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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	x86-patch-review@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 16:59:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWF1NQeGXy0GXRwW71Bc3oSN=vsXMsBqnaqs7Us7RYebQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMe9rOrxM=RefftngNXhP906mrW1SMy7vp+O=yOj_WwcdQpGcg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 4:52 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 9, 2020 at 4:21 PM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 3/9/20 4:11 PM, H.J. Lu wrote:
> > > A threaded application is loaded from disk.  The object file on disk is
> > > either CET enabled or not CET enabled.
> >
> > Huh.  Are you saying that all instructions executed on userspace on
> > Linux come off of object files on the disk?  That's an interesting
> > assertion.  You might want to go take a look at the processes on your
> > systems.  Here's my browser for example:
> >
> > # for p in $(ps aux | grep chromium | awk '{print $2}' ); do cat
> > /proc/$p/maps; done | grep ' r-xp 00000000 00:00 0'
> > ...
> > 202f00082000-202f000bf000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
> > 202f000c2000-202f000c3000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
> > 202f00102000-202f00103000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
> > 202f00142000-202f00143000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
> > 202f00182000-202f001bf000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0
> >
> > Lots of funny looking memory areas which are anonymous and executable!
> > Those didn't come off the disk.  Same thing in firefox.  Weird.  Any
> > idea what those are?
> >
> > One guess: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-in-time_compilation
>
> jitted code belongs to a process loaded from disk.  Enable CET in
> an application which uses JIT engine means to also enable CET in
> JIT engine.  Take git as an example, "git grep" crashed for me on Tiger
> Lake.   It turned out that git itself was compiled with -fcf-protection and
> git was linked against libpcre2-8.so.0 also compiled with -fcf-protection,
> which has a JIT, sljit, which was not CET enabled.  git crashed in the
> jitted codes due to missing ENDBR.  I had to enable CET in sljit to make
> git working on CET enabled Tiger Lake.  So we need to enable CET in
> JIT engine before enabling CET in applications which use JIT engine.

This could presumably have been fixed by having libpcre or sljit
disable IBT before calling into JIT code or by running the JIT code in
another thread.  In the other direction, a non-CET libpcre build could
build IBT-capable JITted code and enable JIT (by syscall if we allow
that or by creating a thread?) when calling it.  And IBT has this
fancy legacy bitmap to allow non-instrumented code to run with IBT on,
although SHSTK doesn't have hardware support for a similar feature.

So, sure, the glibc-linked ELF ecosystem needs some degree of CET
coordination, but it is absolutely not the case that a process MUST
have all CET or no CET.  Let's please support the complicated cases in
the kernel and the ABI too.  If glibc wants to make it annoying to do
complicated things, so be it.  People work behind glibc's back all the
time.

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-09 23:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-05 18:19 [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06  0:16   ` Randy Dunlap
     [not found]     ` <af5ee976-3b57-4afe-6304-fcab8de45c77-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-06 20:17       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59                   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19                       ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11                         ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20                           ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51                             ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59                               ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-03-10  0:08                                 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10  1:21                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10  2:13                                     ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:08   ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27  0:34   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27  0:55   ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22   ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29   ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
     [not found] ` <20200205181935.3712-1-yu-cheng.yu-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57       ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  1:02       ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  1:16         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27  2:11           ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27  3:57             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03               ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02         ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35     ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22         ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20     ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18     ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19   ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook

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