From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 10:42:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWhdM4NOhvzhNyChV9FaiBTjrQwzN+neMnY0FtHDforZQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ac8da604-3dff-ddb2-f530-2a256da3618d@intel.com>
On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 12:09 PM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 10/1/2020 10:26 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 1, 2020 at 9:51 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 9/30/2020 6:10 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 6:01 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 4:44 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> [...]
> >>
> >>>>>>>>> From 09803e66dca38d7784e32687d0693550948199ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> >>>>>>>>> From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> >>>>>>>>> Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 14:15:38 -0800
> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and
> >>>>>>>>> Indirect Branch
> >>>>>>>>> Tracking for vsyscall emulation
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Vsyscall entry points are effectively branch targets. Mark them with
> >>>>>>>>> ENDBR64 opcodes. When emulating the RET instruction, unwind shadow stack
> >>>>>>>>> and reset IBT state machine.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>
> [...]
>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> For what it's worth, I think there is an alternative. If you all
> >>>>>>> (userspace people, etc) can come up with a credible way for a user
> >>>>>>> program to statically declare that it doesn't need vsyscalls, then we
> >>>>>>> could make SHSTK depend on *that*, and we could avoid this mess. This
> >>>>>>> breaks orthogonality, but it's probably a decent outcome.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Would an arch_prctl(DISABLE_VSYSCALL) work? The kernel then sets a
> >>>>>> thread flag, and in emulate_vsyscall(), checks the flag.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> When CET is enabled, ld-linux will do DISABLE_VSYSCALL.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> How is that?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Backwards, no? Presumably vsyscall needs to be disabled before or
> >>>>> concurrently with CET being enabled, not after.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I think the solution of making vsyscall emulation work correctly with
> >>>>> CET is going to be better and possibly more straightforward.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> We can do
> >>>>
> >>>> 1. Add ARCH_X86_DISABLE_VSYSCALL to disable the vsyscall page.
> >>>> 2. If CPU supports CET and the program is CET enabled:
> >>>> a. Disable the vsyscall page.
> >>>> b. Pass control to user.
> >>>> c. Enable the vsyscall page when ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE is called.
> >>>>
> >>>> So when control is passed from kernel to user, the vsyscall page is
> >>>> disabled if the program
> >>>> is CET enabled.
> >>>
> >>> Let me say this one more time:
> >>>
> >>> If we have a per-process vsyscall disable control and a per-process
> >>> CET control, we are going to keep those settings orthogonal. I'm
> >>> willing to entertain an option in which enabling SHSTK without also
> >>> disabling vsyscalls is disallowed, We are *not* going to have any CET
> >>> flags magically disable vsyscalls, though, and we are not going to
> >>> have a situation where disabling vsyscalls on process startup requires
> >>> enabling SHSTK.
> >>>
> >>> Any possible static vsyscall controls (and CET controls, for that
> >>> matter) also need to come with some explanation of whether they are
> >>> properties set on the ELF loader, the ELF program being loaded, or
> >>> both. And this explanation needs to cover what happens when old
> >>> binaries link against new libc versions and vice versa. A new
> >>> CET-enabled binary linked against old libc running on a new kernel
> >>> that is expected to work on a non-CET CPU MUST work on a CET CPU, too.
> >>>
> >>> Right now, literally the only thing preventing vsyscall emulation from
> >>> coexisting with SHSTK is that the implementation eeds work.
> >>>
> >>> So your proposal is rejected. Sorry.
> >>>
> >> I think, even with shadow stack/ibt enabled, we can still allow XONLY
> >> without too much mess.
> >>
> >> What about this?
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Yu-cheng
> >>
> >> ======
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> >> b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> >> index 8b0b32ac7791..d39da0a15521 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> >> @@ -48,16 +48,16 @@
> >> static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode __ro_after_init =
> >> #ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
> >> NONE;
> >> -#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY)
> >> +#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY) || defined(CONFIG_X86_CET)
> >> XONLY;
> >> -#else
> >> +#else
> >> EMULATE;
> >> #endif
> >
> > I don't get it.
> >
> > First, you can't do any of this based on config -- it must be runtime.
> >
> > Second, and more importantly, I don't see how XONLY helps at all. The
> > (non-executable) text that's exposed to user code in EMULATE mode is
> > trivial to get right with CET -- your code already handles it. It's
> > the emulation code (that runs identically in EMULATE and XONLY mode)
> > that's tricky.
> >
>
> Hi,
>
> There has been some ambiguity in my previous proposals. To make things
> clear, I created a patch for arch_prctl(VSYSCALL_CTL), which controls
> the TIF_VSYSCALL_DISABLE flag. It is entirely orthogonal to shadow
> stack or IBT. On top of the patch, we can do SET_PERSONALITY2() to
> disable vsyscall, e.g.
NAK. Let me try explaining again.
>
> ======
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> index 0e1be2a13359..c730ff00bc62 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
> @@ -394,6 +394,19 @@ struct arch_elf_state {
> .gnu_property = 0, \
> }
>
> +#define SET_PERSONALITY2(ex, state) \
> +do { \
> + unsigned int has_cet; \
> + \
> + has_cet = GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK | \
> + GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT; \
> + \
> + if ((state)->gnu_property & has_cet) \
> + set_thread_flag(TIF_VSYSCALL_DISABLE); \
> + \
> + SET_PERSONALITY(ex); \
> +} while (0)
> +
This is not what "orthogonal" means. If the bits were orthogonal, the
logic would be:
if (gnu_property & DISABLE_VSYSCALL)
disable vsyscall;
if (gnu_property & SHSTK)
enable SHSTK;
if (gnu_property & IBT);
enable IBT;
and, if necessarily (although I still think it would be preferable not
to do this):
if ((gnu_property & (DISABLE_VSYSCALL | SHSTK)) == SHSTK)
return -EINVAL;
As far as I'm concerned, you have two choices:
a) Make SHSTK work *correctly* with vsyscall emulation.
b) Add a high quality mechanism to disable vsyscall emulation and make
SHSTK depend on that.
As far as I'm concerned, (a) is preferable. Ideally we'd get (a)
*and* a high quality vsyscall emulation disable mechanism with no
dependencies.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> index 44c33103a955..fe8f3db6d21b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> @@ -127,6 +127,9 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
> long ret;
> unsigned long orig_dx;
>
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_VSYSCALL_DISABLE))
> + return false;
> +
This needs to be per-mm, not per-thread. There's a patch floating
around that gets us about a quarter of the way there. I'm not
convinced that CET should wait for this to finish.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-09 17:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-25 14:57 [PATCH v13 0/8] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:57 ` [PATCH v13 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:57 ` [PATCH v13 2/8] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:57 ` [PATCH v13 3/8] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:58 ` [PATCH v13 4/8] x86/cet/ibt: ELF header parsing " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:58 ` [PATCH v13 5/8] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:58 ` [PATCH v13 6/8] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:58 ` [PATCH v13 7/8] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 16:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-25 16:24 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-25 14:58 ` [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 16:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-25 16:47 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-25 16:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-28 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-28 17:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-28 19:04 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-29 18:37 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-29 19:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-29 20:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-30 22:33 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-30 23:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-01 1:00 ` H.J. Lu
2020-10-01 1:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-01 1:21 ` H.J. Lu
2020-10-01 16:51 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-01 17:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-06 19:09 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-09 17:42 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
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