From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" Subject: [PATCH v5 0/1] random: getrandom(2): warn on large CRNG waits, introduce new flags Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 22:42:17 +0200 Message-ID: <20190926204217.GA1366@pc> References: <20190912034421.GA2085@darwi-home-pc> <20190912082530.GA27365@mit.edu> <20190914122500.GA1425@darwi-home-pc> <008f17bc-102b-e762-a17c-e2766d48f515@gmail.com> <20190915052242.GG19710@mit.edu> <20190918211503.GA1808@darwi-home-pc> <20190918211713.GA2225@darwi-home-pc> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Linus Torvalds , "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Cc: Florian Weimer , Willy Tarreau , Matthew Garrett , Andy Lutomirski , Lennart Poettering , "Eric W. Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , Michael Kerrisk , lkml , linux-ext4 , linux-api , linux-man List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Summary / Changelog-v5: - Add the new flags GRND_INSECURE and GRND_SECURE_UNBOUNDED_INITIAL_WAIT to getrandom(2), instead of introducing a new getrandom2(2) system call, which nobody liked. - Fix a bug discovered through testing where "int ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(waitq, true, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT)" returns failure (-1) due to implicit LONG_MAX => int truncation - WARN if a process is stuck on getrandom(,,flags=0) for more than 30 seconds ... defconfig and bootparam configurable - Add documentation for "random.getrandom_wait_threshold" kernel param - Extra comments @ include/uapi/linux/random.h and random.c::getrandom. Explicit recommendations to *exclusively* use the new flags. - GRND_INSECURE never issue any warning, even if CRNG is not inited. Similarly for GRND_SECURE_UNBOUNDED_INITIAL_WAIT, no matter how big the unbounded wait is. In a reply to the V4 patch, Linus posted a related patch [*] with the following additions: - Drop the original random.c behavior of having each /dev/urandom "CRNG not inited" warning also _reset_ the crng_init_cnt entropy. This is not included in this patch, as IMHO this can be done as a separate patch on top. - Limit GRND_RANDOM max count/buflen to 32MB instead of 2GB. This is very sane obviously, and can be done in a separate patch on top. This V5 patch just tries to be as conservative as possible. - GRND_WAIT_ENTROPY and GRND_EXCPLICIT: AFAIK these were primarily added so that getrandom(,,flags=0) can be changed to return weaker non-blocking crypto from non-inited CRG in a possible future. I hope we don't have to resort to that extreme measure.. Hopefully the WARN() on this patch will be enough in nudging distributions to enable more hwrng sources (RDRAND, etc.) .. and also for the user-space developres badly pointed at (hi GDM and Qt) to fix their code. [*] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wiCqDiU7SE3FLn2W26MS_voUAuqj5XFa1V_tiGTrrW-zQ@mail.gmail.com Ahmed S. Darwish (1): random: getrandom(2): warn on large CRNG waits, introduce new flags .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 ++ drivers/char/Kconfig | 60 ++++++++++- drivers/char/random.c | 102 +++++++++++++++--- include/uapi/linux/random.h | 27 ++++- 4 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) -- 2.23.0