking */
-		memzero_explicit(keydup, keylen);
-		kfree(keydup);
+		kfree_sensitive(keydup);
 
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-- 
2.18.1


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
                     ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-04-14 12:48   ` David Sterba
@ 2020-04-15  5:01   ` Johannes Weiner
  2020-06-15 18:07   ` Dan Carpenter
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Johannes Weiner @ 2020-04-15  5:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long
  Cc: linux-btrfs, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization, David Howells,
	linux-mm, linux-sctp, keyrings, kasan-dev, samba-technical,
	linux-stm32, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, cocci, linux-wpan, intel-wired-lan,
	David Rientjes, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linux-nfs,
	linux-fscrypt, linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-cifs, Linus Torvalds, linux-wireless,
	linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth, linux-security-module,
	target-devel, tipc-discussion, linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches,
	Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, wireguard, linux-ppp

On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 05:15:49PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> As said by Linus:
> 
>   A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
>   Otherwise it's actively misleading.

As the btrfs example proves - people can be tempted by this false
symmetry to pair kzalloc with kzfree, which isn't what we wanted.

>   In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
>   caller wants.
> 
>   In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
>   future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
>   something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
> 
> The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
> that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
> objects.
> 
> Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the
> recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API
> more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the
> memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
> 
> The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
> 
>   git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
>   xargs sed -i 's/\bkzfree\b/kfree_sensitive/'
> 
> followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and the
> use of memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
> 
> Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>

Looks good to me. Thanks for fixing this very old mistake.

Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
  2020-04-14 20:02 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
@ 2020-04-16  9:06   ` Corentin Labbe
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Corentin Labbe @ 2020-04-16  9:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long
  Cc: linux-crypto, Herbert Xu, James Morris, Jarkko Sakkinen,
	linux-kernel, David Howells, linux-mm, Chen-Yu Tsai, keyrings,
	Matthew Wilcox, David Rientjes, Joe Perches, linux-amlogic,
	Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds, David S. Miller, linux-arm-kernel,
	Serge E. Hallyn

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 04:02:14PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(),
> there is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
> keylen is cleared if key memory allocation fails.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
> ---
>  .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c      | 23 +++++++-----------
>  .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c      | 24 +++++++------------
>  drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c   | 14 ++++-------
>  drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c  |  3 +--
>  4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> index aa4e8fdc2b32..a2bac10d2876 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> @@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>  {
>  	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>  
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>  	pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
>  }
> @@ -391,14 +388,13 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  		dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	op->keylen = keylen;
>  	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> -	if (!op->key)
> +	if (unlikely(!op->key)) {
> +		op->keylen = 0;
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>  
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> @@ -416,14 +412,13 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  	if (err)
>  		return err;
>  
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	op->keylen = keylen;
>  	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> -	if (!op->key)
> +	if (unlikely(!op->key)) {
> +		op->keylen = 0;
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>  
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> index 5246ef4f5430..a24d567a6c36 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> @@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
>  			offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
>  			if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
>  				memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
> -				memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
>  				kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
>  			} else {
>  				scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
> @@ -367,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ss_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>  {
>  	struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>  
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>  	pm_runtime_put_sync(op->ss->dev);
>  }
> @@ -392,14 +388,13 @@ int sun8i_ss_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  		dev_dbg(ss->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	op->keylen = keylen;
>  	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> -	if (!op->key)
> +	if (unlikely(!op->key))
> +		op->keylen = 0;
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>  
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> @@ -418,14 +413,13 @@ int sun8i_ss_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	op->keylen = keylen;
>  	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> -	if (!op->key)
> +	if (unlikely(!op->key))
> +		op->keylen = 0;
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>  
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
>  	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> index fd1269900d67..5312bad7534e 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> @@ -341,10 +341,7 @@ void meson_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
>  {
>  	struct meson_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>  
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
>  }
>  
> @@ -368,14 +365,13 @@ int meson_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  		dev_dbg(mc->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
> -	if (op->key) {
> -		memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> -		kfree(op->key);
> -	}
> +	kfree_sensitive(op->key);
>  	op->keylen = keylen;
>  	op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> -	if (!op->key)
> +	if (unlikely(!op->key))
> +		op->keylen = 0;
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
>  
>  	return crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(op->fallback_tfm, key, keylen);
>  }

For sun8i-ss/sun8i-ce
Acked-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
For amlogic
Acked-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>

Thanks

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linux-amlogic@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
                     ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-04-15  5:01   ` Johannes Weiner
@ 2020-06-15 18:07   ` Dan Carpenter
  2020-06-15 18:39     ` Waiman Long
  5 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2020-06-15 18:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Waiman Long
  Cc: linux-cifs, linux-wireless, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization,
	David Howells, linux-mm, linux-sctp, target-devel, kasan-dev,
	cocci, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, linux-stm32, intel-wired-lan, David Rientjes,
	Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linuxppc-dev, linux-fscrypt,
	linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-btrfs, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-nfs, Linus Torvalds, samba-technical,
	linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth, linux-security-module, keyrings,
	tipc-discussion, linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches,
	Andrew Morton, linux-wpan, wireguard, linux-ppp

On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 05:15:49PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> index 23c7500eea7d..c08bc7eb20bd 100644
> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> @@ -1707,17 +1707,17 @@ void *krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(krealloc);
>  
>  /**
> - * kzfree - like kfree but zero memory
> + * kfree_sensitive - Clear sensitive information in memory before freeing
>   * @p: object to free memory of
>   *
>   * The memory of the object @p points to is zeroed before freed.
> - * If @p is %NULL, kzfree() does nothing.
> + * If @p is %NULL, kfree_sensitive() does nothing.
>   *
>   * Note: this function zeroes the whole allocated buffer which can be a good
>   * deal bigger than the requested buffer size passed to kmalloc(). So be
>   * careful when using this function in performance sensitive code.
>   */
> -void kzfree(const void *p)
> +void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
>  {
>  	size_t ks;
>  	void *mem = (void *)p;
> @@ -1725,10 +1725,10 @@ void kzfree(const void *p)
>  	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem)))
>  		return;
>  	ks = ksize(mem);
> -	memset(mem, 0, ks);
> +	memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This is an unrelated bug fix.  It really needs to be pulled into a
separate patch by itself and back ported to stable kernels.

>  	kfree(mem);
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
>  
>  /**
>   * ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object

regards,
dan carpenter

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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
  2020-06-15 18:07   ` Dan Carpenter
@ 2020-06-15 18:39     ` Waiman Long
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Waiman Long @ 2020-06-15 18:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dan Carpenter
  Cc: linux-cifs, linux-wireless, Jarkko Sakkinen, virtualization,
	David Howells, linux-mm, linux-sctp, target-devel, kasan-dev,
	cocci, devel, linux-s390, linux-scsi, x86, James Morris,
	Matthew Wilcox, linux-stm32, intel-wired-lan, David Rientjes,
	Serge E. Hallyn, linux-pm, ecryptfs, linuxppc-dev, linux-fscrypt,
	linux-mediatek, linux-amlogic, linux-btrfs, linux-integrity,
	linux-arm-kernel, linux-nfs, Linus Torvalds, samba-technical,
	linux-kernel, linux-bluetooth, linux-security-module, keyrings,
	tipc-discussion, linux-crypto, netdev, Joe Perches,
	Andrew Morton, linux-wpan, wireguard, linux-ppp

On 6/15/20 2:07 PM, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 05:15:49PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
>> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
>> index 23c7500eea7d..c08bc7eb20bd 100644
>> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
>> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
>> @@ -1707,17 +1707,17 @@ void *krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(krealloc);
>>   
>>   /**
>> - * kzfree - like kfree but zero memory
>> + * kfree_sensitive - Clear sensitive information in memory before freeing
>>    * @p: object to free memory of
>>    *
>>    * The memory of the object @p points to is zeroed before freed.
>> - * If @p is %NULL, kzfree() does nothing.
>> + * If @p is %NULL, kfree_sensitive() does nothing.
>>    *
>>    * Note: this function zeroes the whole allocated buffer which can be a good
>>    * deal bigger than the requested buffer size passed to kmalloc(). So be
>>    * careful when using this function in performance sensitive code.
>>    */
>> -void kzfree(const void *p)
>> +void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
>>   {
>>   	size_t ks;
>>   	void *mem = (void *)p;
>> @@ -1725,10 +1725,10 @@ void kzfree(const void *p)
>>   	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem)))
>>   		return;
>>   	ks = ksize(mem);
>> -	memset(mem, 0, ks);
>> +	memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
>          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> This is an unrelated bug fix.  It really needs to be pulled into a
> separate patch by itself and back ported to stable kernels.
>
>>   	kfree(mem);
>>   }
>> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree);
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
>>   
>>   /**
>>    * ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object
> regards,
> dan carpenter
>
Thanks for the suggestion. I will break it out and post a version soon.

Cheers,
Longman


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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-amlogic

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread

end of thread, back to index

Thread overview: 22+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-04-13 21:15 [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() Waiman Long
2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Waiman Long
2020-04-14  0:29   ` David Rientjes
2020-04-14  8:32   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-04-14  9:01   ` Michal Hocko
2020-04-14 12:48   ` David Sterba
2020-04-14 18:26     ` Waiman Long
2020-04-15  5:01   ` Johannes Weiner
2020-06-15 18:07   ` Dan Carpenter
2020-06-15 18:39     ` Waiman Long
2020-04-13 21:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
2020-04-13 21:31   ` Joe Perches
2020-04-13 21:52     ` Waiman Long
2020-04-13 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 " Waiman Long
2020-04-14  6:08   ` Christophe Leroy
2020-04-14 16:24     ` Waiman Long
2020-04-14 19:16       ` Michal Suchánek
2020-04-14 19:37         ` Waiman Long
2020-04-14 19:44           ` Joe Perches
2020-04-14 13:06 ` [PATCH 1/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() David Howells
2020-04-14 20:02 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit() Waiman Long
2020-04-16  9:06   ` Corentin Labbe

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