From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Kees Cook Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 13:36:09 -0700 Message-ID: References: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20181002005505.6112-24-keescook@chromium.org> <785ef6a9-ae46-3533-0348-74bcf6f10928@tycho.nsa.gov> <809f1cfd-077b-ee58-51ba-b22daf46d12b@tycho.nsa.gov> <5955f5ce-b803-4f58-8b07-54c291e33da5@canonical.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: James Morris Cc: John Johansen , Jordan Glover , Stephen Smalley , Paul Moore , Casey Schaufler , Tetsuo Handa , "Schaufler, Casey" , linux-security-module , Jonathan Corbet , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , linux-arch , LKML List-Id: linux-arch.vger.kernel.org On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 1:10 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:28 AM, James Morris wrote: >> On Wed, 3 Oct 2018, Kees Cook wrote: >> >>> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:17 AM, James Morris wrote: >>> > On Tue, 2 Oct 2018, John Johansen wrote: >>> >> To me a list like >>> >> lsm.enable=X,Y,Z >>> > >>> > What about even simpler: >>> > >>> > lsm=selinux,!apparmor,yama >>> >>> We're going to have lsm.order=, so I'd like to keep it with a dot >>> separator (this makes it more like module parameters, too). You want >>> to mix enable/disable in the same string? That implies you'd want >>> implicit enabling (i.e. it complements the builtin enabling), which is >>> opposite from what John wanted. >>> >> >> Why can't this be the order as well? > > That was covered extensively in the earlier threads. It boils down to > making sure we do not create a pattern of leaving LSMs disabled by > default when they are added to the kernel. The v1 series used > security= like this: > > + security= [SECURITY] An ordered comma-separated list of > + security modules to attempt to enable at boot. If > + this boot parameter is not specified, only the > + security modules asking for initialization will be > + enabled (see CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY). Duplicate > + or invalid security modules will be ignored. The > + capability module is always loaded first, without > + regard to this parameter. > > This meant booting "security=apparmor" would disable all the other > LSMs, which wasn't friendly at all. So "security=" was left alone (to > leave it to only select the "major" LSM: all major LSMs not matching > "security=" would be disabled). So I proposed "lsm.order=" to specify > the order things were going to be initialized in, but to avoid kernels > booting with newly added LSMs forced-off due to not being listed in > "lsm.order=", it had to have implicit fall-back for unlisted LSMs. > (i.e. anything missing from lsm.order would then follow their order in > CONFIG_LSM_ORDER, and anything missing there would fall back to > link-time ordering.) However, then the objection was raised that this > didn't provide a way to explicitly disable an LSM. So I proposed > lsm.enable/disable, and John argued for CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE over > CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE. I still think we should have all built LSMs enabled by default, with CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE available to turn stuff off. CONFIG_LSM_ORDER declares their order, "lsm.order=" works as mentioned, and "lsm.enable/disable=" make changes to what's enabled. (This would be most like the v3 series, swapping CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE for CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE.) It gives us centralized ordering and centralized disabling. Distros wanting specific LSMs are already building them, so _also_ adding them to CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE seems redundant to me. Distros wanting all the LSMs just want to declare the order of initialization, and maybe add some to CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE some day, so they use CONFIG_LSM_ORDER. I should also note that I don't want to leave CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in, since it's just a way to disable all the other majors. I don't like this because it will force LSMs to be disabled that don't need to be once blob-sharing lands. The whole point of this series is to get us away from fixed ordering and thinking about "major" vs "minor" and towards "exclusive" or not, where we can continue to slowly chip away at exclusivity without breaking anything. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-yw1-f68.google.com ([209.85.161.68]:40374 "EHLO mail-yw1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727109AbeJDD0M (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Oct 2018 23:26:12 -0400 Received: by mail-yw1-f68.google.com with SMTP id l79-v6so2862352ywc.7 for ; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 13:36:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-yb1-f170.google.com (mail-yb1-f170.google.com. [209.85.219.170]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id x64-v6sm2059657ywx.103.2018.10.03.13.36.10 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 03 Oct 2018 13:36:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yb1-f170.google.com with SMTP id 5-v6so2982214ybf.3 for ; Wed, 03 Oct 2018 13:36:10 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20181002005505.6112-24-keescook@chromium.org> <785ef6a9-ae46-3533-0348-74bcf6f10928@tycho.nsa.gov> <809f1cfd-077b-ee58-51ba-b22daf46d12b@tycho.nsa.gov> <5955f5ce-b803-4f58-8b07-54c291e33da5@canonical.com> From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 13:36:09 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: James Morris Cc: John Johansen , Jordan Glover , Stephen Smalley , Paul Moore , Casey Schaufler , Tetsuo Handa , "Schaufler, Casey" , linux-security-module , Jonathan Corbet , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , linux-arch , LKML Message-ID: <20181003203609._l-cszrQgXeY8WnKJlYdSr-eGcBXsrHBN6hX9OBAuME@z> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 1:10 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:28 AM, James Morris wrote: >> On Wed, 3 Oct 2018, Kees Cook wrote: >> >>> On Wed, Oct 3, 2018 at 11:17 AM, James Morris wrote: >>> > On Tue, 2 Oct 2018, John Johansen wrote: >>> >> To me a list like >>> >> lsm.enable=X,Y,Z >>> > >>> > What about even simpler: >>> > >>> > lsm=selinux,!apparmor,yama >>> >>> We're going to have lsm.order=, so I'd like to keep it with a dot >>> separator (this makes it more like module parameters, too). You want >>> to mix enable/disable in the same string? That implies you'd want >>> implicit enabling (i.e. it complements the builtin enabling), which is >>> opposite from what John wanted. >>> >> >> Why can't this be the order as well? > > That was covered extensively in the earlier threads. It boils down to > making sure we do not create a pattern of leaving LSMs disabled by > default when they are added to the kernel. The v1 series used > security= like this: > > + security= [SECURITY] An ordered comma-separated list of > + security modules to attempt to enable at boot. If > + this boot parameter is not specified, only the > + security modules asking for initialization will be > + enabled (see CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY). Duplicate > + or invalid security modules will be ignored. The > + capability module is always loaded first, without > + regard to this parameter. > > This meant booting "security=apparmor" would disable all the other > LSMs, which wasn't friendly at all. So "security=" was left alone (to > leave it to only select the "major" LSM: all major LSMs not matching > "security=" would be disabled). So I proposed "lsm.order=" to specify > the order things were going to be initialized in, but to avoid kernels > booting with newly added LSMs forced-off due to not being listed in > "lsm.order=", it had to have implicit fall-back for unlisted LSMs. > (i.e. anything missing from lsm.order would then follow their order in > CONFIG_LSM_ORDER, and anything missing there would fall back to > link-time ordering.) However, then the objection was raised that this > didn't provide a way to explicitly disable an LSM. So I proposed > lsm.enable/disable, and John argued for CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE over > CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE. I still think we should have all built LSMs enabled by default, with CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE available to turn stuff off. CONFIG_LSM_ORDER declares their order, "lsm.order=" works as mentioned, and "lsm.enable/disable=" make changes to what's enabled. (This would be most like the v3 series, swapping CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE for CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE.) It gives us centralized ordering and centralized disabling. Distros wanting specific LSMs are already building them, so _also_ adding them to CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE seems redundant to me. Distros wanting all the LSMs just want to declare the order of initialization, and maybe add some to CONFIG_LSM_DISABLE some day, so they use CONFIG_LSM_ORDER. I should also note that I don't want to leave CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in, since it's just a way to disable all the other majors. I don't like this because it will force LSMs to be disabled that don't need to be once blob-sharing lands. The whole point of this series is to get us away from fixed ordering and thinking about "major" vs "minor" and towards "exclusive" or not, where we can continue to slowly chip away at exclusivity without breaking anything. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security