From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Christian Brauner Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2018 19:31:22 +0200 Message-ID: <20181004173121.e6tfwd6nc2geuv5c@brauner.io> References: <20180929103453.12025-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> <20180929131534.24472-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> <20181004162611.vdlujbdguvagalpt@ryuk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181004162611.vdlujbdguvagalpt@ryuk> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Aleksa Sarai Cc: Jann Horn , "Eric W. Biederman" , jlayton@kernel.org, Bruce Fields , Al Viro , Arnd Bergmann , shuah@kernel.org, David Howells , Andy Lutomirski , Tycho Andersen , kernel list , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, dev@opencontainers.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, Linux API List-Id: linux-arch.vger.kernel.org On Fri, Oct 05, 2018 at 02:26:11AM +1000, Aleksa Sarai wrote: > On 2018-09-29, Jann Horn wrote: > > You attempt to open "C/../../etc/passwd" under the root "/A/B". > > Something else concurrently moves /A/B/C to /A/C. This can result in > > the following: > > > > 1. You start the path walk and reach /A/B/C. > > 2. The other process moves /A/B/C to /A/C. Your path walk is now at /A/C. > > 3. Your path walk follows the first ".." up into /A. This is outside > > the process root, but you never actually encountered the process root, > > so you don't notice. > > 4. Your path walk follows the second ".." up to /. Again, this is > > outside the process root, but you don't notice. > > 5. Your path walk walks down to /etc/passwd, and the open completes > > successfully. You now have an fd pointing outside your chroot. > > I've been playing with this and I have the following patch, which > according to my testing protects against attacks where ".." skips over > nd->root. It abuses __d_path to figure out if nd->path can be resolved > from nd->root (obviously a proper version of this patch would refactor > __d_path so it could be used like this -- and would not return > -EMULTIHOP). > > I've also attached my reproducer. With it, I was seeing fairly constant > breakouts before this patch and after it I didn't see a single breakout > after running it overnight. Obviously this is not conclusive, but I'm > hoping that it can show what my idea for protecting against ".." was. > > Does this patch make sense? Or is there something wrong with it that I'm > not seeing? Interesting. Apart from the abuse of __d_path() :) the question I'd have is whether this just minimizes the race window or if you can provide a sound argument that this actually can't happen anymore with this patch. > > --8<------------------------------------------------------------------- > > There is a fairly easy-to-exploit race condition with chroot(2) (and > thus by extension AT_THIS_ROOT and AT_BENEATH) where a rename(2) of a > path can be used to "skip over" nd->root and thus escape to the > filesystem above nd->root. > > thread1 [attacker]: > for (;;) > renameat2(AT_FDCWD, "/a/b/c", AT_FDCWD, "/a/d", RENAME_EXCHANGE); > thread2 [victim]: > for (;;) > openat(dirb, "b/c/../../etc/shadow", O_THISROOT); > > With fairly significant regularity, thread2 will resolve to > "/etc/shadow" rather than "/a/b/etc/shadow". With this patch, such cases > will be detected during ".." resolution (which is the weak point of > chroot(2) -- since walking *into* a subdirectory tautologically cannot > result in you walking *outside* nd->root). > > The use of __d_path here might seem suspect, however we don't mind if a > path is moved from within the chroot to outside the chroot and we > incorrectly decide it is safe (because at that point we are still within > the set of files which were accessible at the beginning of resolution). > However, we can fail resolution on the next path component if it remains > outside of the root. A path which has always been outside nd->root > during resolution will never be resolveable from nd->root and thus will > always be blocked. > > DO NOT MERGE: Currently this code returns -EMULTIHOP in this case, > purely as a debugging measure (so that you can see that > the protection actually does something). Obviously in the > proper patch this will return -EXDEV. > > Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai > --- > fs/namei.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index 6f995e6de6b1..c8349693d47b 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ > * The new code replaces the old recursive symlink resolution with > * an iterative one (in case of non-nested symlink chains). It does > * this with calls to _follow_link(). > - * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now > - * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all > + * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now > + * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all > * the special cases of the former code. > * > * With the new dcache, the pathname is stored at each inode, at least as > @@ -1375,6 +1375,20 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd) > return -EXDEV; > break; > } > + if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT))) { > + char *pathbuf, *pathptr; > + > + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC); > + if (!pathbuf) > + return -ECHILD; > + pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX); > + kfree(pathbuf); > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) { > + if (!pathptr) > + pathptr = ERR_PTR(-EMULTIHOP); > + return PTR_ERR(pathptr); > + } > + } > if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) { > struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry; > struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent; > @@ -1510,6 +1524,20 @@ static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd) > return -EXDEV; > break; > } > + if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT))) { > + char *pathbuf, *pathptr; > + > + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!pathbuf) > + return -ENOMEM; > + pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX); > + kfree(pathbuf); > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) { > + if (!pathptr) > + pathptr = ERR_PTR(-EMULTIHOP); > + return PTR_ERR(pathptr); > + } > + } > if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) { > int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path); > if (ret) > -- > 2.19.0 > > -- > Aleksa Sarai > Senior Software Engineer (Containers) > SUSE Linux GmbH > From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wm1-f68.google.com ([209.85.128.68]:50543 "EHLO mail-wm1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727407AbeJEAZr (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Oct 2018 20:25:47 -0400 Received: by mail-wm1-f68.google.com with SMTP id s12-v6so9814224wmc.0 for ; Thu, 04 Oct 2018 10:31:30 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2018 19:31:22 +0200 From: Christian Brauner Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution Message-ID: <20181004173121.e6tfwd6nc2geuv5c@brauner.io> References: <20180929103453.12025-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> <20180929131534.24472-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> <20181004162611.vdlujbdguvagalpt@ryuk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20181004162611.vdlujbdguvagalpt@ryuk> Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: Aleksa Sarai Cc: Jann Horn , "Eric W. Biederman" , jlayton@kernel.org, Bruce Fields , Al Viro , Arnd Bergmann , shuah@kernel.org, David Howells , Andy Lutomirski , Tycho Andersen , kernel list , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, dev@opencontainers.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, Linux API Message-ID: <20181004173122.iXZMHZFvNzrrnduzQSGdVcdnYD9hfdY1ClGcTiIFL3k@z> On Fri, Oct 05, 2018 at 02:26:11AM +1000, Aleksa Sarai wrote: > On 2018-09-29, Jann Horn wrote: > > You attempt to open "C/../../etc/passwd" under the root "/A/B". > > Something else concurrently moves /A/B/C to /A/C. This can result in > > the following: > > > > 1. You start the path walk and reach /A/B/C. > > 2. The other process moves /A/B/C to /A/C. Your path walk is now at /A/C. > > 3. Your path walk follows the first ".." up into /A. This is outside > > the process root, but you never actually encountered the process root, > > so you don't notice. > > 4. Your path walk follows the second ".." up to /. Again, this is > > outside the process root, but you don't notice. > > 5. Your path walk walks down to /etc/passwd, and the open completes > > successfully. You now have an fd pointing outside your chroot. > > I've been playing with this and I have the following patch, which > according to my testing protects against attacks where ".." skips over > nd->root. It abuses __d_path to figure out if nd->path can be resolved > from nd->root (obviously a proper version of this patch would refactor > __d_path so it could be used like this -- and would not return > -EMULTIHOP). > > I've also attached my reproducer. With it, I was seeing fairly constant > breakouts before this patch and after it I didn't see a single breakout > after running it overnight. Obviously this is not conclusive, but I'm > hoping that it can show what my idea for protecting against ".." was. > > Does this patch make sense? Or is there something wrong with it that I'm > not seeing? Interesting. Apart from the abuse of __d_path() :) the question I'd have is whether this just minimizes the race window or if you can provide a sound argument that this actually can't happen anymore with this patch. > > --8<------------------------------------------------------------------- > > There is a fairly easy-to-exploit race condition with chroot(2) (and > thus by extension AT_THIS_ROOT and AT_BENEATH) where a rename(2) of a > path can be used to "skip over" nd->root and thus escape to the > filesystem above nd->root. > > thread1 [attacker]: > for (;;) > renameat2(AT_FDCWD, "/a/b/c", AT_FDCWD, "/a/d", RENAME_EXCHANGE); > thread2 [victim]: > for (;;) > openat(dirb, "b/c/../../etc/shadow", O_THISROOT); > > With fairly significant regularity, thread2 will resolve to > "/etc/shadow" rather than "/a/b/etc/shadow". With this patch, such cases > will be detected during ".." resolution (which is the weak point of > chroot(2) -- since walking *into* a subdirectory tautologically cannot > result in you walking *outside* nd->root). > > The use of __d_path here might seem suspect, however we don't mind if a > path is moved from within the chroot to outside the chroot and we > incorrectly decide it is safe (because at that point we are still within > the set of files which were accessible at the beginning of resolution). > However, we can fail resolution on the next path component if it remains > outside of the root. A path which has always been outside nd->root > during resolution will never be resolveable from nd->root and thus will > always be blocked. > > DO NOT MERGE: Currently this code returns -EMULTIHOP in this case, > purely as a debugging measure (so that you can see that > the protection actually does something). Obviously in the > proper patch this will return -EXDEV. > > Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai > --- > fs/namei.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index 6f995e6de6b1..c8349693d47b 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ > * The new code replaces the old recursive symlink resolution with > * an iterative one (in case of non-nested symlink chains). It does > * this with calls to _follow_link(). > - * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now > - * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all > + * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now > + * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all > * the special cases of the former code. > * > * With the new dcache, the pathname is stored at each inode, at least as > @@ -1375,6 +1375,20 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd) > return -EXDEV; > break; > } > + if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT))) { > + char *pathbuf, *pathptr; > + > + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC); > + if (!pathbuf) > + return -ECHILD; > + pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX); > + kfree(pathbuf); > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) { > + if (!pathptr) > + pathptr = ERR_PTR(-EMULTIHOP); > + return PTR_ERR(pathptr); > + } > + } > if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) { > struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry; > struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent; > @@ -1510,6 +1524,20 @@ static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd) > return -EXDEV; > break; > } > + if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT))) { > + char *pathbuf, *pathptr; > + > + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!pathbuf) > + return -ENOMEM; > + pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX); > + kfree(pathbuf); > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) { > + if (!pathptr) > + pathptr = ERR_PTR(-EMULTIHOP); > + return PTR_ERR(pathptr); > + } > + } > if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) { > int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path); > if (ret) > -- > 2.19.0 > > -- > Aleksa Sarai > Senior Software Engineer (Containers) > SUSE Linux GmbH >