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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	x86-patch-review@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 12:06:08 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202002251205.E2BA56A2B9@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200205181935.3712-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 10:19:12AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
> attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
> For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
> on the Shadow Stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK
> prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.
> 
> The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
> protection fault handler.  It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
> handler.
> 
> v9:
> - Add Shadow Stack pointer to the fault printout.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S          |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h       |  3 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
>  6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index 76942cbd95a1..6ca77312d008 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ idtentry spurious_interrupt_bug		do_spurious_interrupt_bug	has_error_code=0
>  idtentry coprocessor_error		do_coprocessor_error		has_error_code=0
>  idtentry alignment_check		do_alignment_check		has_error_code=1
>  idtentry simd_coprocessor_error		do_simd_coprocessor_error	has_error_code=0
> -
> +idtentry control_protection		do_control_protection		has_error_code=1
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Reload gs selector with exception handling
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> index ffa0dc8a535e..7ac26bbd0bef 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ asmlinkage void invalid_TSS(void);
>  asmlinkage void segment_not_present(void);
>  asmlinkage void stack_segment(void);
>  asmlinkage void general_protection(void);
> +asmlinkage void control_protection(void);
>  asmlinkage void page_fault(void);
>  asmlinkage void async_page_fault(void);
>  asmlinkage void spurious_interrupt_bug(void);
> @@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s);
>  void __init trap_init(void);
>  #endif
>  dotraplinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
> +dotraplinkage void do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
>  dotraplinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address);
>  dotraplinkage void do_spurious_interrupt_bug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
>  dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
> @@ -154,6 +156,7 @@ enum {
>  	X86_TRAP_AC,		/* 17, Alignment Check */
>  	X86_TRAP_MC,		/* 18, Machine Check */
>  	X86_TRAP_XF,		/* 19, SIMD Floating-Point Exception */
> +	X86_TRAP_CP = 21,	/* 21 Control Protection Fault */
>  	X86_TRAP_IRET = 32,	/* 32, IRET Exception */
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> index 87ef69a72c52..8ed406f469e7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
> @@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
>  #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
>  	SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR,	entry_INT80_32),
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +	INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,		control_protection),
> +#endif
>  };
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
> index 9ccbf0576cd0..c572a3de1037 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
> @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
>  	 */
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
> -	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 7);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 8);
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index 05da6b5b167b..99c83ee522ed 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -570,6 +570,65 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
>  }
>  NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_general_protection);
>  
> +static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
> +	"unknown",
> +	"near-ret",
> +	"far-ret/iret",
> +	"endbranch",
> +	"rstorssp",
> +	"setssbsy",
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal
> + * to the responsible application.  Currently, control
> + * protection is only enabled for the user mode.  This
> + * exception should not come from the kernel mode.
> + */
> +dotraplinkage void
> +do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
> +{
> +	struct task_struct *tsk;
> +
> +	RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
> +	if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs,
> +		       error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
> +		return;
> +	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
> +
> +	if (!user_mode(regs))
> +		die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
> +
> +	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> +	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> +		WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control protection fault\n");
> +
> +	tsk = current;
> +	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
> +	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
> +
> +	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
> +	    printk_ratelimit()) {
> +		unsigned int max_err;
> +		unsigned long ssp;
> +
> +		max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1;
> +		if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err))
> +			error_code = 0;
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +		pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
> +			tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
> +			regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
> +			control_protection_err[error_code]);
> +		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
> +		pr_cont("\n");
> +	}
> +
> +	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR,
> +			(void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr(regs));
> +}
> +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_control_protection);
> +
>  dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
> diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> index cb3d6c267181..693071dbe641 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
> @@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
>  #define SEGV_ACCADI	5	/* ADI not enabled for mapped object */
>  #define SEGV_ADIDERR	6	/* Disrupting MCD error */
>  #define SEGV_ADIPERR	7	/* Precise MCD exception */
> -#define NSIGSEGV	7
> +#define SEGV_CPERR	8
> +#define NSIGSEGV	8
>  
>  /*
>   * SIGBUS si_codes
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-25 20:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06  0:16   ` Randy Dunlap
     [not found]     ` <af5ee976-3b57-4afe-6304-fcab8de45c77-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-06 20:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59                   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11                         ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20                           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51                             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  0:08                                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  1:21                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  2:13                                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-02-26 17:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:08   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:34   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27  0:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
     [not found] ` <20200205181935.3712-1-yu-cheng.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57       ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:02       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:16         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  2:11           ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  3:57             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03               ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook

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