linux-arch.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 18:34:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201106173410.GG14914@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201012153850.26996-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 08:38:25AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> +[1] Overview
> +============
> +
> +Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is an Intel processor feature
> +that provides protection against return/jump-oriented programming (ROP)
> +attacks.  It can be set up to protect both applications and the kernel.
> +Only user-mode protection is implemented in the 64-bit kernel, including
> +support for running legacy 32-bit applications.
> +
> +CET introduces Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking.  Shadow stack is
> +a secondary stack allocated from memory and cannot be directly modified by
> +applications.  When executing a CALL, the processor pushes the return
				       ^
				    . .. instruction ...


> +address to both the normal stack and the shadow stack.  Upon function
> +return, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the
> +normal stack copy.  If the two differ, the processor raises a control-
> +protection fault.  Indirect branch tracking verifies indirect CALL/JMP
> +targets are intended as marked by the compiler with 'ENDBR' opcodes.
> +
> +There are two kernel configuration options:
> +
> +    X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER, and
> +    X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
> +
> +These need to be enabled to build a CET-enabled kernel, and Binutils v2.31
> +and GCC v8.1 or later are required to build a CET kernel.  To build a CET-
> +enabled application, GLIBC v2.28 or later is also required.
> +
> +There are two command-line options for disabling CET features::
> +
> +    no_user_shstk - disables user shadow stack, and
> +    no_user_ibt   - disables user indirect branch tracking.
> +
> +At run time, /proc/cpuinfo shows CET features if the processor supports
> +CET.
> +
> +[2] Application Enabling
> +========================
> +
> +An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be
> +verified from the following command output, in the NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0
> +field:
> +
> +    readelf -n <application>

Can be verified how? What does it say for a CET-enabled executable? Put
it here in the doc pls.

> +
> +If an application supports CET and is statically linked, it will run with
> +CET protection.  If the application needs any shared libraries, the loader
> +checks all dependencies and enables CET when all requirements are met.
> +
> +[3] Backward Compatibility
> +==========================
> +
> +GLIBC provides a few tunables for backward compatibility.
> +
> +GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.hwcaps=-SHSTK,-IBT
> +    Turn off SHSTK/IBT for the current shell.

For the current shell? How?

You mean, you execute the kernel shell with that variable set? So you
set this variable in any executable's env which links with glibc in
order to disable CET?

In any case, this needs clarification.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-06 17:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-12 15:38 [PATCH v14 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-06 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2020-11-06 18:16     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-06 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 18:32         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-06 18:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 19:48     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-06 20:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 20:14         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 19:58   ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2020-10-12 20:48     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 19/26] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-10-09 18:32 [PATCH v14 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-09 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20201106173410.GG14914@zn.tnic \
    --to=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=esyr@redhat.com \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
    --cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=pengfei.xu@intel.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com \
    --cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).