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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v29 26/32] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 11:11:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210820181201.31490-27-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210820181201.31490-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and
the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within
the same shadow stack.  This is distinctively different from other pointers
on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code area.

The restore token can be used as an extra protection for signal handling.
To deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put the token
and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack.  In sigreturn, verify
the token and restore from it the shadow stack pointer.

Introduce token setup and verify routines.  Also introduce WRUSS, which is
a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack.  It is
used to construct user signal stack as described above.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v29:
- Update comments for the use of get_xsave_addr().

v28:
- Add comments for get_xsave_addr().

v27:
- For shstk_check_rstor_token(), instead of an input param, use current
  shadow stack pointer.
- In response to comments, fix/simplify a few syntax/format issues.

v25:
- Update inline assembly syntax, use %[].
- Change token address from (unsigned long) to (u64/u32 __user *).
- Change -EPERM to -EFAULT.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h           |   7 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h |  30 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c              | 140 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 177 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 4314a41ab3c9..aa533700ba31 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
 			     unsigned long stack_size);
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
 void shstk_disable(void);
+int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long restorer,
+			    unsigned long *new_ssp);
+int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long *new_ssp);
 #else
 static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
 static inline int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -28,6 +31,10 @@ static inline int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
 					   unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
 static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
+static inline int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long restorer,
+					  unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32,
+					  unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index f3fbb84ff8a7..c6df3773b44c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -222,6 +222,36 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
 		: [pax] "a" (p));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+static inline int write_user_shstk_32(u32 __user *addr, u32 val)
+{
+	if (WARN_ONCE(!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) &&
+		      !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_X32),
+		      "%s used but not supported.\n", __func__)) {
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %[val], (%[addr])\n"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+			  :: [addr] "r" (addr), [val] "r" (val)
+			  :: fail);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static inline int write_user_shstk_64(u64 __user *addr, u64 val)
+{
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %[val], (%[addr])\n"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+			  :: [addr] "r" (addr), [val] "r" (val)
+			  :: fail);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
 #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
 
 static inline void serialize(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 7c1ca2476a5e..548d0552f9b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
 #include <asm/cet.h>
+#include <asm/special_insns.h>
 
 static void start_update_msrs(void)
 {
@@ -193,3 +194,142 @@ void shstk_disable(void)
 
 	shstk_free(current);
 }
+
+static unsigned long get_user_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+	struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
+	unsigned long ssp = 0;
+
+	fpregs_lock();
+
+	if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	} else {
+		struct cet_user_state *p;
+
+		/*
+		 * When !fpregs_state_valid() and get_xsave_addr() returns
+		 * null, XFEAUTRE_CET_USER is in init state.  Shadow stack
+		 * pointer is null in this case, so return zero.  This can
+		 * happen when shadow stack is enabled, but its xstates in
+		 * memory is corrupted.
+		 */
+		p = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+		if (p)
+			ssp = p->user_ssp;
+	}
+
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return ssp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.  A token is always 8-byte
+ * and aligned to 8.
+ */
+static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
+			       unsigned long *token_addr)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	/* Aligned to 8 is aligned to 4, so test 8 first */
+	if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	addr = ALIGN_DOWN(ssp, 8) - 8;
+
+	/* Is the token for 64-bit? */
+	if (!ia32)
+		ssp |= BIT(0);
+
+	if (write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)addr, (u64)ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	*token_addr = addr;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on shadow stack, and then push the user-mode
+ * function return address.
+ */
+int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ret_addr,
+			    unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &current->thread.shstk;
+	unsigned long ssp, token_addr;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!shstk->size)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!ret_addr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+	if (!ssp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = create_rstor_token(ia32, ssp, &token_addr);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (ia32) {
+		ssp = token_addr - sizeof(u32);
+		err = write_user_shstk_32((u32 __user *)ssp, (u32)ret_addr);
+	} else {
+		ssp = token_addr - sizeof(u64);
+		err = write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)ret_addr);
+	}
+
+	if (!err)
+		*new_ssp = ssp;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify token_addr points to a valid token, and then set *new_ssp
+ * according to the token.
+ */
+int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool proc32, unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long token_addr;
+	unsigned long token;
+	bool shstk32;
+
+	token_addr = get_user_shstk_addr();
+
+	if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)token_addr))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Is mode flag correct? */
+	shstk32 = !(token & BIT(0));
+	if (proc32 ^ shstk32)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Is busy flag set? */
+	if (token & BIT(1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Mask out flags */
+	token &= ~3UL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore address aligned?
+	 */
+	if ((!proc32 && !IS_ALIGNED(token, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(token, 4))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Token placed properly?
+	 */
+	if (((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != token_addr) || token >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*new_ssp = token;
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-20 18:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-20 18:11 [PATCH v29 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 01/32] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 02/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 03/32] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 04/32] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 05/32] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 06/32] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 07/32] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 08/32] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 09/32] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-21 19:20   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-08-22  2:59     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 10/32] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 11/32] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 12/32] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-26 10:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 13/32] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 14/32] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 15/32] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-26 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 16/32] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 17/32] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 18/32] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 19/32] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 20/32] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 21/32] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 22/32] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 23/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-26 16:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:10     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-27 18:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:37         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-27 18:46           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 20:25         ` Dave Hansen
2021-09-01 13:00           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-01 15:24             ` Dave Hansen
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 24/32] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 25/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-26 16:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-26 17:22     ` H.J. Lu
2021-08-26 17:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-26 17:33         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-26 17:25     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-20 18:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-08-26 17:21   ` [PATCH v29 26/32] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 27/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 28/32] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 29/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:11 ` [PATCH v29 30/32] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:12 ` [PATCH v29 31/32] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-20 18:12 ` [PATCH v29 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu

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