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* [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
@ 2017-04-26 18:34 Thomas Garnier
  2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] x86/syscalls: Optimize address limit check Thomas Garnier
                   ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-04-26 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	David Howells, René Nyffenegger, Thomas Garnier,
	Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Eric W . Biederman, Thomas Gleixner, Oleg Nesterov,
	Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski,
	Paolo Bonzini, Kees Cook
  Cc: linux-s390-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r,
	kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8

Ensure that a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel address
limit. If that happens, a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
elevate privileges [1].

The CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK option disables the generic check so each
architecture can create optimized versions.

[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
---
Based on next-20170426
---
 arch/s390/Kconfig        |  1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 init/Kconfig             |  6 ++++++
 kernel/sys.c             | 13 +++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index d25435d94b6e..164de1d24e92 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+	select ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
 	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 980c3c9b06f8..ebde64f1622c 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -191,6 +191,28 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)			\
 	__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+
+/*
+ * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
+ * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
+ */
+static inline void addr_limit_check_syscall(void)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL() \
+	bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
+#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT() \
+	if (user_caller) addr_limit_check_syscall()
+#else
+#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL()
+#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT()
+asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void) __noreturn;
+#endif
+
+
 #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
 #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)					\
 	asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
@@ -199,7 +221,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))	\
 	{								\
-		long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		long ret;						\
+		__CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL();				\
+		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		__VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT();					\
 		__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);				\
 		__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 		return ret;						\
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 42a346b0df43..599d9fe30703 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1961,6 +1961,12 @@ config PROFILING
 config TRACEPOINTS
 	bool
 
+config ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+	bool
+	help
+	  Disable the generic address limit check. Allow each architecture to
+	  optimize how and when the verification is done.
+
 source "arch/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu		# General setup
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 8a94b4eabcaa..a1cbcd715d62 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2458,3 +2458,16 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+/*
+ * Used when an architecture specific implementation detects an invalid address
+ * limit. This function does not return.
+ */
+asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void)
+{
+	/* Try to fail on the generic address limit check */
+	addr_limit_check_syscall();
+	panic("Invalid address limit before returning to user-mode");
+}
+#endif
-- 
2.13.0.rc0.306.g87b477812d-goog

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 2/4] x86/syscalls: Optimize address limit check
  2017-04-26 18:34 [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-04-26 18:34 ` Thomas Garnier
  2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-04-26 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	David Howells, René Nyffenegger, Thomas Garnier,
	Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Eric W . Biederman, Thomas Gleixner, Oleg Nesterov,
	Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski,
	Paolo Bonzini, Kees Cook, Rik van Riel, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Borislav Petkov
  Cc: linux-s390, linux-kernel, linux-api, x86, linux-arm-kernel,
	kernel-hardening

Disable the generic address limit check in favor of an architecture
specific optimized implementation.

The user-mode state check is added to the prepare_exit_to_usermode
function. This function is called before any user-mode return on 32-bit
and on the 64-bit syscall slowpath. For the 64-bit syscall fast path, an
assembly address limit check redirects to the slow path if the address
limit is different.

The TASK_SIZE_MAX definition is moved to the pgtable_64_types header so
it can be used in assembly code.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
Based on next-20170426
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                        |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                 |  3 +++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S               |  8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h        | 11 -----------
 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cd18994a9555..f3ce1859bd61 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_ACPI_PDC		if ACPI
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO
+	select ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING	if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index cdefcfdd9e63..057d133d7b78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
 #include <linux/uprobes.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 	u32 cached_flags;
 
+	addr_limit_check_syscall();
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) && WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled()))
 		local_irq_disable();
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 607d72c4a485..62aca6dcdaf4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -218,6 +218,14 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
 	testl	$_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
 	jnz	1f
 
+	/*
+	 * If address limit is not based on user-mode, jump to slow path for
+	 * additional security checks.
+	 */
+	movq	$TASK_SIZE_MAX, %rcx
+	cmp	%rcx, TASK_addr_limit(%r11)
+	jne	1f
+
 	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON		/* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
 	movq	RIP(%rsp), %rcx
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
index 06470da156ba..78af4d43a7ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
@@ -104,4 +104,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
 
 #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES	64
 
+/*
+ * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
+ * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
+ * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
+ * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
+ * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
+ * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
+ * at the maximum canonical address.
+ */
+#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 3cada998a402..e80822582d3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -825,17 +825,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
 #define KSTK_ESP(task)		(task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
 
 #else
-/*
- * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
- * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
- * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
- * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
- * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
- * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
- * at the maximum canonical address.
- */
-#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
-
 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
  * space during mmap's.
  */
-- 
2.13.0.rc0.306.g87b477812d-goog

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 3/4] arm/syscalls: Optimize address limit check
  2017-04-26 18:34 [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
  2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] x86/syscalls: Optimize address limit check Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-04-26 18:34 ` Thomas Garnier
  2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
       [not found] ` <20170426183425.32158-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-04-26 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	David Howells, René Nyffenegger, Thomas Garnier,
	Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Eric W . Biederman, Thomas Gleixner, Oleg Nesterov,
	Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski,
	Paolo Bonzini, Kees Cook, Rik van Riel, Josh Poimboeuf,
	Borislav Petkov
  Cc: linux-s390, linux-kernel, linux-api, x86, linux-arm-kernel,
	kernel-hardening

Disable the generic address limit check in favor of an architecture
specific optimized implementation.

The address limit is checked on each syscall return path to user-mode
path as well as the irq user-mode return function. If the address limit
was changed, a generic handler is called to stop the kernel on an
explicit check.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
---
Based on next-20170426
---
 arch/arm/Kconfig               |  1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 4c1a35f15838..f17f30084a4e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM
 	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
+	select ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT if CPU_V7
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index eb5cd77bf1d8..c83927498f40 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <asm/ftrace.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/memory.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_AEABI
 #include <asm/unistd-oabi.h>
 #endif
@@ -27,7 +28,6 @@
 
 #include "entry-header.S"
 
-
 	.align	5
 #if !(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING))
 /*
@@ -40,9 +40,12 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
  UNWIND(.fnstart	)
  UNWIND(.cantunwind	)
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ re-check for syscall tracing
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
 	bne	fast_work_pending
+	cmp	r2, #TASK_SIZE
+	blne	addr_limit_check_failed
 
 	/* perform architecture specific actions before user return */
 	arch_ret_to_user r1, lr
@@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
  UNWIND(.cantunwind	)
 	str	r0, [sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF]!	@ save returned r0
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ re-check for syscall tracing
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
 	beq	no_work_pending
@@ -82,6 +86,7 @@ slow_work_pending:
 	mov	r2, why				@ 'syscall'
 	bl	do_work_pending
 	cmp	r0, #0
+	ldreq   r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	beq	no_work_pending
 	movlt	scno, #(__NR_restart_syscall - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
 	ldmia	sp, {r0 - r6}			@ have to reload r0 - r6
@@ -99,9 +104,12 @@ ret_slow_syscall:
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
 ENTRY(ret_to_user_from_irq)
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
 	bne	slow_work_pending
 no_work_pending:
+	cmp	r2, #TASK_SIZE
+	blne	addr_limit_check_failed
 	asm_trace_hardirqs_on save = 0
 
 	/* perform architecture specific actions before user return */
-- 
2.13.0.rc0.306.g87b477812d-goog

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Optimize address limit check
  2017-04-26 18:34 [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
  2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] x86/syscalls: Optimize address limit check Thomas Garnier
  2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-04-26 18:34 ` Thomas Garnier
       [not found] ` <20170426183425.32158-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-04-26 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	David Howells, René Nyffenegger, Thomas Garnier,
	Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Eric W . Biederman, Thomas Gleixner, Oleg Nesterov,
	Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski,
	Paolo Bonzini, Kees Cook
  Cc: linux-s390, linux-kernel, linux-api, x86, linux-arm-kernel,
	kernel-hardening

Disable the generic address limit check in favor of an architecture
specific optimized implementation.

The address limit is checked on each syscall return path to user-mode.
If it was changed, a generic handler is called to stop the kernel on an
explicit check.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---
Based on next-20170426
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig        |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 3dcd7ec69bca..fe9466d3bf94 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
 	select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
 	select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
+	select ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
 	select ARM_AMBA
 	select ARM_ARCH_TIMER
 	select ARM_GIC
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 43512d4d7df2..c895c4402d32 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -744,6 +744,8 @@ ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to)
 ret_fast_syscall:
 	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
 	str	x0, [sp, #S_X0]			// returned x0
+	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
+	tbnz	x2, #63, addr_limit_fail
 	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]	// re-check for syscall tracing
 	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
 	cbnz	x2, ret_fast_syscall_trace
@@ -771,6 +773,8 @@ work_pending:
  */
 ret_to_user:
 	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
+	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
+	tbnz	x2, #63, addr_limit_fail
 	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
 	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
 	cbnz	x2, work_pending
@@ -780,6 +784,14 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
 ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
 
 /*
+ * Address limit was incorrect before returning in user-mode which could be
+ * used to elevate privileges. Call the generic handler to stop the kernel on
+ * the appropriate check. This function does not return.
+ */
+addr_limit_fail:
+	b	addr_limit_check_failed
+
+/*
  * This is how we return from a fork.
  */
 ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
-- 
2.13.0.rc0.306.g87b477812d-goog

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
       [not found] ` <20170426183425.32158-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
@ 2017-04-27  6:49   ` Ingo Molnar
  2017-04-27 14:16     ` Thomas Garnier
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2017-04-27  6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Thomas Garnier
  Cc: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	David Howells, René Nyffenegger, Andrew Morton,
	Paul E . McKenney, Eric W . Biederman, Thomas Gleixner,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin,
	Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Kees Cook, Rik van Riel,
	Josh Poimboeuf


* Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:

> +
> +/*
> + * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
> + * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
> + */
> +static inline void addr_limit_check_syscall(void)
> +{
> +	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
> +}
> +
> +#ifndef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
> +#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL() \
> +	bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
> +#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT() \
> +	if (user_caller) addr_limit_check_syscall()
> +#else
> +#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL()
> +#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT()
> +asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void) __noreturn;
> +#endif

_Please_ harmonize all the externally exposed names and symbols.

There's no reason for this mismash of names:

	CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK

	__CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL
	__VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT

When we could just as easily name them consistently, along the existing pattern:

	CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK

	__SYSCALL_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
	__ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK

which should fit into existing nomenclature:

>  #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)					\

But even with that fixed, the whole construct still looks pretty weird:

>  	{								\
> -		long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
> +		long ret;						\
> +		__CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL();				\
> +		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
> +		__ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK();					\
>  		__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);				\
>  		__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));	\
>  		return ret;						\

I think something like this would be more natural to read:

> +		ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE();					\
> +		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
> +		ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST();				\

it's a clear pre/post construct. Also note the lack of double underscores.

BTW., a further simplification would be:

#ifndef ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE
# define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE ...
#endif

This way architectures could override this generic functionality simply by 
defining the helpers. Architectures that don't do that get the generic version. 

Thanks,

	Ingo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
  2017-04-27  6:49   ` [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar
@ 2017-04-27 14:16     ` Thomas Garnier
       [not found]       ` <CAJcbSZENjCgn3TNDGzCBBSOXMvbTX8mBO7Trugdb5VRzhxwmHg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-04-27 14:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ingo Molnar
  Cc: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	David Howells, René Nyffenegger, Andrew Morton,
	Paul E . McKenney, Eric W . Biederman, Thomas Gleixner,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin,
	Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Kees Cook, Rik van Riel,
	Josh Poimboeuf, Borislav Petkov, Brian Gerst,
	Kirill A . Shutemov

On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 11:49 PM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> * Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
>
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
>> + * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
>> + */
>> +static inline void addr_limit_check_syscall(void)
>> +{
>> +     BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
>> +}
>> +
>> +#ifndef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
>> +#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL() \
>> +     bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
>> +#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT() \
>> +     if (user_caller) addr_limit_check_syscall()
>> +#else
>> +#define __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL()
>> +#define __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT()
>> +asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void) __noreturn;
>> +#endif
>
> _Please_ harmonize all the externally exposed names and symbols.
>
> There's no reason for this mismash of names:
>
>         CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
>
>         __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL
>         __VERIFY_ADDR_LIMIT
>
> When we could just as easily name them consistently, along the existing pattern:
>
>         CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
>
>         __SYSCALL_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
>         __ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
>
> which should fit into existing nomenclature:
>
>>  #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)                                      \
>
> But even with that fixed, the whole construct still looks pretty weird:
>
>>       {                                                               \
>> -             long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));  \
>> +             long ret;                                               \
>> +             __CHECK_USERMODE_SYSCALL();                             \
>> +             ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));       \
>> +             __ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK();                                   \
>>               __MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);                         \
>>               __PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));       \
>>               return ret;                                             \
>
> I think something like this would be more natural to read:
>
>> +             ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE();                                 \
>> +             ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));       \
>> +             ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST();                                \
>
> it's a clear pre/post construct. Also note the lack of double underscores.

I think this construct makes more sense because the first macro check
if the syscall was called by user-mode. I will send an update for this
on this thread.

>
> BTW., a further simplification would be:
>
> #ifndef ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE
> # define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE ...
> #endif
>
> This way architectures could override this generic functionality simply by
> defining the helpers. Architectures that don't do that get the generic version.

I don't think architectures need to do that. The optimizations are
embedding the checks on their architecture-specific code to make it
faster and remove the size impact. The pre/post is fine for the rest.

>
> Thanks,
>
>         Ingo



-- 
Thomas

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
       [not found]       ` <CAJcbSZENjCgn3TNDGzCBBSOXMvbTX8mBO7Trugdb5VRzhxwmHg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
@ 2017-04-27 14:42         ` Thomas Garnier
       [not found]           ` <20170427144227.113630-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
  2017-04-28  6:33         ` Ingo Molnar
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-04-27 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andrew Morton, Al Viro, Thomas Garnier, David Howells,
	René Nyffenegger, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Thomas Gleixner, Eric W . Biederman, Oleg Nesterov,
	Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski,
	Paolo Bonzini
  Cc: linux-s390-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r,
	kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8

Ensure that a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel address
limit. If that happens, a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
elevate privileges [1].

The CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK option disables the generic check so each
architecture can create optimized versions.

[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
---
Based on next-20170426
---
 arch/s390/Kconfig        |  1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 init/Kconfig             |  6 ++++++
 kernel/sys.c             | 13 +++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index d25435d94b6e..164de1d24e92 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+	select ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
 	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 980c3c9b06f8..ebde64f1622c 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -191,6 +191,28 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)			\
 	__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+
+/*
+ * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
+ * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
+ */
+static inline void addr_limit_check_syscall(void)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE() \
+	bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
+#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST() \
+	if (user_caller) addr_limit_check_syscall()
+#else
+#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE()
+#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST()
+asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void) __noreturn;
+#endif
+
+
 #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
 #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)					\
 	asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
@@ -199,7 +221,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))	\
 	{								\
-		long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		long ret;						\
+		ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE();					\
+		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST();				\
 		__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);				\
 		__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 		return ret;						\
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 42a346b0df43..599d9fe30703 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1961,6 +1961,12 @@ config PROFILING
 config TRACEPOINTS
 	bool
 
+config ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+	bool
+	help
+	  Disable the generic address limit check. Allow each architecture to
+	  optimize how and when the verification is done.
+
 source "arch/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu		# General setup
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 8a94b4eabcaa..a1cbcd715d62 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2458,3 +2458,16 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
+/*
+ * Used when an architecture specific implementation detects an invalid address
+ * limit. This function does not return.
+ */
+asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void)
+{
+	/* Try to fail on the generic address limit check */
+	addr_limit_check_syscall();
+	panic("Invalid address limit before returning to user-mode");
+}
+#endif
-- 
2.13.0.rc0.306.g87b477812d-goog

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
       [not found]       ` <CAJcbSZENjCgn3TNDGzCBBSOXMvbTX8mBO7Trugdb5VRzhxwmHg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
  2017-04-27 14:42         ` Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-04-28  6:33         ` Ingo Molnar
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2017-04-28  6:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Thomas Garnier
  Cc: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	David Howells, René Nyffenegger, Andrew Morton,
	Paul E . McKenney, Eric W . Biederman, Thomas Gleixner,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin,
	Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Kees Cook, Rik van Riel,
	Josh Poimboeuf


* Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:

> > BTW., a further simplification would be:
> >
> > #ifndef ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE
> > # define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE ...
> > #endif
> >
> > This way architectures could override this generic functionality simply by
> > defining the helpers. Architectures that don't do that get the generic version.
> 
> I don't think architectures need to do that. The optimizations are
> embedding the checks on their architecture-specific code to make it
> faster and remove the size impact. The pre/post is fine for the rest.

Indeed, only the generic code needs to turn off that code - architectures will 
place these callbacks elsewhere.

Thanks,

	Ingo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode
       [not found]           ` <20170427144227.113630-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
@ 2017-04-28  6:35             ` Ingo Molnar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2017-04-28  6:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Thomas Garnier
  Cc: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, Dave Hansen, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andrew Morton, Al Viro, David Howells, René Nyffenegger,
	Paul E . McKenney, Thomas Gleixner, Eric W . Biederman,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin,
	Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Rik van Riel, Kees Cook


* Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:

> Ensure that a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel address
> limit. If that happens, a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
> elevate privileges [1].
> 
> The CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK option disables the generic check so each
> architecture can create optimized versions.
> 
> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> Based on next-20170426
> ---
>  arch/s390/Kconfig        |  1 +
>  include/linux/syscalls.h | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  init/Kconfig             |  6 ++++++
>  kernel/sys.c             | 13 +++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> index d25435d94b6e..164de1d24e92 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
>  	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
>  	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
>  	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
> +	select ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
>  	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
>  	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
>  	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> index 980c3c9b06f8..ebde64f1622c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> @@ -191,6 +191,28 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
>  	SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)			\
>  	__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
>  
> +
> +/*
> + * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
> + * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
> + */
> +static inline void addr_limit_check_syscall(void)
> +{
> +	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
> +}
> +
> +#ifndef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
> +#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE() \
> +	bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
> +#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST() \
> +	if (user_caller) addr_limit_check_syscall()
> +#else
> +#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE()
> +#define ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST()
> +asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void) __noreturn;
> +#endif
> +
> +
>  #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
>  #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)					\
>  	asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
> @@ -199,7 +221,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
>  	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__));	\
>  	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))	\
>  	{								\
> -		long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
> +		long ret;						\
> +		ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_PRE();					\
> +		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
> +		ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK_POST();				\
>  		__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);				\
>  		__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));	\
>  		return ret;						\
> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> index 42a346b0df43..599d9fe30703 100644
> --- a/init/Kconfig
> +++ b/init/Kconfig
> @@ -1961,6 +1961,12 @@ config PROFILING
>  config TRACEPOINTS
>  	bool
>  
> +config ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
> +	bool
> +	help
> +	  Disable the generic address limit check. Allow each architecture to
> +	  optimize how and when the verification is done.
> +
>  source "arch/Kconfig"
>  
>  endmenu		# General setup
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index 8a94b4eabcaa..a1cbcd715d62 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -2458,3 +2458,16 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ADDR_LIMIT_CHECK
> +/*
> + * Used when an architecture specific implementation detects an invalid address
> + * limit. This function does not return.
> + */
> +asmlinkage void addr_limit_check_failed(void)
> +{
> +	/* Try to fail on the generic address limit check */
> +	addr_limit_check_syscall();
> +	panic("Invalid address limit before returning to user-mode");
> +}
> +#endif

Ok, this version looks pretty good to me. Could you (re-)send a full series?

I assume some of these changes need to be propagated into the followup patches but 
even if not it's better to pick up a clean series.

Thanks,

	Ingo

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2017-04-28  6:35 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-04-26 18:34 [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier
2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] x86/syscalls: Optimize address limit check Thomas Garnier
2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-04-26 18:34 ` [PATCH v8 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
     [not found] ` <20170426183425.32158-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-27  6:49   ` [PATCH v8 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar
2017-04-27 14:16     ` Thomas Garnier
     [not found]       ` <CAJcbSZENjCgn3TNDGzCBBSOXMvbTX8mBO7Trugdb5VRzhxwmHg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-27 14:42         ` Thomas Garnier
     [not found]           ` <20170427144227.113630-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-28  6:35             ` Ingo Molnar
2017-04-28  6:33         ` Ingo Molnar

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