From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter
Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 22:38:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <638db305-cfef-4391-90bf-458f50c4612f@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLmQQd4e=B3YsiEoRVih2m889ia2tnzu5r8bqcms2sOqQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 10/03/2018 10:26 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 6:39 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>> On 10/02/2018 07:54 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 2, 2018 at 4:46 PM, John Johansen
>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 10/02/2018 04:06 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the current proposal (in the other thread) is likely the
>>>>> sanest approach:
>>>>>
>>>>> - Drop CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
>>>>> - Drop CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
>>>>> - All enabled LSMs are listed at build-time in CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hrrmmm isn't this a Kconfig selectable list, with each built-in LSM
>>>> available to be enabled by default at boot.
>>>
>>>
>>> That's not how I have it currently. It's a comma-separated a string,
>>> including the reserved name "all". The default would just be
>>> "CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE=all". Casey and I wanted this to have a way to
>>> capture new LSMs by default at build-time.
>>>
>>>>> - Boot time enabling for selinux= and apparmor= remain
>>>>> - lsm.enable= is explicit: overrides above and omissions are disabled
>>>>
>>>> wfm
>>>
>>>
>>> Okay, this is closer to v3 than v4. Paul or Stephen, how do you feel
>>> about losing the SELinux bootparam CONFIG? (i.e. CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE
>>> would be replacing its functionality.)
>>
>>
>> I'd like to know how distro kernel maintainers feel about it. They would
>> need to understand that if they were previously setting
>> CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE to 0 and want to preserve that
>> behavior, then they must set CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE explicitly to a list of
>> security modules (that does not include selinux, of course). In practice,
>
> That's not how it would be done. See below...
>
>> this means that even the distros that choose to build all security modules
>> into their kernels must explicitly set CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE to a specific list
>> of security modules. So no one would use "all" in practice.
>
> This is why I had originally wanted to do CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE. Right
> now, distro kernel maintainers have two ways to trigger enablement:
> via the SELinux and AppArmor BOOTPARAM_VALUE _and_ DEFAULT_SECURITY
> (which is an implicit "enable" for Smack or TOMOYO). All the minors
> are on-if-built. So, really, the BOOTPARAM_VALUEs were only used for
> disabling. Distros would build what they wanted, then use
> DEFAULT_SECURITY for their desired major, and if their
> DEFAULT_SECURITY wasn't SELinux or AppArmor, they'd _also_ have to set
> those BOOTPARAM_VALUEs to 0.
>
> The goal of the series is to split this more cleanly between "enable"
> and "order": the way to handle the LSMs is to enable _everything_ and
> then set the desired init order: the first exclusive "wins". So I *do*
> think the default would be CONFIG_LSM_ENALBE=all, since it's
> CONFIG_LSM_ORDER= that effectively replaces CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY.
>
but distinct of first exclusive (major) will likely be going away
once full lsm stacking land.
> Either a distro builds a very specific subset of LSMs, or they build
> in all LSMs (for the user to choose from). In both cases, they set an
> explicit order, which defines which exclusive LSM get selected.
>
and when lsm stacking lands, that exlusive LSM goes away.
> AppArmor wants to drop BOOTPARAM_VALUE, which make sense, since it's
> even now redundant to CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY. I think it makes sense
> to drop SELinux's BOOTPARAM_VALUE too. The current way to "enable" a
> major LSM is via CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY. No sane distro kernel is
> going to set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY=selinux and
> CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=0. If you wanted no major LSM
> (but still build them all in), you'd set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="".
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-04 5:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 184+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-02 0:54 [PATCH security-next v4 00/32] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 01/32] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 02/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 03/32] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 04/32] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:14 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:14 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 05/32] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 06/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:15 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:15 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 07/32] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:16 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:16 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 08/32] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 09/32] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 10/32] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:20 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:20 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 11/32] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 12/32] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 13/32] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:06 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 1:06 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:47 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 4:47 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 14/32] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 15/32] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 16/32] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 17/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 18/32] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 19/32] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 20/32] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 21/32] LSM: Finalize centralized LSM enabling logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:18 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 1:18 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 4:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 22/32] apparmor: Remove boot parameter Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 12:12 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-02 12:12 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-02 13:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 13:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 14:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 14:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 16:33 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-02 16:33 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-02 16:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 16:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 18:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 18:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 19:47 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 19:47 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:11 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 21:11 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 22:06 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 22:06 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 23:06 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:06 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 0:05 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 0:05 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 13:15 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 13:15 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 19:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 19:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-04 5:38 ` John Johansen [this message]
2018-10-04 5:38 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 16:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 14:25 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-08 14:25 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-03 18:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 18:28 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:28 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 20:10 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:10 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:36 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:36 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:19 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 21:19 ` James Morris
2018-10-04 5:56 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 5:56 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 16:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 17:40 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-04 17:40 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-04 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:34 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 21:34 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 23:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-03 23:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-04 0:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 0:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 6:22 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 6:22 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 6:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 6:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 17:49 ` James Morris
2018-10-04 17:49 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05 4:58 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 4:58 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:29 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:29 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:28 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:28 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 16:34 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 16:34 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 24/32] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 25/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 26/32] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 27/32] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 28/32] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 29/32] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 30/32] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 31/32] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 32/32] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` Kees Cook
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