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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 08:03:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180921150351.20898-8-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20180921150331.gdH8KSoWx6uUMQcWjtVpR18M9PAv8_9XLkHvxW0iSH4@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180921150351.20898-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER.

An application has shadow stack protection when all the following are
true:

  (1) The kernel has X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER enabled,
  (2) The running processor supports the shadow stack,
  (3) The application is built with shadow stack enabled tools & libs
      and, and at runtime, all dependent shared libs can support shadow
      stack.

If this kernel config option is enabled, but (2) or (3) above is not
true, the application runs without the shadow stack protection.
Existing legacy applications will continue to work without the shadow
stack protection.

The user-mode shadow stack protection is only implemented for the
64-bit kernel.  Thirty-two bit applications are supported under the
compatibility mode.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig  | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Makefile |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 1a0be022f91d..808aa3aecf3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1913,6 +1913,30 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+config X86_INTEL_CET
+	def_bool n
+
+config ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+	prompt "Intel Shadow Stack for user-mode"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	select X86_INTEL_CET
+	select ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+	---help---
+	  Shadow stack provides hardware protection against program stack
+	  corruption.  Only when all the following are true will an application
+	  have the shadow stack protection: the kernel supports it (i.e. this
+	  feature is enabled), the application is compiled and linked with
+	  shadow stack enabled, and the processor supports this feature.
+	  When the kernel has this configuration enabled, existing non shadow
+	  stack applications will continue to work, but without shadow stack
+	  protection.
+
+	  If unsure, say y.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 8f6e7eb8ae9f..b28842b80295 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -152,6 +152,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32
 endif
 export CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
 
+# Check assembler shadow stack suppot
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+  ifeq ($(call as-instr, saveprevssp, y),)
+      $(error CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER not supported by the assembler)
+  endif
+endif
+
 #
 # If the function graph tracer is used with mcount instead of fentry,
 # '-maccumulate-outgoing-args' is needed to prevent a GCC bug
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-09-21 20:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 142+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-21 15:03 [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 16:27     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 16:29     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:29       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-28 16:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-28 16:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-28 16:56     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-28 16:56       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:37   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 16:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-02 15:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:21       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:30       ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:30         ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:37         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:37           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:39           ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:39             ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:43             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:43               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 17:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 17:03     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 17:23     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 17:23       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 17:15   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 17:15     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-04 15:47     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-04 15:47       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 10:39   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 10:39     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:11     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:11       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-09-21 15:03   ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 13:38   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-03 13:38     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-03 14:05     ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-03 14:05       ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-03 16:07     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:07       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 13:19   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 13:19     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 15:08   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 15:08     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 15:12     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 15:12       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03  4:15   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03  4:15     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 14:36   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 14:36     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:46   ` Jann Horn
2018-10-03 16:46     ` Jann Horn
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 23:27   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 23:27     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-09 21:15     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-09 21:15       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-15 23:40   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-15 23:40     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-16 17:23     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-16 17:23       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/27] mm/map: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 16:55   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-21 16:55     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-21 17:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 17:21       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03  4:56   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03  4:56     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03  5:36     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03  5:36       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:00         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:18         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:18           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:32         ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:32           ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:40           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:40             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:52           ` Jann Horn
2018-10-03 16:52             ` Jann Horn
2018-10-03 21:21             ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 21:21               ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 17:57   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 17:57     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 22:53 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2018-09-21 22:53   ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-24 15:25   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-24 15:25     ` Yu-cheng Yu

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