From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] arm64: Enable BTI for main executable as well as the interpreter
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 17:51:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210603165134.GF4257@sirena.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210603154034.GH4187@arm.com>
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On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 04:40:35PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> Do we know how libcs will detect that they don't need to do the
> mprotect() calls? Do we need a detection mechanism at all?
> Ignoring certain errors from mprotect() when ld.so is trying to set
> PROT_BTI on the main executable's code pages is probably a reasonable,
> backwards-compatible compromise here, but it seems a bit wasteful.
I think the theory was that they would just do the mprotect() calls and
ignore any errors as they currently do, or declare that they depend on a
new enough kernel version I guess (not an option for glibc but might be
for others which didn't do BTI yet).
> > flexibility userspace has to disable BTI but it is expected that for cases
> > where there are problems which require BTI to be disabled it is more likely
> > that it will need to be disabled on a system level.
> There's no flexibility impact unless MemoryDenyWriteExecute is in force,
> right?
Right, or some other mechanism that has the same effect.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-03 16:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-21 14:46 [PATCH v1 0/2] arm64: Enable BTI for the executable as well as the interpreter Mark Brown
2021-05-21 14:46 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] elf: Allow architectures to parse properties on the main executable Mark Brown
2021-06-03 15:40 ` Dave Martin
2021-06-03 18:52 ` Mark Brown
2021-05-21 14:46 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] arm64: Enable BTI for main executable as well as the interpreter Mark Brown
2021-06-03 15:40 ` Dave Martin
2021-06-03 16:51 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2021-06-03 18:04 ` Catalin Marinas
2021-06-07 11:25 ` Dave Martin
2021-06-07 18:12 ` Catalin Marinas
2021-06-08 11:33 ` Mark Brown
2021-06-08 15:19 ` Dave Martin
2021-06-08 15:42 ` Jeremy Linton
2021-06-10 10:33 ` Dave Martin
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