From: Alex Belits <abelits@marvell.com> To: "frederic@kernel.org" <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: "mingo@kernel.org" <mingo@kernel.org>, "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>, "rostedt@goodmis.org" <rostedt@goodmis.org>, "Prasun Kapoor" <pkapoor@marvell.com>, "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "linux-api@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "catalin.marinas@arm.com" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, "netdev@vger.kernel.org" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>, "davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>, "linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, "will@kernel.org" <will@kernel.org> Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 03/12] task_isolation: userspace hard isolation from kernel Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2020 05:32:19 +0000 Message-ID: <92135de5e710c3fddb7256259a759b20460e9052.camel@marvell.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200305183313.GA29033@lenoir> On Thu, 2020-03-05 at 19:33 +0100, Frederic Weisbecker wrote: > On Wed, Mar 04, 2020 at 04:07:12PM +0000, Alex Belits wrote: > > > > Hi Alew, > > I'm glad this patchset is being resurected. > Reading that changelog, I like the general idea and the direction. > The diff is a bit scary though but I'll check the patches in detail > in the upcoming days. > I made some updates -- added missing code for arm and x86, restored sign-off lines and updated commit messages. This is the result of some work that mostly happened on earlier versions and had to deal with the fact that timers and housekeeping work often appeared on all CPUs, so some solutions may look like an overkill. Nevertheless it was very helpful for finding the sources of unexpected disturbances. Also originally some of the race conditions and potential delayed work at the time when a task is entering isolated state were considered unavoidable. So the part in kernel was focused on correctness of handling those conditions, while detection and dealing with their consequences was done in userspace (in libtmc). Now it looks like there may be much fewer such situations, however I am still not very thrilled with the idea of complicating the kernel more than we have to. Especially when it comes to code that is relevant only over few seconds when the task is starting and entering isolated mode. So I have to admit that some solutions look like "more EINTR than EINTR", and I still like them more than making kernel side of entering/exiting isolation even more complex than it is now. I may be wrong, and there may be some more elegant solution, however I don't see it now. Userspace-assisted isolation entering/exiting procedure worked very well in a system with a huge number of cores, threads, drivers with unusual features, etc., so at very least we have some usable reference point. > > In a number of cases we can tell on a remote cpu that we are > > going to be interrupting the cpu, e.g. via an IPI or a TLB flush. > > In that case we generate the diagnostic (and optional stack dump) > > on the remote core to be able to deliver better diagnostics. > > If the interrupt is not something caught by Linux (e.g. a > > hypervisor interrupt) we can also request a reschedule IPI to > > be sent to the remote core so it can be sure to generate a > > signal to notify the process. > > I'm wondering if it's wise to run that on a guest at all :-) > Or we should consider any guest exit to the host as a > disturbance, we would then need some sort of paravirt > driver to notify that, etc... That doesn't sound appealing. Why not? I am not a big fan of virtualization, however people seem to use it for all kinds of purposes now, and we only have to propagate (or reject) isolation requests from guest to host (as long as resource and permissions policy allow that). For KVM it would be literally replicating guest task isolation state on the host, and as long as CPU core is isolated, does it really matter if the task was created with two layers of virtualization instead of one? For isolation to make sense, it's still code running on a CPU with fixed address mapping. If this is still the case, virtualization only determines what can be in that space, not how it behaves. If this is not the case, and task causes kernel code to run, be it guest or host kernel, then something is wrong, and isolation is broken. Not very different from behavior without virtualization. This would be very bad for early days of virtualization when very little could be done by a guest without host messing with it. Now, when pieces of hardware can be (relatively) safely given to the guest userspace to work on, we can just as well let it run isolated. > > Thanks. Thanks! -- Alex
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-03-04 16:01 [PATCH 00/12] "Task_isolation" mode Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:03 ` [PATCH 01/12] task_isolation: vmstat: add quiet_vmstat_sync function Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 02/12] task_isolation: vmstat: add vmstat_idle function Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:07 ` [PATCH 03/12] task_isolation: userspace hard isolation from kernel Alex Belits 2020-03-05 18:33 ` Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-08 5:32 ` Alex Belits [this message] 2020-04-28 14:12 ` Marcelo Tosatti 2020-03-06 15:26 ` Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-08 6:06 ` [EXT] " Alex Belits 2020-03-06 16:00 ` Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-08 7:16 ` [EXT] " Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:08 ` [PATCH 04/12] task_isolation: Add task isolation hooks to arch-independent code Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:09 ` [PATCH 05/12] task_isolation: arch/x86: enable task isolation functionality Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:10 ` [PATCH 06/12] task_isolation: arch/arm64: " Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:31 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-08 4:48 ` [EXT] " Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:11 ` [PATCH 07/12] task_isolation: arch/arm: " Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:12 ` [PATCH 08/12] task_isolation: don't interrupt CPUs with tick_nohz_full_kick_cpu() Alex Belits 2020-03-06 16:03 ` Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-08 7:28 ` [EXT] " Alex Belits 2020-03-09 2:38 ` Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-04 16:13 ` [PATCH 09/12] task_isolation: net: don't flush backlog on CPUs running isolated tasks Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:14 ` [PATCH 10/12] task_isolation: ringbuffer: don't interrupt CPUs running isolated tasks on buffer resize Alex Belits 2020-03-04 16:15 ` [PATCH 11/12] task_isolation: kick_all_cpus_sync: don't kick isolated cpus Alex Belits 2020-03-06 15:34 ` Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-08 6:48 ` [EXT] " Alex Belits 2020-03-09 2:28 ` Frederic Weisbecker 2020-03-04 16:16 ` [PATCH 12/12] task_isolation: CONFIG_TASK_ISOLATION prevents distribution of jobs to non-housekeeping CPUs Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:42 ` [PATCH v2 00/12] "Task_isolation" mode Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:44 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] task_isolation: vmstat: add quiet_vmstat_sync function Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] task_isolation: vmstat: add vmstat_idle function Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:47 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] task_isolation: userspace hard isolation from kernel Alex Belits [not found] ` <20200307214254.7a8f6c22@hermes.lan> 2020-03-08 7:33 ` [EXT] " Alex Belits 2020-03-27 8:42 ` Marta Rybczynska 2020-04-06 4:31 ` Kevyn-Alexandre Paré 2020-04-06 4:43 ` Kevyn-Alexandre Paré 2020-03-08 3:48 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] task_isolation: Add task isolation hooks to arch-independent code Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:49 ` [PATCH v2 05/12] task_isolation: arch/x86: enable task isolation functionality Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] task_isolation: arch/arm64: " Alex Belits 2020-03-09 16:59 ` Mark Rutland 2020-03-08 3:52 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] task_isolation: arch/arm: " Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:53 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] task_isolation: don't interrupt CPUs with tick_nohz_full_kick_cpu() Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] task_isolation: net: don't flush backlog on CPUs running isolated tasks Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:55 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] task_isolation: ringbuffer: don't interrupt CPUs running isolated tasks on buffer resize Alex Belits 2020-04-06 4:27 ` Kevyn-Alexandre Paré 2020-03-08 3:56 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] task_isolation: kick_all_cpus_sync: don't kick isolated cpus Alex Belits 2020-03-08 3:57 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] task_isolation: CONFIG_TASK_ISOLATION prevents distribution of jobs to non-housekeeping CPUs Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:09 ` [PATCH v3 00/13] "Task_isolation" mode Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:15 ` [PATCH 01/13] task_isolation: vmstat: add quiet_vmstat_sync function Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:16 ` [PATCH 02/13] task_isolation: vmstat: add vmstat_idle function Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:17 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] task_isolation: add instruction synchronization memory barrier Alex Belits 2020-04-15 12:44 ` Mark Rutland 2020-04-19 5:02 ` [EXT] " Alex Belits 2020-04-20 12:23 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-20 12:36 ` Mark Rutland 2020-04-20 13:55 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-21 7:41 ` Will Deacon 2020-04-20 12:45 ` Mark Rutland 2020-04-09 15:20 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] task_isolation: userspace hard isolation from kernel Alex Belits 2020-04-09 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-04-19 5:07 ` Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:21 ` [PATCH 05/13] task_isolation: Add task isolation hooks to arch-independent code Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:22 ` [PATCH 06/13] task_isolation: arch/x86: enable task isolation functionality Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:23 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] task_isolation: arch/arm64: " Alex Belits 2020-04-22 12:08 ` Catalin Marinas 2020-04-09 15:24 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] task_isolation: arch/arm: " Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:25 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] task_isolation: don't interrupt CPUs with tick_nohz_full_kick_cpu() Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] task_isolation: net: don't flush backlog on CPUs running isolated tasks Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:27 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] task_isolation: ringbuffer: don't interrupt CPUs running isolated tasks on buffer resize Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:27 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] task_isolation: kick_all_cpus_sync: don't kick isolated cpus Alex Belits 2020-04-09 15:28 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] task_isolation: CONFIG_TASK_ISOLATION prevents distribution of jobs to non-housekeeping CPUs Alex Belits
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