From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Thomas Garnier Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 13:38:19 -0700 Message-ID: References: <20170615011203.144108-1-thgarnie@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-api-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Kees Cook Cc: Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner , "H . Peter Anvin" , Andy Lutomirski , Paolo Bonzini , Rik van Riel , Oleg Nesterov , Josh Poimboeuf , Petr Mladek , Miroslav Benes , Al Viro , Arnd Bergmann , Dave Hansen , David Howells , Russell King , Andy Lutomirski , Will Drewry , Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , Mark Rutland , Pratyush Anand List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jun 28, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote: > >> Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to > >> user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and elevate > >> privileges [1]. > >> > >> The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on > >> return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if > >> needed. > >> > >> The addr_limit_user_check function is added as a cross-architecture > >> function to check the address limit. > >> > >> [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier > > > > Thanks for reworking this series! > > > > The bad state correctly BUGs under the LKDTM test: > > > > [ 21.171586] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS > > [ 21.172791] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit > > [ 21.173742] ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > [ 21.174641] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:220! > > ... > > [ 21.193166] Call Trace: > > [ 21.193617] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c > > [ 21.194443] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 > > > > > > Tested-by: Kees Cook > > Is everyone happy with this patch for x86? Does this need anything > more/different? Asking again. Additional feedback? Anyone wants to pick-it up? > > Thanks! > > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Pixel Security -- Thomas