From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "bsingharora@gmail.com" <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
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"Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
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<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 26/39] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 22:13:51 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e9271515f40ef1350cb8b365cc3665da9ea14f5e.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202210031330.3C9F7E4E@keescook>
On Mon, 2022-10-03 at 13:44 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:29:23PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> > From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> >
> > Shadow stack's are normally written to via CALL/RET or specific CET
> > instuctions like RSTORSSP/SAVEPREVSSP. However during some Linux
> > operations the kernel will need to write to directly using the
> > ring-0 only
> > WRUSS instruction.
> >
> > A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow
> > stack, and
> > the address in a token must point directly above the token, which
> > is within
> > the same shadow stack. This is distinctively different from other
> > pointers
> > on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code
> > area.
> >
> > Introduce token setup and verify routines. Also introduce WRUSS,
> > which is
> > a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack.
> >
> > In future patches that enable shadow stack to work with signals,
> > the kernel
> > will need something to denote the point in the stack where
> > sigreturn may be
> > called. This will prevent attackers calling sigreturn at arbitrary
> > places
> > in the stack, in order to help prevent SROP attacks.
> >
> > To do this, something that can only be written by the kernel needs
> > to be
> > placed on the shadow stack. This can be accomplished by setting bit
> > 63 in
> > the frame written to the shadow stack. Userspace return addresses
> > can't
> > have this bit set as it is in the kernel range. It is also can't be
> > a
> > valid restore token.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >
> > ---
> >
> > v2:
> > - Add data helpers for writing to shadow stack.
> >
> > v1:
> > - Use xsave helpers.
> >
> > Yu-cheng v30:
> > - Update commit log, remove description about signals.
> > - Update various comments.
> > - Remove variable 'ssp' init and adjust return value accordingly.
> > - Check get_user_shstk_addr() return value.
> > - Replace 'ia32' with 'proc32'.
> >
> > Yu-cheng v29:
> > - Update comments for the use of get_xsave_addr().
> >
> > arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 13 ++++
> > arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 108
> > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 121 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> > b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> > index 35f709f619fb..f096f52bd059 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> > @@ -223,6 +223,19 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
> > : [pax] "a" (p));
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> > +static inline int write_user_shstk_64(u64 __user *addr, u64 val)
> > +{
> > + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %[val], (%[addr])\n"
> > + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
> > + :: [addr] "r" (addr), [val] "r" (val)
> > + :: fail);
> > + return 0;
> > +fail:
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +}
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
> > +
> > #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
> >
> > static inline void serialize(void)
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> > index db4e53f9fdaf..8904aef487bf 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> > @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
> > #include <asm/fpu/api.h>
> > #include <asm/prctl.h>
> >
> > +#define SS_FRAME_SIZE 8
> > +
> > static bool feature_enabled(unsigned long features)
> > {
> > return current->thread.features & features;
> > @@ -40,6 +42,31 @@ static void feature_clr(unsigned long features)
> > current->thread.features &= ~features;
> > }
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always
> > 8-byte
> > + * and aligned to 8.
> > + */
> > +static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long
> > *token_addr)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long addr;
> > +
> > + /* Token must be aligned */
> > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + addr = ssp - SS_FRAME_SIZE;
> > +
> > + /* Mark the token 64-bit */
> > + ssp |= BIT(0);
>
> Wow, that confused me for a moment. :) SDE says:
>
> - Bit 63:2 – Value of shadow stack pointer when this restore point
> was created.
> - Bit 1 – Reserved. Must be zero.
> - Bit 0 – Mode bit. If 0, the token is a compatibility/legacy mode
> “shadow stack restore” token. If 1, then this shadow stack
> restore
> token can be used with a RSTORSSP instruction in 64-bit
> mode.
>
> So shouldn't this actually be:
>
> ssp &= ~BIT(1); /* Reserved */
> ssp |= BIT(0); /* RSTORSSP instruction in 64-bit mode */
Since SSP is aligned, it should not have bits 0 to 2 set. I'll add a
comment.
>
> > +
> > + if (write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)addr, (u64)ssp))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + *token_addr = addr;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
> > {
> > int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
> > @@ -158,6 +185,87 @@ int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct
> > task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static unsigned long get_user_shstk_addr(void)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long long ssp;
> > +
> > + fpu_lock_and_load();
> > +
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> > +
> > + fpregs_unlock();
> > +
> > + return ssp;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int put_shstk_data(u64 __user *addr, u64 data)
> > +{
> > + WARN_ON(data & BIT(63));
>
> Let's make this a bit more defensive:
>
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(data & BIT(63)))
> return -EFAULT;
Hmm, sure. I'm thinking EINVAL since the failure has nothing to do with
faulting.
>
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Mark the high bit so that the sigframe can't be processed as
> > a
> > + * return address.
> > + */
> > + if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, data | BIT(63)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int get_shstk_data(unsigned long *data, unsigned long
> > __user *addr)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long ldata;
> > +
> > + if (unlikely(get_user(ldata, addr)))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + if (!(ldata & BIT(63)))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + *data = ldata & ~BIT(63);
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Verify the user shadow stack has a valid token on it, and then
> > set
> > + * *new_ssp according to the token.
> > + */
> > +static int shstk_check_rstor_token(unsigned long *new_ssp)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long token_addr;
> > + unsigned long token;
> > +
> > + token_addr = get_user_shstk_addr();
> > + if (!token_addr)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)token_addr))
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + /* Is mode flag correct? */
> > + if (!(token & BIT(0)))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /* Is busy flag set? */
>
> "Busy"? Not "Reserved"?
Yes reserved is more accurate, I'll change it. In a previous-ssp token
it is 1, so kind of busy-like. That is probably where the comment came
from.
>
> > + if (token & BIT(1))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /* Mask out flags */
> > + token &= ~3UL;
> > +
> > + /* Restore address aligned? */
> > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(token, 8))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + /* Token placed properly? */
> > + if (((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != token_addr) || token >=
> > TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + *new_ssp = token;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > {
> > struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
> > --
> > 2.17.1
> >
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-04 22:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 241+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-29 22:28 [PATCH v2 00/39] Shadowstacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30 3:41 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-09-30 13:33 ` Jonathan Corbet
2022-09-30 13:41 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-03 16:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 2:16 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-05 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05 9:25 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-05 9:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-03 19:35 ` John Hubbard
2022-10-03 19:39 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04 2:13 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-03 17:18 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 19:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 0:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 12:19 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 16:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-10 16:51 ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-12 12:29 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-12 15:59 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-12 16:54 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-13 21:28 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-13 22:15 ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-26 21:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 02/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 13:40 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 19:53 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 17:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 19:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 19:42 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-03 19:50 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-12 20:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-13 0:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-13 9:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 16:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14 19:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05 0:55 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-14 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14 18:15 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14 19:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:40 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-15 9:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-17 18:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-17 19:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:48 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:05 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 14:18 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04 16:13 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 07/39] x86/cet: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 14:01 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 18:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:04 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-03 23:09 ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-10-03 23:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 1:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 22:44 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 9:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05 22:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 14:17 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-05 1:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 11:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05 12:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:06 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30 15:16 ` Jann Horn
2022-10-06 16:10 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 16:26 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 21:36 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 21:54 ` Jann Horn
2022-10-03 22:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 22:14 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-05 2:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 14:08 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-05 23:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 23:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 11:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 9:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14 9:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 18:06 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:43 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 18:11 ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 18:51 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-03 22:28 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 23:17 ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:20 ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:25 ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 0:40 ` Nadav Amit
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 13/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:11 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 18:24 ` Peter Xu
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 14/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:47 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04 0:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:17 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 15/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 10:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 16/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:22 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:53 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-14 15:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:45 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 17/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:24 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:56 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04 16:15 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 1:56 ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-04 16:21 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14 15:52 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 18/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:30 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05 2:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 12:33 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 13:32 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 13:40 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 13:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 19/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 0:03 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04 0:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 20/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 21/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 22/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30 19:16 ` Dave Hansen
2022-09-30 20:30 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-30 20:37 ` Dave Hansen
2022-09-30 23:00 ` Jann Horn
2022-09-30 23:02 ` Jann Horn
2022-09-30 23:04 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:39 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 4:21 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 23/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for CET enabling Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-06 18:50 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-10 10:56 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 16:28 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-12 12:18 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-12 17:30 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 24/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:43 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:04 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04 4:04 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 16:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 10:17 ` David Laight
2022-10-04 19:32 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05 13:32 ` David Laight
2022-10-20 21:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-20 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 25/39] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 10:36 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-03 16:57 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:09 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 26/39] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 20:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:13 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2022-10-05 2:43 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 22:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 22:58 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-20 21:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 27/39] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 20:52 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 22:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-20 22:57 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 28/39] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:23 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 23:16 ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-10 11:13 ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 14:19 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 29/39] x86/cet/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 4:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-06 0:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-06 3:11 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 8:30 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 30/39] x86: Expose thread features status in /proc/$PID/arch_status Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 4:18 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 31/39] x86/cet/shstk: Wire in CET interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:41 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 32/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:56 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 33/39] x86/cpufeatures: Limit shadow stack to Intel CPUs Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:57 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 0:09 ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04 4:54 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 15:47 ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-04 19:43 ` John Allen
2022-10-04 20:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 20:50 ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-04 21:17 ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-10-04 23:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-03 17:39 ` John Allen
2022-10-20 21:22 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 8:36 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/CLEANUP v2 34/39] x86: Separate out x86_regset for 32 and 64 bit Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/CLEANUP v2 35/39] x86: Improve formatting of user_regset arrays Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:07 ` Chang S. Bae
2022-10-04 23:05 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 37/39] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 8:44 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-04 19:24 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 38/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add ARCH_CET_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-04 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 39/39] x86: Add alt shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 16:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 18:04 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 00/39] Shadowstacks for userspace Kees Cook
2022-10-03 17:25 ` Jann Horn
2022-10-04 5:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 9:57 ` David Laight
2022-10-04 19:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 18:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 3:59 ` Kees Cook
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