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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 13:50:15 -0500
Message-ID: <20200521185015.aopfkpwpfhzwd4hs@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a1e7c71c72de517a288e6273ba0c18dac2e937bc.camel@intel.com>

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 08:57:57AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-05-21 at 10:15 -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:07:06PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
> > > return/jump-oriented programming attacks.  Details can be found in "Intel
> > > 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
> > > 
> > > This series depends on the XSAVES supervisor state series that was split
> > > out and submitted earlier [2].
> > > 
> > > I have gone through previous comments, and hope all concerns have been
> > > resolved now.  Please inform me if anything is overlooked.
> > > 
> > > Changes in v10:
> > 
> > Hi Yu-cheng,
> > 
> > Do you have a git branch with the latest Shadow Stack and IBT branches
> > applied?  I tried to apply IBT v9 on top of this, but I guess the SS
> > code has changed since then and it didn't apply cleanly.
> 
> It is here:
> 
> https://github.com/yyu168/linux_cet/commits/cet

Thanks.  FYI, I got the following warning on an AMD system.

[   18.936979] get of unsupported state
[   18.936989] WARNING: CPU: 251 PID: 1794 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c:919 get_xsave_addr+0x83/0x90
[   18.949676] Modules linked in:
[   18.952731] CPU: 251 PID: 1794 Comm: dracut-rootfs-g Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6+ #162
[   18.960121] Hardware name: AMD Corporation DAYTONA_X/DAYTONA_X, BIOS RDY1005C 11/22/2019
[   18.968198] RIP: 0010:get_xsave_addr+0x83/0x90
[   18.972637] Code: 5b c3 48 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b c3 80 3d f9 c2 7a 01 00 75 bc 48 c7 c7 c4 cb 8f a9 89 74 24 04 c6 05 e5 c2 7a 01 01 e8 3f 49 0a 00 <0f> 0b 8b 74 24 04 eb 9d 31 c0 c3 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 fe 0f
[   18.991373] RSP: 0018:ffffb8db103cfcd8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   18.996591] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff947da1189440 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   19.003715] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffaa6809d8 RDI: ffffffffaa67e58c
[   19.010839] RBP: ffff947da1188000 R08: 0000000468bb5e6c R09: 0000000000000018
[   19.017962] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 00000000000000f0 R12: ffffb8db103cfd20
[   19.025087] R13: ffff947da1189400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000007
[   19.032211] FS:  00007f0a81b15740(0000) GS:ffff947dcf8c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   19.040321] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   19.046057] CR2: 00007f0a81b156c0 CR3: 0000003fa125a000 CR4: 0000000000340ee0
[   19.053183] Call Trace:
[   19.055637]  cet_restore_signal+0x26/0xf0
[   19.059649]  __fpu__restore_sig+0x4cc/0x6e0
[   19.063832]  ? remove_wait_queue+0x20/0x60
[   19.067928]  ? reuse_swap_page+0x6e/0x340
[   19.071939]  restore_sigcontext+0x162/0x1b0
[   19.076128]  ? recalc_sigpending+0x17/0x50
[   19.080223]  ? __set_task_blocked+0x34/0xa0
[   19.084401]  __do_sys_rt_sigreturn+0x92/0xde
[   19.088675]  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1b0
[   19.092342]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   19.097394] RIP: 0033:0x7f0a811389d1
[   19.100970] Code: 64 c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 41 ba 08 00 00 00 b8 0e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 07 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 15 81 44 38 00
[   19.119709] RSP: 002b:00007ffd643d5dd8 EFLAGS: 00000246
[   19.124933] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0a811389d1
[   19.132056] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd643d5e60 RDI: 0000000000000002
[   19.139182] RBP: 000055e140190e20 R08: 000055e14017a014 R09: 0000000000000001
[   19.146307] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e13f47e4e0
[   19.153436] R13: 00007ffd643d5e60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000


  reply index

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-29 22:07 Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:53   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-29 23:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-12 23:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 18:39         ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 21:33           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 22:43             ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-15 23:29               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-15 23:56                 ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-16  2:51                   ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-17 23:09                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-16  2:53                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 13:41                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:01                       ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-18 14:26                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-18 14:21                       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-18 23:47                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-19  0:38                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-19  1:35                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-20  1:04                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-29  2:08                             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-16  0:13               ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-16  2:37                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-05-16 14:09                   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-22 16:49                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-22 17:48                       ` Andrew Cooper
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-07 15:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-05-07 16:59     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 21/26] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 22/26] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-29 22:07 ` [PATCH v10 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 22:42   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-22 17:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-22 17:29       ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2020-05-22 18:13         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 15:15 ` [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-21 15:57   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-05-21 18:50     ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2020-05-21 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu

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