From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-yb1-f193.google.com ([209.85.219.193]:39563 "EHLO mail-yb1-f193.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727077AbeJDDAt (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Oct 2018 23:00:49 -0400 Received: by mail-yb1-f193.google.com with SMTP id c4-v6so2940149ybl.6 for ; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 13:10:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-yb1-f178.google.com (mail-yb1-f178.google.com. [209.85.219.178]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 84-v6sm1869888ywn.83.2018.10.03.13.10.53 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 03 Oct 2018 13:10:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yb1-f178.google.com with SMTP id p74-v6so2931150ybc.9 for ; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 13:10:53 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20181002005505.6112-24-keescook@chromium.org> <785ef6a9-ae46-3533-0348-74bcf6f10928@tycho.nsa.gov> <809f1cfd-077b-ee58-51ba-b22daf46d12b@tycho.nsa.gov> <5955f5ce-b803-4f58-8b07-54c291e33da5@canonical.com> From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 13:10:51 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: James Morris Cc: John Johansen , Jordan Glover , Stephen Smalley , Paul Moore , Casey Schaufler , Tetsuo Handa , "Schaufler, Casey" , linux-security-module , Jonathan Corbet , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , linux-arch , LKML Message-ID: <20181003201051.wtuIWmpYxxAMwVFe2niZyvmjc9TWMM8NLw8GRMxL3_Y@z> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:28 AM, James Morris wrote: > On Wed, 3 Oct 2018, Kees Cook wrote: > >> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:17 AM, James Morris wrote: >> > On Tue, 2 Oct 2018, John Johansen wrote: >> >> To me a list like >> >> lsm.enable=X,Y,Z >> > >> > What about even simpler: >> > >> > lsm=selinux,!apparmor,yama >> >> We're going to have lsm.order=, so I'd like to keep it with a dot >> separator (this makes it more like module parameters, too). You want >> to mix enable/disable in the same string? That implies you'd want >> implicit enabling (i.e. it complements the builtin enabling), which is >> opposite from what John wanted. >> > > Why can't this be the order as well? That was covered extensively in the earlier threads. It boils down to making sure we do not create a pattern of leaving LSMs disabled by default when they are added to the kernel. The v1 series used security= like this: + security= [SECURITY] An ordered comma-separated list of + security modules to attempt to enable at boot. If + this boot parameter is not specified, only the + security modules asking for initialization will be + enabled (see CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY). Duplicate + or invalid security modules will be ignored. The + capability module is always loaded first, without + regard to this parameter. This meant booting "security=apparmor" would disable all the other LSMs, which wasn't friendly at all. So "security=" was left alone (to leave it to only select the "major" LSM: all major LSMs not matching "security=" would be disabled). So I proposed "lsm.order=" to specify the order things were going to be initialized in, but to avoid kernels booting with newly added LSMs forced-off due to not being listed in "lsm.order=", it had to have implicit fall-back for unlisted LSMs. (i.e. anything missing from lsm.order would then follow their order in CONFIG_LSM_ORDER, and anything missing there would fall back to link-time ordering.) However, then the objection was raised that this didn't provide a way to explicitly disable an LSM. So I proposed lsm.enable/disable, and John argued for CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE over CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security