From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60151C6FA99 for ; Fri, 10 Mar 2023 16:47:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231601AbjCJQr5 (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Mar 2023 11:47:57 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:32848 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229932AbjCJQrj (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Mar 2023 11:47:39 -0500 Received: from mail.skyhub.de (mail.skyhub.de [5.9.137.197]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E1A3E11CD58; Fri, 10 Mar 2023 08:45:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from zn.tnic (p5de8e9fe.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [93.232.233.254]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.skyhub.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id 6790E1EC0554; Fri, 10 Mar 2023 17:44:58 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=dkim; t=1678466698; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references; bh=TIJaXRtNR2Oz/UBISlYbA7F6Z6RSSveXZRo1kMuPhBM=; b=qIfhFPqzveKn5qUOw2mhgMxzUd7jx+rQ6vBdqwd4apDSOYq/toJ8ve8juYrugBBthx/n8K A2vf5jE4YMcgga/Is1A3VK2MDImmjwOoPgukBDLlD0KRHuHmiBo0FQ75XQ7Updh7Mwd8yL IIJhz1nNm4bMMT1wxtLaX8WbPOucsrU= Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 17:44:54 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov To: Rick Edgecombe Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, christina.schimpe@intel.com, david@redhat.com, debug@rivosinc.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 34/41] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Message-ID: References: <20230227222957.24501-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> <20230227222957.24501-35-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230227222957.24501-35-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 02:29:50PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > For the current shadow stack implementation, shadow stacks contents can't > easily be provisioned with arbitrary data. This property helps apps > protect themselves better, but also restricts any potential apps that may > want to do exotic things at the expense of a little security. > > The x86 shadow stack feature introduces a new instruction, WRSS, which > can be enabled to write directly to shadow stack permissioned memory from s/permissioned // By now it is clear that shadow stack memory is a special thing anyway. > userspace. Allow it to get enabled via the prctl interface. > > Only enable the userspace WRSS instruction, which allows writes to > userspace shadow stacks from userspace. Do not allow it to be enabled > independently of shadow stack, as HW does not support using WRSS when > shadow stack is disabled. > > From a fault handler perspective, WRSS will behave very similar to WRUSS, > which is treated like a user access from a #PF err code perspective. ... > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h > index 65ec1965cd28..2d3b35c957ad 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h > @@ -310,6 +310,17 @@ void msrs_free(struct msr *msrs); > int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit); > int msr_clear_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit); > > +/* Helper that can never get accidentally un-inlined. */ > +#define set_clr_bits_msrl(msr, set, clear) do { \ Uff, pls kill this thing. Our MSR interfaces universe is already insane and arch/x86/lib/msr.c already has similar attempts to what you're doing here in addition to all the other gunk in msr.h. I highly doubt this can't be done the usual way, lemme see... > + u64 __val, __new_val, __msr = msr; \ > + \ > + rdmsrl(__msr, __val); \ > + __new_val = (__val & ~(clear)) | (set); \ > + \ > + if (__new_val != __val) \ > + wrmsrl(__msr, __new_val); \ > +} while (0) > + > #ifdef CONFIG_SMP > int rdmsr_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 *l, u32 *h); > int wrmsr_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 l, u32 h); > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h > index 7dfd9dc00509..e31495668056 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h > @@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ > > /* ARCH_SHSTK_ features bits */ > #define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK (1ULL << 0) > +#define ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS (1ULL << 1) > > #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c > index 0a3decab70ee..009cb3fa0ae5 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c > @@ -363,6 +363,36 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk) > unmap_shadow_stack(shstk->base, shstk->size); > } > > +static int wrss_control(bool enable) > +{ > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK)) > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + > + /* > + * Only enable wrss if shadow stack is enabled. If shadow stack is not "WRSS". Insns in all caps pls. > + * enabled, wrss will already be disabled, so don't bother clearing it Ditto. > + * when disabling. > + */ > + if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + /* Already enabled/disabled? */ > + if (features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS) == enable) > + return 0; > + > + fpregs_lock_and_load(); > + if (enable) { > + set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_WRSS_EN, 0); > + features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS); > + } else { > + set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0, CET_WRSS_EN); > + features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS); > + } > + fpregs_unlock(); Yes, doing it the "usual" way is more readable because it is a common code pattern which one encounters all around arch/x86/. Diff ontop: diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c index 009cb3fa0ae5..914feff26b23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c @@ -365,6 +365,8 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk) static int wrss_control(bool enable) { + u64 msrval; + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -381,13 +383,22 @@ static int wrss_control(bool enable) return 0; fpregs_lock_and_load(); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval); + if (enable) { - set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_WRSS_EN, 0); features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS); + msrval |= CET_WRSS_EN; } else { - set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0, CET_WRSS_EN); features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS); + if (!(msrval & CET_WRSS_EN)) + goto unlock; + + msrval &= ~CET_WRSS_EN; } + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval); + +unlock: fpregs_unlock(); return 0; -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette