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From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Anton Ivanov" <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Jeff Dike" <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Vincent Dagonneau" <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 01:13:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1arKO3uYzwng8fst-UHkcH6J7YzyHFN+vfXUT2=1HT+w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210316204252.427806-8-mic@digikod.net>

 On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 9:43 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
> according to a process's domain.
[...]
> +static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
> +       __releases(object->lock)
> +{
> +       struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
> +       struct super_block *sb;
> +
> +       if (!inode) {
> +               spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +               return;
> +       }
> +
> +       /*
> +        * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference
> +        * to the underlying inode.
> +        */
> +       object->underobj = NULL;
> +       /*
> +        * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
> +        * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
> +        */
> +       sb = inode->i_sb;
> +       atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
> +       spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +       /*
> +        * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
> +        * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset
> +        * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.  It is therefore
> +        * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
> +        */
> +       rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
> +       /*
> +        * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object().
> +        */
> +
> +       iput(inode);
> +       if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
> +               wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
> +}
[...]
> +static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
> +{
> +       struct landlock_object *object, *new_object;
> +       struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode);
> +
> +       rcu_read_lock();
> +retry:
> +       object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object);
> +       if (object) {
> +               if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) {
> +                       rcu_read_unlock();
> +                       return object;
> +               }
> +               /*
> +                * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going
> +                * away.  Wait for release_inode(), then retry.
> +                */
> +               spin_lock(&object->lock);
> +               spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +               goto retry;
> +       }
> +       rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +       /*
> +        * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without
> +        * holding any locks).
> +        */
> +       new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode);
> +       if (IS_ERR(new_object))
> +               return new_object;
> +
> +       /* Protects against concurrent get_inode_object() calls. */
> +       spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> +       object = rcu_dereference_protected(inode_sec->object,
> +                       lockdep_is_held(&inode->i_lock));

rcu_dereference_protected() requires that inode_sec->object is not
concurrently changed, but I think another thread could call
get_inode_object() while we're in landlock_create_object(), and then
we could race with the NULL write in release_inode() here? (It
wouldn't actually be a UAF though because we're not actually accessing
`object` here.) Or am I missing a lock that prevents this?

In v28 this wasn't an issue because release_inode() was holding
inode->i_lock (and object->lock) during the NULL store; but in v29 and
this version the NULL store in release_inode() moved out of the locked
region. I think you could just move the NULL store in release_inode()
back up (and maybe add a comment explaining the locking rules for
landlock_inode(...)->object)?

(Or alternatively you could use rcu_dereference_raw() with a comment
explaining that the read pointer is only used to check for NULL-ness,
and that it is guaranteed that the pointer can't change if it is NULL
and we're holding the lock. But that'd be needlessly complicated, I
think.)


> +       if (unlikely(object)) {
> +               /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */
> +               spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +               kfree(new_object);
> +
> +               rcu_read_lock();
> +               goto retry;
> +       }
> +
> +       rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object);
> +       /*
> +        * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock
> +        * shutdown.
> +        */
> +       ihold(inode);
> +       spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +       return new_object;
> +}

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-03-23  0:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-16 20:42 [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:13   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 18:57     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:40   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 19:03     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 19:15       ` Kees Cook
2021-03-24 20:31       ` James Morris
2021-03-25  9:29         ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23  0:13   ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:45   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 19:07     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:45   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:24   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:24   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-18 23:10   ` James Morris
2021-03-19 18:57   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 19:19     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23 19:30       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23  0:13   ` Jann Horn [this message]
2021-03-23 15:55     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23 17:49       ` Jann Horn
2021-03-23 19:22         ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-24  3:10           ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 19:06   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 21:53     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-24 15:03       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:56   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 18:41     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 19:11       ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 21:57         ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:26   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:03   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 18:54     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23 19:25       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-24 16:21       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-18 23:26 ` [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM James Morris
2021-03-19 15:52   ` Mickaël Salaün

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