From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> To: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, lokeshgidra@google.com, dancol@google.com, nnk@google.com Cc: nosh@google.com, timmurray@google.com Subject: [PATCH 0/7] Harden userfaultfd Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2019 12:15:55 -0700 Message-ID: <20191012191602.45649-1-dancol@google.com> (raw) Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd file descriptors (via a new flag, for compatibility with existing code) and allows administrators to limit userfaultfd to servicing user-mode faults, increasing the difficulty of using userfaultfd in exploit chains invoking delaying kernel faults. A new anon_inodes interface allows callers to opt into SELinux management of anonymous file objects. In this mode, anon_inodes creates new ephemeral inodes for anonymous file objects instead of reusing a singleton dummy inode. A new LSM hook gives security modules an opportunity to configure and veto these ephemeral inodes. Existing anon_inodes users must opt into the new functionality. Daniel Colascione (7): Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file Add a UFFD_SECURE flag to the userfaultfd API. Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults Allow users to require UFFD_SECURE Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 19 +++++- fs/anon_inodes.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++-------- fs/userfaultfd.c | 47 +++++++++++-- include/linux/anon_inodes.h | 27 ++++++-- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 +++ include/linux/security.h | 2 + include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 3 + include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 14 ++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++ security/security.c | 8 +++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 + 12 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) -- 2.23.0.700.g56cf767bdb-goog
next reply index Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-10-12 19:15 Daniel Colascione [this message] 2019-10-12 19:15 ` [PATCH 1/7] Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione 2019-10-14 4:26 ` kbuild test robot 2019-10-14 15:38 ` Jann Horn 2019-10-14 18:15 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-10-14 18:30 ` Jann Horn 2019-10-15 8:08 ` Christoph Hellwig 2019-10-12 19:15 ` [PATCH 2/7] Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file Daniel Colascione 2019-10-14 3:01 ` kbuild test robot 2019-10-15 8:08 ` Christoph Hellwig 2019-10-12 19:15 ` [PATCH 3/7] Add a UFFD_SECURE flag to the userfaultfd API Daniel Colascione 2019-10-12 23:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-13 0:51 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-10-13 1:14 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-13 1:38 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-10-14 16:04 ` Jann Horn 2019-10-23 19:09 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2019-10-23 19:21 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-23 21:16 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2019-10-23 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-23 22:41 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2019-10-23 23:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-23 23:27 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2019-10-23 20:05 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-10-24 0:23 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2019-10-23 20:15 ` Linus Torvalds 2019-10-24 9:02 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-10-24 15:10 ` Andrea Arcangeli 2019-10-25 20:12 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-10-22 21:27 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-10-23 4:11 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-23 7:29 ` Cyrill Gorcunov 2019-10-23 12:43 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-10-23 17:13 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-12 19:15 ` [PATCH 4/7] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class Daniel Colascione 2019-10-12 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-13 0:11 ` Daniel Colascione 2019-10-13 0:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-12 19:16 ` [PATCH 5/7] Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults Daniel Colascione 2019-10-12 19:16 ` [PATCH 6/7] Allow users to require UFFD_SECURE Daniel Colascione 2019-10-12 23:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-10-12 19:16 ` [PATCH 7/7] Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults Daniel Colascione 2019-10-16 0:02 ` [PATCH 0/7] Harden userfaultfd James Morris 2019-11-15 15:09 ` Stephen Smalley
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