From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
dev@opencontainers.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] syscalls: Document OCI seccomp filter interactions & workaround
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 18:21:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201124172152.q5egylertvj3zp3w@wittgenstein> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <X70/uPNt2BA/vUSo@kroah.com>
On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 06:15:36PM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 06:06:38PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> > +seccomp maintainers/reviewers
> > [thread context is at
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-api/87lfer2c0b.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com/
> > ]
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 5:49 PM Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> wrote:
> > > On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 03:08:05PM +0100, Mark Wielaard wrote:
> > > > For valgrind the issue is statx which we try to use before falling back
> > > > to stat64, fstatat or stat (depending on architecture, not all define
> > > > all of these). The problem with these fallbacks is that under some
> > > > containers (libseccomp versions) they might return EPERM instead of
> > > > ENOSYS. This causes really obscure errors that are really hard to
> > > > diagnose.
> > >
> > > So find a way to detect these completely broken container run times
> > > and refuse to run under them at all. After all they've decided to
> > > deliberately break the syscall ABI. (and yes, we gave the the rope
> > > to do that with seccomp :().
> >
> > FWIW, if the consensus is that seccomp filters that return -EPERM by
> > default are categorically wrong, I think it should be fairly easy to
> > add a check to the seccomp core that detects whether the installed
> > filter returns EPERM for some fixed unused syscall number and, if so,
> > prints a warning to dmesg or something along those lines...
>
> Why? seccomp is saying "this syscall is not permitted", so -EPERM seems
> like the correct error to provide here. It's not -ENOSYS as the syscall
> is present.
>
> As everyone knows, there are other ways to have -EPERM be returned from
> a syscall if you don't have the correct permissions to do something.
> Why is seccomp being singled out here? It's doing the correct thing.
The correct solution to this problem is simple: the standard and the
problematic container runtimes need to be fixed to return ENOSYS as I
said in my first mail. Imho, the kernel neither should need to log
anything or be opinionated about what error is correct or not. Imho,
this is a broken standard and that's where the story ends.
We've had that argument about ENOSYS being the correct errno in such
scenarios in userspace already and that's been ignored for _years_. Now,
as could be expected it's suddenly the kernel who's supposed to fix
this. That's totally wrong imho.
Christian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-24 17:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-24 12:08 [PATCH] syscalls: Document OCI seccomp filter interactions & workaround Florian Weimer
2020-11-24 12:26 ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 12:54 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-24 14:08 ` Mark Wielaard
2020-11-24 16:45 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-11-24 17:06 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-24 17:15 ` Greg KH
2020-11-24 17:21 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2020-11-24 17:30 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-24 17:44 ` Greg KH
2020-11-24 17:47 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-24 18:17 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-24 18:02 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-24 18:09 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-24 12:58 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-11-24 13:05 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-24 13:37 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-11-24 14:08 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-24 16:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-11-24 16:52 ` Florian Weimer
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