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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	paul@paul-moore.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 10:36:35 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <521dd15c-1dbb-77ed-0c97-0ea38688e219@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b63f1957-d3d5-28f9-fd27-c0e629456a9f@digikod.net>

On 4/3/2023 5:04 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 15/03/2023 23:46, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security
>> module maintained attributes of the current process.
>> Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security
>> module maintained attribute of the current process.
>> Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via
>> entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.
>>
>> The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure
>> identifys the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format
>> of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field
>> is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and
>> must
>> be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and
>> any
>> padding, is maintained as well.
>>
>> struct lsm_ctx {
>>          __u64   id;
>>          __u64   flags;
>>          __u64   len;
>>          __u64   ctx_len;
>>          __u8    ctx[];
>> };
>>
>> Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.
>> security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the
>> LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.
>> security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is
>> intended for and passes it along.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>   Documentation/userspace-api/lsm.rst | 15 +++++
>>   include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  4 ++
>>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h           |  9 +++
>>   include/linux/security.h            | 19 ++++++
>>   include/linux/syscalls.h            |  5 ++
>>   include/uapi/linux/lsm.h            | 33 ++++++++++
>>   kernel/sys_ni.c                     |  4 ++
>>   security/Makefile                   |  1 +
>>   security/lsm_syscalls.c             | 55 ++++++++++++++++
>>   security/security.c                 | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   10 files changed, 242 insertions(+)
>>   create mode 100644 security/lsm_syscalls.c
>
> [...]
>
>> diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..feee31600219
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +/*
>> + * System calls implementing the Linux Security Module API.
>> + *
>> + *  Copyright (C) 2022 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> + *  Copyright (C) 2022 Intel Corporation
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <asm/current.h>
>> +#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
>> +#include <linux/err.h>
>> +#include <linux/errno.h>
>> +#include <linux/security.h>
>> +#include <linux/stddef.h>
>> +#include <linux/syscalls.h>
>> +#include <linux/types.h>
>> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>> +#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * sys_lsm_set_self_attr - Set current task's security module attribute
>> + * @attr: which attribute to set
>> + * @ctx: the LSM contexts
>> + * @size: size of @ctx
>> + * @flags: reserved for future use
>> + *
>> + * Sets the calling task's LSM context. On success this function
>> + * returns 0. If the attribute specified cannot be set a negative
>> + * value indicating the reason for the error is returned.
>
> Do you think it is really worth it to implement syscalls that can get
> and set attributes to several LSMs at the same time, instead of one at
> a time? 

Setting the values for more than one LSM is impractical due to the possibility
that the Nth value may fail, and unwinding the N-1 values may not be possible.

> LSM-specific tools don't care about other LSMs.

That's part of the problem. Are systemd, dbusd, ps and id LSM specific tools?
They shouldn't be.

> I still think it would be much simpler (for kernel and user space) to
> pass an LSM ID to both syscalls. This would avoid dealing with
> variable arrays of variable element lengths, to both get or set
> attributes.

ps and id should both work regardless of which and how many LSMs provide
context attributes. They shouldn't need to know which LSMs are active in
advance. If a new LSM is introduced, they shouldn't need to be updated to
support it.

>
> Furthermore, considering the hypotetical LSM_ATTR_MAGICFD that was
> previously talked about, getting an unknown number of file descriptor
> doesn't look good neither.

If you have multiple LSM_ATTR_MAGICFD values and can only get one at
a time you have to do something convoluted with flags to get them all.
I don't see that as a good thing.

>
>
>> + */
>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_set_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct
>> lsm_ctx __user *,
>> +        ctx, size_t __user, size, u32, flags)
>> +{
>> +    return security_setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * sys_lsm_get_self_attr - Return current task's security module
>> attributes
>> + * @attr: which attribute to set
>
> attribute to *get*
>
>> + * @ctx: the LSM contexts
>> + * @size: size of @ctx, updated on return
>
> I suggest to use a dedicated argument to read the allocated size, and
> another to write the actual/written size.
>
> This would not be required with an LSM ID passed to the syscall
> because attribute sizes should be known by user space, and there is no
> need to help them probe this information.
>
>
>> + * @flags: reserved for future use
>> + *
>> + * Returns the calling task's LSM contexts. On success this
>> + * function returns the number of @ctx array elements. This value
>> + * may be zero if there are no LSM contexts assigned. If @size is
>> + * insufficient to contain the return data -E2BIG is returned and
>> + * @size is set to the minimum required size.
>
> Doing something (updating a buffer) even when returning an error
> doesn't look right. These sizes should be well-known to user space and
> part of the ABI/UAPI.

No. The size of attributes is not well known to user space.
They are usually text strings. The maximum size will be known,
but that's putting additional burden on user space to know
about all possible LSMs. It's not always necessary.

>
>
>> In all other cases
>> + * a negative value indicating the error is returned.
>> + */
>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_get_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct
>> lsm_ctx __user *,
>> +        ctx, size_t __user *, size, u32, flags)
>> +{
>> +    return security_getselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
>> +}
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 87c8796c3c46..2c57fe28c4f7 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -2168,6 +2168,103 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry
>> *dentry, struct inode *inode)
>>   }
>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
>>   +/**
>> + * security_getselfattr - Read an LSM attribute of the current process.
>> + * @attr: which attribute to return
>> + * @ctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL
>> + * @size: the size of space available to receive the data
>> + * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0
>> + *
>> + * Returns the number of attributes found on success, negative value
>> + * on error. @size is reset to the total size of the data.
>> + * If @size is insufficient to contain the data -E2BIG is returned.
>> + */
>> +int security_getselfattr(unsigned int __user attr, struct lsm_ctx
>> __user *ctx,
>> +             size_t __user *size, u32 __user flags)
>> +{
>> +    struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +    void __user *base = (void *)ctx;
>> +    size_t total = 0;
>> +    size_t this;
>> +    size_t left;
>> +    bool istoobig = false;
>> +    int count = 0;
>> +    int rc;
>> +
>> +    if (attr == 0)
>> +        return -EINVAL;
>> +    if (flags != 0)
>> +        return -EINVAL;
>> +    if (size == NULL)
>> +        return -EINVAL;
>> +    if (get_user(left, size))
>> +        return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getselfattr, list) {
>> +        this = left;
>> +        if (base)
>> +            ctx = (struct lsm_ctx __user *)(base + total);
>> +        rc = hp->hook.getselfattr(attr, ctx, &this, flags);
>> +        switch (rc) {
>> +        case -EOPNOTSUPP:
>> +            rc = 0;
>> +            continue;
>> +        case -E2BIG:
>> +            istoobig = true;
>> +            left = 0;
>> +            break;
>
> These two error cases could be directly handled by
> security_getselfattr() instead of relying on each LSM-specific
> implementations. See my suggestion on patch 7/11 (lsm_get_attr_size).

Yes, they could. My understanding is that Paul wants the LSM layer
to be "thin". Where possible and not insane, the logic should be in
the LSM, not the infrastructure.

>
>
>> +        case 0:
>> +            left -= this;
>> +            break;
>> +        default:
>> +            return rc;
>> +        }
>> +        total += this;
>> +        count++;
>> +    }
>> +    if (count == 0)
>> +        return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getselfattr);
>> +    if (put_user(total, size))
>> +        return -EFAULT;
>> +    if (rc)
>> +        return rc;
>> +    if (istoobig)
>> +        return -E2BIG;
>> +    return count;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * security_setselfattr - Set an LSM attribute on the current process.
>> + * @attr: which attribute to set
>> + * @ctx: the user-space source for the information
>> + * @size: the size of the data
>> + * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0
>> + *
>> + * Set an LSM attribute for the current process. The LSM, attribute
>> + * and new value are included in @ctx.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success, an LSM specific value on failure.
>> + */
>> +int security_setselfattr(unsigned int __user attr, struct lsm_ctx
>> __user *ctx,
>> +             size_t __user size, u32 __user flags)
>> +{
>> +    struct security_hook_list *hp;
>> +    struct lsm_ctx lctx;
>> +
>> +    if (flags != 0)
>> +        return -EINVAL;
>> +    if (size < sizeof(*ctx))
>> +        return -EINVAL;
>> +    if (copy_from_user(&lctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx)))
>> +        return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +    hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setselfattr, list)
>> +        if ((hp->lsmid->id) == lctx.id)
>> +            return hp->hook.setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
>> +
>> +    return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr);
>> +}
>> +
>>   int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const
>> char *name,
>>                char **value)
>>   {

  reply	other threads:[~2023-04-03 17:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20230315224704.2672-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2023-03-15 22:46 ` [PATCH v7 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:46   ` [PATCH v7 01/11] LSM: Identify modules by more than name Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30  1:10     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:46   ` [PATCH v7 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data Casey Schaufler
2023-03-22 15:30     ` kernel test robot
2023-03-30  1:10     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:46   ` [PATCH v7 03/11] proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:46   ` [PATCH v7 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Casey Schaufler
2023-03-16 12:35     ` kernel test robot
2023-03-30  1:12     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 11:24       ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 20:00       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 23:22         ` Paul Moore
2023-04-03 12:04     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 17:36       ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2023-04-03 18:04         ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 18:28           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-11  0:31       ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:46   ` [PATCH v7 05/11] LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30  1:12     ` Paul Moore
2023-04-03 12:04     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-10 23:37       ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 23:38         ` Paul Moore
2023-04-13 11:55           ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-15 22:46   ` [PATCH v7 06/11] LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:47   ` [PATCH v7 07/11] LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling an lsm_ctx Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30  1:13     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 20:42       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 23:28         ` Paul Moore
2023-03-31 16:56           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-31 19:24             ` Paul Moore
2023-03-31 20:22               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-03  9:47     ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03  9:54       ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 11:47         ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 18:04         ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-03 18:03       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-03 18:06         ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-03 18:33           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:47   ` [PATCH v7 08/11] Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:47   ` [PATCH v7 09/11] AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-03-15 22:47   ` [PATCH v7 10/11] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30  1:13     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-30 20:55       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-30 23:32         ` Paul Moore
2023-03-15 22:47   ` [PATCH v7 11/11] LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler

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